TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- 11TH PLENARY SESSION MINUTES 7-9 DECEMBER 1994

ELEVENTH PLENARY SESSION U.S.-RUSSIAN JOINT COMMISSION ON POWS/MIAS 7-9 DECEMBER 1994

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Eleventh Plenary Session U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POWs/MIAs Opening Plenary Session December 7, 1994 Washington, D.C.

Ambassador Toon: As is customary, the guest will be the first chairman and I will be second. I turn the floor over to you, General.

General Volkogonov: In the name of the Russian Side of the Commission, I'm very happy to be able to greet you at the present meeting of our Joint Commission here in Washington. In view of Ambassador Toon's offer for me to speak first, I make the following proposal. First, the two Co-Chairmen, Ambassador Toon and I, will make their presentations, followed by a break. Then the chairmen of the sections will make their presentations describing what they plan to present at the meetings. Then there will be questions and perhaps some statements for consideration, and that will be the end of our session. If you agree, then let's begin. Since I hear no objections, I surmise that this is acceptable. With your permission, Ambassador, I'll go first.

In several days it will be three years since the time that 92 U.S. senators signed a letter to President Yeltsin to do everything possible to determine the fate of U.S. citizens who may have gone missing in the former Soviet Union. This very possibility and the possibility of such a letter bespeaks the fact that major changes have taken place in the relations between our two countries. I myself remember only too well when President Boris Yeltsin gave the order to do everything possible in order to make known everything related to this problem. I remember him saying that nothing at all should remain unknown to our American colleagues. As we know, the work of the Commission gradually went beyond the framework of its narrow function and became a very noble factor in increasing mutual trust between our two countries. In a short time it gained quite an international authority, which is demonstrated by the fact that many organizations and individuals are turning to us now with requests for humanitarian assistance in this area.

Moreover, I would like to say that the high moral interests of our American colleagues have set the public in Russia into motion. One can now hear voices saying that it is necessary to do everything possible to find out what happened to Russian military personnel who disappeared during the conflicts and wars in the past number of years. For the first time in the last 70 years the government has turned to humanitarian problems. It is necessary that everyone have not only a right to life, but a right to be remembered.

Very recently Senator Smith, one of the initiators of this letter from 92 senators, turned again to the President of Russia. I was present when the President of Russia was reading the letter written by Senator Smith.As he did in the past, President Yeltsin asserted his intention to do everything possible to get at the

facts. I would like to emphasize that this bespeaks the faithfulness of the leadership of democratic Russia to humanitarian principles and absolute acknowledgement of the right of every human being to life and to memory. Our plenary session is taking place at a time when it is necessary to note the following:

First, the 50th anniversary of our common victory is drawing close. That is when we, in a unified effort, were victorious over one form of totalitarianism, namely fascism. Therefore, I believe that on May 9, 1995, we should underline the work achieved in relation to World War II. I'd like to mention that today is a sad day - the 7th of December, the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

Secondly, for the Russian Side, the work of the Commission is taking place during a rather complicated period. Russia is trying to free itself from the multi-layered effect of totalitarianism and is attempting to place itself on the civilized tracks of development. The process turned out to be much more complicated than one could have imagined. I can tell you that not everyone in our country is very enthusiastic about the work of our Commission.

Thirdly, the general, positive nature of our Commission makes it possible to have a positive influence on our society. As far as this is the second plenary session to be conducted in Washington, we should draw our attention to the following:

My Russian colleagues feel that we should go along the path of deepening our information and making it more specific. Some of the findings since our last meeting make it possible for us to hope that we have taken some very specific steps ahead. How does the Russian Side view the work done in the past?

First, I would like to note the successful completion of the work done in finding the body of Captain Dunham on Yuri Island in the Kurils, thanks to two lengthy joint expeditions headed by General Volkov and Colonel Semenec. As a result of this work, which was not at all simple, we were able to find the remains of a human being who turned out to be a victim of the Cold War on a little piece of forsaken land in the ocean. We can say that the expedition was completed just in time, because after the earthquake and *tsunami* that took place, one could hardly be expected to do any work there.

During the last months, several trips were made by expert groups of the Joint Commission. In a number of cases, one could find moments of detective-type work. For example, one of the witnesses of the Cold War, Panov, made a statement that a flyer had in fact been saved. We sought to verify this assertion empirically a number of ways. With great difficulty, we found the aviator who said that he saw the plane that was shot down by Panov. This pilot lives in the Crimea, and we met with him. He very definitely stated that he saw the plane crash and explode. We have a tape-recording of this interview.

We also were successful in determining what happened with the plane that was shot down on July 29, 1953, i.e., the plane whose crew included the father of Bruce Sanderson. After several months we were able to establish the name of the pilot, who, together with Captain Rybakov, shot this plane down. We were not able to contact him previously because in the documents the last name of the co-pilot was distorted. Records everywhere listed him as "Yablonsky," but, in reality, his name was "Yablonovsky." We organized a meeting with him, and we also have a tape-recording of this interview. Unfortunately, one can deduce from this interview that the crew of this plane had neither the time nor the opportunity to eject. Apparently, the guns that were aboard the plane exploded, and the plane fell apart in the air. We are prepared to present a video-recording of the interview with this pilot to Mr. Sanderson.

I would like to say that we have completed the task which we have taken upon ourselves, namely, publishing information and photographs of Mr. Reynolds in a psychiatric journal. This is a purely scientific journal called the *Korsakovsky Journal*. It comes out four times a year. The editorial board promised that these photographs will be published in the first issue of 1995.

All the remaining time, we have continued working in the archives. On the Russian Side of the delegation there are some notable archivists, including Professor Korotkov, who is in charge of the Presidential Archives; Colonel Mukhin, who is in charge of the Military Archives; General Krayushkin, who is in charge of the Federal Counter- Intelligence Service Archives; and other members of the Commission who

have been working in other archives. In the Presidential Archives we found the materials from 1952. We have found 30 cases on American planes violating the former USSR's border. Of these 30, there were 5 cases where the U.S. planes were shot down. These documents are very exhaustive. They contain maps and charts that make it possible to elucidate these cases, which, up to this time, had not been very clear to us. In particular, I'm referring to the cases of 13 June 1952 and 7 October 1952. Included in these materials, we found something we didn't expect - reference to a number of American planes that participated in military operations in Korea and that flew over our military base in Port Arthur. One such episode is of special interest. An American F-86 was shot down in the area of *Bidze-do,* and the pilot ejected. The pilot survived, was handed over to the authorities in Port Arthur and was interrogated. We have the interrogation protocol. We were not able to follow up on the fate of this particular pilot. This particular material was found together with other materials from the interrogations of American flyers that was kept with the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. Why did this happen? We're trying to clear it up right now. On one hand, it is an enigma. On the other hand, it is proof of the fact that Soviet forces at times participated in interrogating American flyers shot down during the Korean War. We believe that the Korean War remains one of the most acute issues in our current work. We are not stopping our search on this topic.

I can tell you that together with Professor Korotkov, we were able to locate an erstwhile unknown stenographic report of a conversation. It was never published previously and was not communicated to anyone in the press. It was a conversation between Stalin with Chinese Premier Chou En- lai, who came to Moscow on an official visit, and also with Kim Il-sung, who came secretly to Moscow, and Commander of Chinese Forces in North Korea Forces Peng Teh-huai. The meeting took place in Moscow at the end of 1952. Stalin asked them to tell him how many American prisoners, or flyers, were in the hands of the colleagues in Korea and Northern China. Here we are faced with a strange circumstance: all three, that is, Chou En-lai, Kim Il-sung and Peng Teh-huai, gave different numbers. Peng Teh-huai spoke about 8,000 UN troops, not only American, but UN. The North Korean leader spoke of 4,416 foreigners, among whom were 300 American flyers. This bespeaks the fact that even those who fought together did not have the same figures on foreign prisoners which they held, in particular American prisoners. This is why I believe that it is impossible to establish an exact figure without the participation of the Koreans and Chinese. I will ask the Korean War Working Group Chairman to pass this [document] to the American Side.

The area in which it was possible to move ahead least of all is Vietnam. In response to a request from Senator Smith to the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, the President ordered me to do everything necessary to find out everything possible about this issue. This includes researching the GRU archives. You were handed a letter from General Ladygin of the GRU. This letter contains the reply to Senator Smith. In this connection, I'd like to say a few words about the document which you refer to as the "1205 document." I again assert that the document is an original. Why? I have studied exhaustively the mechanism of the way official Soviet bodies worked at that time. I don't know of any cases where intelligence organs reported false or distorted information to their superiors. Therefore, I insist that this document is real. On the other hand, we cannot vouch for the truth of the contents of this document because we cannot vouch for a report made to the Vietnamese [Communist] Party. General Ladygin describes in his remarks how this document came to Moscow. General Ladygin said that General Quang was a very competent official and reported directly to the Vietnamese Party. I'm speaking about this because some in the mass media have expressed doubt about the authenticity of this document. On the other hand, we examined all the sources that could have any references to transporting American military men to the territory of the Soviet Union. I can state confidently that we have not discovered any new information in this area.

Removing any military equipment from Vietnam was not associated with any specific individuals. Along with this, I'd like to present one piece of information at this high- level meeting. It is connected with our findings of new information, specifically by Colonel Mukhin, related to the fact that Soviet specialists studied the protocols of interrogations of American flyers. We cannot assert that it is all there, but we have been able to establish that these interrogations of American flyers did take place. We only have some fragmentary data at this point, because this information became available to us only in the last days before departing for the United States.

One more issue - at this meeting we are preparing for the publication of documents from World War II. Today, the fates of all 22,556 American citizens are known, i.e., Americans who spent any time at all on the territory of the Soviet Union. I will pass a number of documents on these people today to Ambassador Toon, and also materials on our people.

I would like to turn to the American Side with a major request. Our country is unable to establish the exact number of losses we have suffered in the 50 years since the end of World War II. The term "MIA" in our country was taken to mean "those that perished." We know that hundreds of thousands of these people survived and are alive today. They live in various countries, including the United States. We know that these people did not come home because if they left their Displaced Persons camps they would end up in the GULAG in their native land. Therefore, we would sincerely ask you to open for us the materials of closed DP camps. I emphasize that this is a humanitarian issue and that we don't need addresses or names; we only would like to have the number of those who are alive. We would be grateful for any information.

We have new information on the fate of Russians living abroad. For example, in Hungary in 1956 during the Soviet intervention, 44 Russian citizens disappeared. Our press never spoke about these people, but we know that they are alive and are in the West. There were people who wanted to choose freedom through Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany. We have a list. We would like to know if they are still alive and if they have the right to choose where they want to live. We would like to hand you a list of these people. I'm primarily speaking of Soviet military personnel. Of course, resolving all of these questions takes a long time, and it's not so simple.

President Yeltsin gave me the assignment to state at this meeting today that the Russian leadership is dedicating a great deal of attention to this humanitarian issue. This important humanitarian work will be carried out jointly and we will declare our work completed when both sides find it possible to do so.

I would like to ask Ambassador Toon's forgiveness for being so verbose. Next time I will try to take less time. I would like to hand over to you some materials which will be discussed in the working groups.

Ambassador Toon: General, we never place any limitation on the time offered to you for your remarks. Shall we have a break now?

General Volkogonov: Let's take a ten-minute break, because I took a little more time than I should have.

BREAK

Ambassador Toon: General, as always I'm very happy to see you here in Washington. It seems that whenever we have a plenary session in Washington there seems to be a strain in our relations. The last time you were here we had the Ames case, which caused some unpleasantness in our relations. Now, of course, we've had a sharp exchange in Budapest over the last couple of days. But, General, I think you'll agree with me that despite the unpleasantness at times in our relations, this has no impact on our work. I think that's primarily because, as you've pointed out in your remarks, our goal is a humanitarian one.

General, thank you for your remarks. As always, I found them useful and encouraging. As you know, you're visiting Washington at a very interesting time. We have just gone through our mid-term elections. Some members of our delegation are pleased with the results; others are simply disappointed. As you know, we have a Democratic senator and a Republican senator on our delegation, and a Democratic congressman and a Republican congressman. I don't need to tell you who's happy and who's not.

As you know, General, we've had two very interesting days, which, unfortunately, you could not participate in. We had a very interesting visit to the Naval Academy at Annapolis, and we visited the Aberdeen Proving Ground. I was not able to go to the Academy, but I did go to the Proving Ground yesterday. I should tell you, General, that one member of your delegation, a general, drove a Russian tank at an American base. That would never have happened in the old days. As a matter of fact, your general was gone so long that I thought he was descending on Washington.

Well, General, on a more serious note, in addition to continuing our work, your presence here is especially important for the family members whose unanswered questions are the reason for our Commission's existence. As you know, it's the holiday season in this country and for them, the opportunity to speak with you is a holiday gift of inestimable value. You will have the opportunity to meet with a number of them on Thursday. I'm sure you understand that they are concerned about their loved ones who are missing and anything that you can offer them in the way of hope would be of great value.

In your remarks, General, you mentioned the case of Captain Dunham. I'd like to share with you a small portion of a letter our Commission received from the daughter of a crew member missing from that same loss incident. She wrote that with the discovery of the remains we believe to be of Captain Dunham, "I am finally finishing my own grieving... It is important to me that you understand that the efforts you have put forth to recover Captain Dunham's body have helped more than just his family. You have made it possible for me to heal what I thought was permanent unresolved daily grief. Like a pebble thrown into the pond, the results of your cooperation and efforts have rippled out in unknown and unexpected ways."

She characterized the work of our Commission with the following words: "The cooperation between Russia and the United States, the dedicated humanitarian work of all the military and civilian persons involved, and the expertise of Task Force Russia, General Volkogonov, and so many others has been exceptional. I believe it is unprecedented. I know it to be truly worthy."

As you see, General, our Commission is appreciated. As you know, at their summit in September, President Clinton and President Yeltsin met in the Rose Garden to honor Russian and American veterans from World War II. At that time, President Clinton told the crowd "Two men symbolize the renewed bond between Russians and Americans..." And then he named you and me, General Volkogonov. He stated that our Commission "has become an important part of our bilateral relationship." I'm sure you'll agree with that statement.

At our last plenary session in Moscow at the end of August, you and I agreed that we should prepare some kind of formal, initial conclusions in May, perhaps in the form of a joint report, in time for the anniversary marking the end of World War II. The technical talks that were held in Moscow at the beginning of November to prepare for this plenary session were an important step in focusing and accelerating our work. Preparing these reports will be a tremendous task which requires an enormous effort above and beyond the work we have already accomplished. As you pointed out, General, it is a worthy and noble task that will show to both our peoples the great work our Joint Commission has accomplished over the past almost three years. And, as you indicated, it will also be a fitting and honorable gesture to the memory of our soldiers who fought a common enemy.

We feel that an important impetus to this effort is the creation of a separate working group on World War II to delve into the issues that still must be resolved before we can publish such a report. We appreciate your designation of Colonel Osipov to chair this new working group with Dr. Trudy Peterson from our side. We have already done initial research in the National Archives into what happened during the liberation and repatriation of American POWs. We have discovered that, as is inevitable in the confusion at the end of a war, our records, like yours, contain errors, omissions and contradictions. We hope to call upon our Russian counterparts to provide amplifying data from various Russian archives to correct this historical record.

Although our work on World War II in the National Archives has just begun, we have already reviewed over 30 boxes of documents containing tens of thousands of pages and have identified many files of possible interest to our World War II Working Group. In the course of this work, we have also discovered documents which may shed light on the fate of Russians still listed as missing from World War II. In the course of this work, we have also found 3,528 pages of documents which may shed light on the fate of Russians still missing from World War II. Later during our meeting, Dr. Peterson will describe a few of these documents and then will pass them to the Russian side.

Turning to the Cold War Working Group, since the Tenth Plenary session, our team in Moscow has

pursued important questions related to the July 1, 1960, shootdown incident in the Barents Sea. Although we have identified several new witnesses through public appeals, we have had difficulties in Murmansk with reluctant witnesses. We would appreciate your help in trying to get access to them. Our people in Moscow are still planning a second visit to Vladivostok, because, as you know, it was postponed because of the earthquake, which you mentioned in your remarks. We would appreciate your help in making that possible.

In the case of the Korean War Working Group, I'm sure you will agree that the key to getting at the facts about Americans still unaccounted for rests with determining what is included in historical materials that we have not yet seen. You yourself mentioned in your remarks that you have uncovered a number of interrogation documents that you will be turning over. In the past, we have received assurances from your side that the security services would be searched for the source materials used to produce the list of 510 American servicemembers identified as having transited to a POW point between 1950 and 1951.

For the Vietnam War Working Group, I ask for your help in developing a coordinated approach to investigate our unaccounted for servicemen which combines a comprehensive interview program with an imaginative, well-focused examination of documentary sources. You mentioned the "1205 document" in your remarks. We have never questioned the authenticity of the Russian document, but what puzzles us is the fact that no Vietnamese language text has been found.

I would like to propose, General, that our next plenary take place in Moscow in late February or early March. As you suggested, I hope to travel to Tashkent in conjunction with that plenary as well. At the time of the plenary, I would like to avail myself of your offer to meet with Mr. Boris Ponomarev, whom I remember quite well from my days as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. We had a number of meetings, and I can assure you that they were not pleasant. I believe his former position within the International Department could provide us with perceptive insights and perhaps even some new avenues of inquiry to help our researchers in their work.

I would like to conclude my remarks, General, by describing some of the efforts our side has undertaken to get more information on Soviet MIA's from Afghanistan. We translated the expanded list you gave us in Moscow after our last plenary session into English and have computerized it so that we can search it and update it. Because the English version is over 150 pages long, we compiled a 25-page condensed analysis in the form of a computerized spreadsheet which can also be used to search and update. From our preliminary analysis of the 290 names on the list, it appears that in some cases, there is no information on the fate of the servicemen and it is hoped they may be alive; in other cases, information indicates that the servicemen are no longer alive; and in several other cases, the information is contradictory. As we continue our work, it would be extremely helpful if your side could indicate which of the cases are your priorities so we can concentrate our efforts on those cases. Perhaps you could designate someone on your side who would be able to work with us on this issue during this plenary session?

Since we last met in Moscow, I also met personally with the Afghan *charg*,, Engineer Abdul Rahim, to request his government's assistance. He assured me that he would do what he can to help. He did say to me that the figures we had given him on Soviet MIA's are vastly exaggerated. He said as far as he knows there are no more than 20 Soviet POWs in Afghanistan. I cannot confirm the accuracy of that number, but, in any case, I plan to meet with him again when he returns from Afghanistan.

Beyond this, at my request, the Department of State sent an action telegram to our diplomatic posts in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to request the governments of those countries to provide us with information which could help account for any of the 290 MIA cases from Afghanistan. We have sent a copy of the list that you gave us, in English translation, to each of these posts to help them in this search. I understand that your government is working directly with the governments of many of these countries, and I would urge you to expand these efforts.

I have also requested in writing that Secretary Perry of the Department of Defense and Director Woolsey of the Central Intelligence Agency do what they can to assist us in our efforts. I met with several high-

ranking officials on Monday at the Central Intelligence Agency, and they told me that, in their first computer search from 1979 to 1990 based on the 290 names you provided, they have not turned up any new information. They explained, however, that they are still pursing several leads and will continue their work. We will, of course, report to you any information we get.

That concludes my remarks, General. Now, I'd like to call on my colleagues to make their remarks.

General Volkogonov: As Ambassador Toon has just finished his presentation, we should start with the American Side's remarks. I suppose with Korea?

Ambassador Toon: I'd like to begin with the Chairman of the World War II Working Group.

General Volkogonov: That's fine.

Dr. Trudy Peterson: Thank you, Ambassador Toon.

As the Ambassador has already stated, we are doing a search of the National Archives to identify documents that may shed light on missing U.S. and Russian servicemen. Although the intensive review of these documents is just beginning, we have identified Record Groups that hold great promise. Among those records already reviewed are:

The G-1 files of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). These files deal with the SHAEF Prisoner of War Branch. They contain primarily organizational and policy documents, but do provide some information on individual Russians. In addition, we have reviewed the files of the Assistant Naval Attach, in Odessa. These files have provided both documents of interest and ideas for further search. Today I will provide you with more than 3,500 pages of copies of documents from these files that you may find interesting.

Files identified for further research, but not yet reviewed are:

The G-2 and G-5 files of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force Branch. These files are referred to extensively by the G-1 files. The G-5 files in particular deal with displaced persons and hold great promise to help answer the major request General Volkogonov made in his opening remarks.

The Army Adjutant General files are also referred to as containing information on displaced persons.

The War Shipping Administration (WSA) files. The WSA was charged with controlling all merchant shipping to and from the former Soviet Union. These files should hold passenger manifests for all personnel movements during and immediately after the war.

The files of the US Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) to Moscow. Most correspondence was either routed through or there was an information copy provided to this mission. We will review these files.

We will also review the records regarding POWs in the Pacific Theater of Operations.

We are also re-examining and re-analyzing World War II documents provided by our Russian colleagues. Several issues have already arisen from these documents and other sources that we are prepared to discuss during our working group session.

Finally, we plan to address outstanding archival issues. There are several outstanding requests for archival work on copies of documents, of which we desire to know the current status.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Volkogonov: Thank you. Now Colonel Osipov will say a few words as the head of that working group.

Colonel Osipov: Thank you, Dr. Peterson, for outlining the set of topics that will be used in our working group. For my part, I'd like to say that the Russian Side of the Commission has completed work on U.S. citizens who were in the hands of Soviet authorities during and after World War II. The Russian Co-Chairman already cited the number of people who were either on the territory of the Soviet Union or on territory liberated by the Soviet Army. That number is 22,556. The majority were POWs liberated from POW camps by the Red Army. Among them, 700 were American pilots interned in the USSR during World War II, and 117 U.S. citizens who fought against the Soviet Union and were held as war prisoners in the GULAG. Besides this, 50 civilians, a small number, were interned during wartime on our territory.

I'm not yet prepared to state what form this report will take, but it is planned to be in the following form: The total number in the list is 2,715,982. [From] the statements, without lists of people transferred, there are 181,250 people. [From] the lists, without the statements of transfer, there are 193,140. [From documents containing only] signatures with no indication of the time or place of transfer, there we have 20,626 people.

In addition, we know that 2 Americans died, one in October, 1945, and one in February, 1946. They are buried in Odessa. Approximately 10 people are buried in the GULAG system. We have handed over a document concerning a group of 700 flyers. We could not find any more documents about this group.

As for Russian citizens, we know that the enemy seized civilians who numbered 6,817,515 people. The number that did not return home is 1,000,300 people. We believe that approximately 400,000 were on territory liberated by American forces. There is a figure of 452,000. Moreover, we have information on camps with different numbers of people at different periods. This is the range of problems that, as seen by the Russian Side, must be resolved. In the resolution of these problems, we are truly counting on the assistance of the American Side. Thank you.

General Volkogonov: Who else will be speaking from your side?

Ambassador Toon: I would like to call on my congressional colleague, Congressman Peterson.

Congressman Peterson: Thank you, Ambassador. Because the Vietnam War Working Group has already completed two days of working group sessions, I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that I reserve detailed remarks for the closing plenary session. I will say, however, that we have conducted very important and constructive meetings defining our past achievements and clarifying our future work. I will save other remarks for the closing session, but I do wish to express my thanks to our Russian colleagues for their feeling of compassion and willingness to reach into the past to define what happened to our missing. Thank you.

General Volkogonov: Thank you. We are in agreement and do not have anything to add.

Ambassador Toon: Congressman Johnson.

Congressman Johnson: Thank you. We have many new ideas and new information on Korea. I thank Colonel Mukhin who has dug up a lot of new information for us. There are still many unanswered questions on both sides, and we hope to get to the bottom of this. During the technical meetings in Moscow you asked for some information and we're pleased to say that we have some for you now. The first of these is the new list of our losses from Korea. The list is updated and more current, but is still not final. Also, it is not well understood that in the case of the RB-49 there was another person on the aircraft. You asked for some substantiating documentation and I'll pass that to you. Finally, Colonel Orlov requested a good copy of "The Secret War of the Top Guns" from the *London Observer*. Believe it or not, we finally found it with the help of our staff. It just proves that we fought against one another in Vietnam and Korea, and now we're working together on Vietnam and Korea in the United States. I thank you.

General Volkogonov: Thank you. Professor Orlov if you have something to add to what was said by Congressman Johnson, please go ahead and do so.

Professor Orlov: Thank you. First, I would like to thank Congressman Johnson and the members of the American Side working on the Korean War for the wonderful work accomplished. I would like to focus on a few issues which I will now enumerate: the issue of American POWs on Soviet territory; the issue of American flyer POWs who went through interrogation centers and were questioned by Soviets in Korea; and, lastly, the military aviation equipment that was delivered to the Soviet Union from Korea. We will also hand over -- that is, Colonel Mukhin and I -- documents to the American Side. Of course, we would like to ask the American Side to assist us with determining the fate of a number of Soviet citizens who disappeared in Korea. Thank you.

Ambassador Toon: Congressman Johnson would like to have a word.

Congressman Johnson: We will assist you on that. I would like to add that we have a new member on our side. Steve Pifer went to work for the U.S. President. Our new member replacing him is John Herbst of the State Department.

Ambassador Toon: Mr. Clift.

Mr. Denis Clift: Thank you. At the outset, I would like to note that earlier this week I received a report from the Executive Director of the National Security Agency, NSA, advising that NSA is conducting a thorough search of its records as they relate to the 290 Soviet servicemen. They hope to have results of that work available to the Commission in early 1995. Also, forensic work continues on the remains brought back from Yuri Island. We hope to have an update this week. General Krayushkin and I both look forward to resuming our work on the Cold War cases this afternoon. We are aware that there is new information of importance for the families. We will be meeting with the families tomorrow afternoon. Thank you.

General Volkogonov: Thank you. Now a few words from General Krayushkin.

General Krayushkin: Mr. Denis Clift is very precise in outlining our remaining work. It is easy to take the floor after him. We have never differed in our plan of work. At the last session, we outlined a precise plan of what was still left to do. This time we will summarize what work remains to be done. Let me stress that in the recent past we have moved ahead considerably. That will make it possible to concentrate on those matters where only contradictory facts exist. Ambassador Toon, we will take all steps necessary to find where the pilot Posa may be buried. As in previous meetings, there are no obstacles. We will arrange a trip to Vladivostok. At the working group session we will give you some archival documents and a list of American pilots kept in camps in Tashkent. Thank you.

General Volkogonov: Thank you. This will conclude our plenary meeting. After lunch we will have meetings where we specifically examine each issue. The meeting places of the working groups are known to you. The time has changed. We will start 30 minutes later because we ended the plenary meeting later. As I understand it, our hosts are inviting us to lunch.

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Colonel Osipov: The Russian side is ready to proceed with today's work. And, I submit in line with Russian tradition, we might let the lady speak first. Thus, I suggest that you, Dr. Peterson, be the first speaker.

Dr. Peterson: Let me begin, then, by introducing the U.S. side.

- This is Danz Blasser, who is the principal analyst for World War II.

- Next to him is Dr. Timothy Nenninger, the senior expert on military archives in the U.S. National Archives.

- Next to him is Henry Eastman of the POW staff.

- Our notetaker is Joe Harthcock of the POW staff.

- And our translator is Dmitri Arensberger.

Colonel Osipov: Thank you. In that case, permit me to introduce the Russian component of the commission.

- Vladimir Nikolaevich Primukhin, Assistant to the President's Office.

- Major General Volkov, Director of the Commission Secretariat.

- Natal'ya Krivova, Assistant Chief Archivist of the Russian Federation.

- Aleksandr Vasil'evich Korotkov, Chief of the Presidential Archives of the Russian Federation.

- And I [Colonel Osipov] am the Executive Secretary of our Commission. Thank you.

Dr. Peterson: In addition to the World War II conflict, we would like to discuss the Yeltsin letter, which is an outstanding piece of commission business, and a few archival issues before we begin the direct discussion of World War II. If you would look at Tab C in your book.

In the Spring of 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin released a letter on U.S. POW/MIAs. In the third paragraph from the end, President Yeltsin stated:

Quote, In addition, it has been found out during the 1950's that 9 U.S. aircraft were shot down over the USSR territory. Some of these crew members survived. The records show that, as of August 1, 1953, 8 American citizens were held in Soviet prisons and prison camps and 4 others were held in special psychiatric clinics. Their history is being investigated. End of quote.

We in the United States know that there were some U.S. persons in Soviet prisons and prison camps in the 1950's. Persons in this category were deserters or individuals that were absent without leave and illegally crossed into Soviet- occupied territory. Cases like Sparks, Verdin, Marchuk, and Noble are in this category. Their cases are well documented, and we have received much information on them. However, President Yeltsin's letter raised additional questions.

First, was President Yeltsin implying that the eight American citizens in prisons and prison camps and the four Americans in special psychiatric clinics were survivors from these nine aircraft shot down in the 1950s? Because he linked them in a single paragraph, it does suggest that these Americans are related to the shootdowns. If these are not linked together, we then need to understand who were these citizens in prisons and in psychiatric clinics.

In a meeting in June of 1992, that I had with Mr. Kozlov and other members of the Russian side, I was told that a report based on documents in the October Revolution Archives formed the basis of President Yeltsin's statement on Americans in Soviet prisons and psychiatric clinics. I was presented with a copy of this report. If you look at the last document in Tab C, this is a copy of what I was handed.

We looked at this, and the number of Americans identified in special camps and prisons added up to 7, not 8, as President Yeltsin's letter said. We asked for an explanation of this discrepancy. And we are still awaiting some sort of clarification. We also requested information on the special psychiatric clinics and the identity of these persons. Our requests, then, are these:

First, we need to know the exact meaning of President Yeltsin's letter. We need to know the correct numbers. We need any background information that will provide the identities of these persons, both those held in the prisons and those held in the special psychiatric clinics.

Are there any questions, or any other information you would like from us on this topic?

Colonel Osipov: There really are no questions because this is a subject that has been in discussion for two years now. I cannot give you any specific answers based on documentary evidence because really we had thought that in this working group we would be working on World War II, not the Cold War. Obviously, we are not prepared. But, I can provide you clarification of the situation right now, if my esteemed American colleagues find that acceptable.

Dr. Peterson: Please, go ahead.

Colonel Osipov: First, insofar as the letter of the President of Russia is concerned, it was drafted more in the form of raising a problem, raising a subject, rather than answering questions on that subject. The principal purpose was to admit, or recognize in principle, that there was indeed such a problem and that some number of U.S. POWs had indeed been on USSR territory at some point, although, at the time that the letter was written, we did not have the exact numbers. In addition to the documents that are contained in your binder, there are four additional documents which cite numbers of U.S. POWs, or prisoners, on Soviet territory during approximately the same time frame. One of these documents contains the very [same] figures that were cited in President Yeltsin's letter, namely 8 in prisons, and 4 in psychiatric clinics. There is another document covering the same period, which stated that the numbers of Americans imprisoned and the number of Americans in psychiatric hospitals were in the dozens, and even in the hundreds. The problem is that, as we learned subsequently, the term "U.S. criminal", was applied to all Russian citizens, or Poles, or Frenchmen, what have you, who were accused of espionage. Thus, at the time of the letter it proved to be impossible to cite a precise figure with respect to American citizens imprisoned in prisons or in psychiatric clinics. The figure that was cited was the one that seemed to be most likely at the time. Today, we can provide you with the names of 8 Americans who were imprisoned -- I'm only talking about prisons now -- at that time. The only discrepancies might be by a few months: June versus August, that sort of thing. These are names that we all know, including the names that Dr. Peterson mentioned: Marchuk, Verdin, Noble, and so forth. As for psychiatric hospitals, including special psychiatric hospitals, here the issue is more complicated. As you see, this document (the same is true of a number of other documents), states directly that some Americans were hospitalized there. However, a thorough search of the archives, including searching individual pages of documents at psychiatric clinics, has not yielded any results with respect to Americans. This is a puzzle, a puzzle that we too have yet to understand, and one that still needs to be resolved. So, if I may repeat myself, we are prepared to provide you the names of 8 Americans who had been imprisoned. As for individuals in psychiatric wards, mentioned in the President's letter, the letter was indeed based on documentary evidence, but what sort of numbers might be involved or what the specifics are, we simply do not know. Moreover, I will point out that we have provided our American colleagues with an opportunity to visit the four special psychiatric clinics on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Your colleagues had an opportunity to talk to the personnel, et cetera, but once again, no traces of any Americans were found. That's all I have.

Dr. Peterson: Would you then provide us the documents from which these numbers were extracted?

Colonel Osipov: This is the document itself. As I recall, this document existed in exactly this form. But aside from that, there are some summary documents. And these other documents have summary numbers, not just of Americans, but of other foreigners as well, who were incarcerated in prisons. These are documents that have the high numbers. But, we are prepared to hand over all these documents to you.

Dr. Peterson: OK. I would just say that I was told in June of 1992, that this document was prepared by an archivist in October Revolution [Archives]. This is a new document, not an archival document.

Colonel Osipov: Obviously, I cannot discuss this document any further, for the simple reason that I don't have the original with me, and that would be contrary to the rules of working with documents. I would, however, repeat that documents on the subject of American POWs are held not only by the October Revolution Archives, the archives that you mentioned, but also by the archives of the Main Directorate on POWs and Internees (GUPVI). The organization *per se*, was being closed down at that time. And so, whatever they had went into an archive.

Dr. Peterson: Let me also clarify why this is in the World War II context. And that is because if the "8" and "4" do not relate to the shootdowns, the logic is that these are persons from World War II who are still being held.

Can we move to the next subject?

Colonel Osipov: Yes, I think so.

Dr. Peterson: Also in June of 1992, in the October Revolution Archives, we were shown the correspondence files of General-Lieutenant Golikov. Because of his importance to the repatriation issue, we reached an agreement that these files would be copied and given to the U.S. side.

Two other issues relating to archival matters. These relate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In June of 1992, at a meeting with the Director of the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he said that the Ministry kept an event log for all military incidents involving the United States. May we have access to this event log?

At the same meeting, he said that the archivists at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had identified 700-800 files, each with between 30-100 pages that may be relevant to the work of the Commission. At the time, these files were awaiting declassification. What is the current status of these documents, and may we have access to them?

Colonel Osipov: I must once again point out the fact that all the questions do not have bearing on the work of this section. But, nevertheless, I would assume that such a log was maintained by that ministry. Together with Mr. Korotkov, we've found excerpts of information about aircraft incidents. We've used them in the Cold War Working Group. They have been declassified. I am talking about the Presidential Archives. These are summaries used at higher levels, at the Politburo level. This leads to the conclusion that a working document must have been prepared. Presently, I have a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to which they do not have any information on Americans on Soviet territory. This is in addition to what we already know. There is nothing further that I can say now. If there is nothing else, perhaps we can move on to World War II?

Dr. Peterson: Yes. To begin, I'd like to speak about reports on the repatriation of U.S. prisoners through Odessa. There are many discrepancies. If you'll look at Tab F, you'll see a page with some of the numbers. We give you here a long list that shows the problems encountered in getting the number of Americans who went through Odessa. I do not wish to take the working group's time in reading this. Let me just address the most important issues.

There are official U.S. records that acknowledge that 2,858 Americans were repatriated through Odessa. We believe that this is just U.S. military personnel who were sent through Odessa. Two documents which you have provided to us, addressed to Stalin from Khrulev [General of the Army; Chief of the Rear of the Soviet Army, 1943-46] state that as of 20 March 1945, a total of 2,891 Americans, including 2,813 military personnel, were already taken to Odessa for repatriation. Then, On 22 March 45, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin responded to President Franklin Roosevelt's 17 March 45 letter, which asked permission to field U.S. repatriation teams in Poland. Stalin replied that, as of 16 March 45, there were only 17 sick Americans in addition to a number of Americans already en route to Odessa. Stalin said that soon, these 17 would be taken by plane to Odessa. He also stated that American repatriation teams are not allowed in Poland because they would be a drain on Soviet Army resources to care and provide for these officers who had no bearing on ongoing operations. This letter suggests that even more U.S. POWs arrived in Odessa after the 20 March 45 date noted in paragraph 1, increasing the discrepancy.

A document you gave us which was dated 23 March, 1945, states that an additional 160 Americans and British were to be transported to Odessa on that date.

Recently, you provided a list to us of 167 Americans who remained in Odessa after 20 March, 1945. We would like access to the document used to formulate this list to help both sides work through this

material.

Yet another document reports that, as of March 1, 1946, a total of 22,479 U.S. POWs and interned citizens were repatriated to their homeland. Of this number, 19,013 were repatriated across the front lines [8 remained on Soviet- controlled territory]. This means that 3,474 U.S. citizens were repatriated by other means. If these 3,474 people were sent to Odessa, then we have another problem.

We understand that we will never be able to find out the exact number. After all, there was a war on, the situation was chaotic. But, we must try to do all we can to get the best number possible.

Colonel Osipov: Very good. That's a good way of putting it.

Dr. Peterson: We would call your attention to one other document.

Colonel Osipov: May I interrupt so that we don't have to return to this topic later? Just one short remark and a brief clarification.

Dr. Peterson: Sure.

Colonel Osipov: The overall numbers of American POWs differ in all of the documents we have at our disposal, from 22,449 to 22,456. So, the built-in difference is already at about 100 persons. Most often, it was not because people didn't know how many individuals they were holding, but because of confusion with respect to citizenship. So, you're right, we will probably never arrive at a precise number, but we should try. In order to do so, we really have three paths of repatriation to investigate:

The first path is through Odessa. We have voluminous, albeit incomplete, lists of Americans who transited through Odessa. Furthermore, we know that such lists were completed in duplicate. And the second copy was given to the senior person on the U.S. repatriation team, who was organizing the return of the Americans. That means, that there is a chance that you can find this documentation in your own archives.

The second path is through the U.S. Military Mission in Bucharest. We have lists specifically of flyers who were sent there. And, I trust, the American Military Mission kept good records as well.

The third path is across the front lines. This is the most complicated avenue, where people were handed over directly from the troops here to the troops over there. I don't know what kind of documentation the Americans had, but the Russians used the following example: X number of Americans were handed over to Captain So-and-so. No names, no details whatsoever. So, we really hope that you will be able to find this documentation in your archives, because our people really didn't keep any sort of detailed records. But, in the coming several months, our side of the commission will research all three of these avenues.

Dr. Peterson: Let me call your attention to a document, called TFR 2, in Tab F. This was given to Senators Smith and Kerry, in 1992. We think this document is a coversheet, earmarking lists for permanent storage, of repatriated Americans who passed through Odessa and through the front lines. We think this coversheet references 370 pages of materials that are being forwarded. Obviously, we would like to look at the lists that accompanied this coversheet, so that we could match those to U.S. lists.

The next one is also interesting. This was provided to Senators Smith and Kerry in 1992. This appears to be lists of American who were liberated from Japanese POW camps, and repatriated through the port of Darien. That is a fourth possible way of repatriation. We would hope a list like the Darien list is the sort of list that accompanied this coversheet.

OK. I'm ready to move on to the next topic.

Colonel Osipov: Yes. I think I've already replied that we're prepared to pursue all of these directions.

Dr. Peterson: I propose to do one more question on lists and general numbers, take a coffee break, and then go to specifics. Is that agreeable?

Colonel Osipov: That is agreeable, but, I would like after the break to present some overall considerations with regard to Russian citizens and after that we might proceed with specifics with regard to both U.S. and Russian issues.

Dr. Peterson: Fine. If you'll go to Tab G then.

During World War II, the Army Adjutant General was tasked with keeping track of known POWs. At the end of the war, the Adjutant General compared his list of known American POWs who were in German captivity with repatriated American servicemen. Discrepancies were published as "American POWs held by the German Government Unaccounted for." And that list is in the U.S. National Archives.

Colonel Osipov: A clarification, if I may?

Dr. Peterson: Yes?

Colonel Osipov: Do you mean individuals who were not accounted for by the U.S., but who were in fact returned by the Soviet Union?

Dr. Peterson: No. These are POWs who we know were in German camps, but never came back. And, we have included a copy of this document. There were, originally, 261 names on the list. There are handwritten notations on the list that show seven people subsequently came back, three were dead, two were British, and one was a Canadian. This brings the list to 248 unaccounted for. Of the unaccounted for, many of the names appear to be of Germanic or Slavic origin. It is possible that in the fog of war, some of these Americans may have been mistaken by the liberators as Germans or Slavs. This is not unbelievable. Numerous instances are documented of American servicemen who had to prove their citizenship to Soviet authorities prior to repatriation.

In June of 1992, General Volkogonov told the press that U.S. servicemen with "suspect" names - Russian, Jewish and Ukrainian - were treated with "great suspicion" by the Soviet secret police. We have included in your book a document you passed to us. It is by our numbering 132-1. And on the second page, there is an indication of a flight engineer from this air crew, who was being held in Russia. The name is underlined. He was the son of emigres. His father was Lithuanian and his mother was a Russian from Odessa. Again, it looks like that name was being singled out.Sgt Laban came back, but what we are interested in is whether or not the names on the List of 261 are at all reflected in your files. We would ask you to take the 261 list, absent those that are accounted for, and look in whatever record sources are most appropriate to determine whether you have any information on these 248 names.

We know that it is difficult from the name whether someone is a U.S. citizen. My maiden name is Huskamp, we have a Blasser and a Nenninger. German names, Slavic names, but still U.S. citizens.

Colonel Osipov: Let me state that your question is certainly legitimate, although, carrying out your request will be difficult. All I can do is to promise that we will try to check these names against all possible lists. But in reality, this means comparing these names against the names of some 4 million foreign military personnel held in the USSR.

Dr. Peterson: Understood. Then, I propose a coffee break.

Colonel Osipov: OK.

BREAK Colonel Osipov: With your permission, I would like to outline a range of issues that we would like to resolve, with a view to subsequent publication. At the present time, the President of Russia has made the decision that by the time of the 50th anniversary of the victory [of WWII] we come up with more accurate data regarding our losses during the Great Patriotic War, and that we learn all we can about

the fates of all military and all citizens of the Soviet Union, who are missing since World War II.

This is the task that has been presented to our Commission, and we would be grateful to the U.S. component of the Commission for its agreement in helping to carry it out.

We are talking about the following magnitudes. Yesterday, General Volkogonov mentioned the numbers. I will now give you precise figures. The [number of] POWs and interned citizens of our country that are accounted for from the World War II period is 6,817,515. Out of that number, we know that as of 1 September, 1948, 5,445,383 were repatriated to the Fatherland. Thus, three years after the war, we did not see 1,388,000 people. Of these, we know that almost 1 million persons, not counting POWs, died in captivity.

Dr. Peterson: Let me check numbers here.

Colonel Osipov: OK. In total, there were 6,817,515. Now, the exact number of human losses. 1,372,132 did not return. 5,445,383 we repatriated. I will give you this document with the numbers; you don't need to copy down the figures.

Dr. Peterson: OK.

Colonel Osipov: So, the overall number of people we are looking for is nearly half a million, including POWs. This is a general number. Now, I will tell concrete numbers for whom we are searching.

According to our information, on the territories liberated by allied forces of Western European countries, there were at least 12 camps for internees and displaced persons. We know that in 1952, the Soviet military command believed that at least 452,000 people were held in these camps. This does not agree with our current knowledge, because we now know that such camps were closed back in 1949. We cannot resolve this contradiction based on documentary evidence at our disposal. We are asking the U.S. side for help in establishing when these camps were closed down, and who ended up where.

Moreover, we have other figures regarding repatriated citizens, and none of the numbers match. For example, if you add the numbers of repatriated people by year, for the period 1944-49, you end up with a total of 5,451,032. And, around the same period, meaning 1950, it was believed that around 456,000 people were located in the British and American zones. Besides that, we now know that hundreds, even thousands, of Russian POWs (or more accurately, Soviet POWs) participated in combat activities in Western Europe and in Africa with allied forces. What we are talking about here are the Allied armed forces, and the Resistance. We know that there was a particular [special] order issued by the U.S. military command that allowed the recruitment of Russian, Soviet, POWs for operations in the rear of U.S. forces.

So, in connection with all of this, we have a two-part interest. First, to determine if possible the accurate numbers of former Soviet citizens who ended up within the American zone of influence in Western Europe. And, if possible, to obtain the accurate numbers of repatriated former Soviet citizens. And we would appreciate all information regarding those persons who either died or, for some other reason, were not able to return to their homeland. I am not talking about those who remained voluntarily. I would like to add, that the Commission has already received several hundred letters from relatives of former Red Army servicemen who were captured by the Germans during the period 1941-1945, but who did not return and are not listed in German POW records as having died. In a number of cases there are references indicating that eyewitnesses had seen these individuals in the zones liberated by U.S. troops. As a rule, these requests come from very old people, mothers and wives of the Red Army servicemen, whose only request is that, now at the end of their lives, they are asking for help in determining the fate of their son or husband. All they're asking for is the ability to perhaps send a letter. I am authorized by the Co-chairman of the Commission, General Volkogonov, to state that the information that I have requested will not be used for any reasons other than humanitarian purposes. We respect American privacy laws, and we are prepared to act in such a way so as not to infringe on their rights.

That's all I have.

Dr. Peterson: If I might ask on the largest numbers? As I understand it, of the 1,372,132 people, I understood that you estimate that this number includes half a million POWs?

Colonel Osipov: Literally, so as not to be mistaken, the presumed number of those, excluding POWs, who died in captivity is 973,697. As of 1 September, 1948, the Soviet military command figured that within the British and American zones, and within the zones of other foreign countries, there remained 398,435 persons. But, as of 1 January, 1950, that is, practically two years later, this number did not drop, but increased to 455,936. We have no other information. We have to operate within these limits. The figures run from 350,000 to 450,000 so we say almost half a million.

Dr. Peterson: All right. Let me summarize what we will look for then. One is the number of the camps, and when the camps were closed. We will specifically look for those camps that were within the U.S. zone. If we find general information on western allied camps we will also provide that. Then, we will begin to look for the numbers of Soviet POWs in the zone liberated by U.S. armies. And to the extent that it exists in the files, we will look for more accurate numbers on the Soviet citizens in the zones of U.S. control. As you know, we gave you a lot of documents yesterday. As you analyze those, some of this sort of information is probably included. At the very first commission plenary, we returned two dogtags of Soviet military who died in a German camp that we came into possession of as part of the war crimes trials.

Colonel Osipov: I didn't understand, to whom were these given?

Dr. Peterson: Ambassador Toon handed them to General Volkogonov at the final Plenary of the first Commission meeting in Moscow, in 1992.

Colonel Osipov: That was before my time in the Commission.

Dr. Peterson: So, we have been aware from the beginning that we had some information about the deaths of Russian military in German camps. We appreciate very much your statement on your understanding of our privacy laws, and also appreciate that you are not talking about those persons who voluntarily remained.

Colonel Osipov: That is true about the personal identities concerned, but we, nonetheless, would like to the have the overall numbers of those who did not return.

Dr. Peterson: Yes, if we can come up with one, we have no problem providing numbers.

Could we move, then, to some of the specific cases?

Colonel Osipov: One question. We have in mind not only the numbers of Soviet POWs freed directly from German POW camps, but we are interested in the information regarding the so-called "Ost-arbeiter", that is, Soviet citizens who were forcibly taken from the Soviet Union for labor. The rest you understood correctly.

Dr. Peterson: All right. As you know, Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov have repeatedly discussed the Commission going to Tashkent. We tentatively plan to do that at the next Commission meeting. If you would look at Tab H, we have some information on air crews repatriated via Tashkent, Kamchatka and Teheran.

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission is relatively certain that most, if not all U.S. air crews interned in the Soviet Union, and especially those in Tashkent, were repatriated. The secret escapes from Tashkent serve as an excellent example of the cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This was particularly important because the Soviet Union, which was not a belligerent at the time in the war against Japan, was obligated as a neutral to hold the Americans as detainees, but did permit an escape to occur.

Colonel Osipov: I think it would be more accurate to say "assisted", rather than "permitted."

Dr. Peterson: Yes, I agree.

We have reproduced here some of the chronology of what happened as we understand it. It is evident from everything we know that this operation was conducted by highly trained professionals that were adept at secretly transporting people without anyone, uninitiated in the process, becoming aware. The location of documents and the analysis of this well-documented event, would aid immensely in the understanding of other possible events. We have included a document that we have received from you on a transfer of interned U.S. airmen from Kamchatka to Yangi-Yul' in probable preparation for the February, 1945, "escape." This document might aid in finding further documents on this and similar events.

I would emphasize that if it is possible to provide these documents, particularly on Tashkent, to our team in Moscow in advance of going to Tashkent, it would make the visit much more fruitful.

Colonel Osipov: First, as you know, all transfers of U.S. personnel to Iranian territory were carried out by well-trained individuals. And, due to the reasons that you cite, namely that we were not in a state of war with Japan, these operations were carried out clandestinely. But, my only objection is that these individuals were by no means transported secretly across Soviet territory. They were transported in normal rail cars. The secrecy began in Tashkent, when at night they boarded trucks, were taken to the border and walked across.

But, we foresaw your request, and yesterday at the plenary meeting Ambassador Toon was handed a complete list with regard to the Tashkent camp which contains rosters of all the Americans that were repatriated through there. And because of the specific nature of the operation, it listed all the specific groups that were there. If necessary, I can get you a second copy of this. But I would have to get it from Moscow. I don't have another copy here.

Dr. Peterson: We would be very interested to see your reaction when you read what we think happened, as opposed to what your documents show. We will examine the documents you handed us and if we have further questions that we believe documents surrounding the events would elucidate, we will come back to you. **Colonel Osipov:** I would just like to remind you, that documents on this topic have been handed over twice now. First, we handed some over at the last plenary session in Moscow, and the remaining part of the documents were turned over yesterday.

Dr. Peterson: OK. In your opening remarks, you talked about the three places in the West where U.S. servicemen were repatriated. One of those was via the U.S. Military Mission in Bucharest. Two documents have caused concern among family members, and these documents relate to Marshall Tolbukhin and the Third Ukrainian front. These are two cables that I will be describing.

Although both cables were refuted in later cable traffic, this remains a central issue in certain circles and I believe we must deal with this in our final report. One U.S. cable of May, 1945, seemed to state that the Soviet Union held 25,000 U.S. POWs. In May of 1945, a British cable said, and I'm quoting, "There are still a number of British and American PW in Soviet hands including 15,597 Americans and 8,462 British released [freed] by Marshal Tolbukhin." Both cables, as I've already stated, were refuted in later cable traffic, but nonetheless continue to raise questions. You provided us with a document which was part of a status report addressed to Stalin from General of the Army Khrulev, reporting that as of March 20, 1945, only 2 Allied servicemen were under the control of the Third Ukrainian Front. Clearly, 25,000 persons is wrong, but 2 also seems much too small.

Colonel Osipov: I don't understand where you get the two people. The cable talks about 30 Americans... Never mind, I understand.

Dr. Peterson: What we request is a search of the records of the Third Ukrainian Front which will hopefully yield more information regarding which German POW camps the Soviets overran, and the repatriation from them. This, we believe, would aid in putting to rest the two erroneous cables that I have mentioned.

Colonel Osipov: I believe that should not be too difficult, because the advances made by the Third Front are well documented, so what we need to do is see what camps they may have overrun, and check those documents. Anatoli Aleksandrovich [Volkov] will get in touch with the military personnel and will take up that issue.

Dr. Peterson: All right. We have under Tab J, a copy of an article published June 1, 1994. As you can imagine, people in the United States are very interested in this report. Task Force Russia in Moscow will contact the newspaper to obtain any information they have that is not reported in the article.

We would ask you to search for more information on this incident. If it was truly shot down by the 176th Fighter Regiment, you should be able to find records there.

Colonel Osipov: I have already investigated such incidents; regrettably this was not the only such case. The reason is that, the U.S. squadron based in Poltava was permitted by the Front Commander to use only a very narrow corridor. This was not related to any military secrets; it was simply that anti-aircraft personnel in Russia did not recognize the silhouette of a B-29, and assumed it was an enemy aircraft. I'm speaking off the top of my head right now. I don't remember exactly, but I believe there were two, or possibly three incidents when a U.S. aircraft was fired upon, including the incident that is described in this article.

Regarding the imprisonment of U.S. crew members, who attempted flight from the prison and other subjects from crime novels, such would be inappropriate here.

According to my information, of course, the crew members were initially held, but after investigation they were sent right back to Poltava. But the documents definitely exist. I've seen them personally.

Dr. Peterson: We do believe that a further search of the records of the Soviet 16th Air Army in the archives of the Russian Federation Security Service will help us understand the events of other aircraft losses. As Colonel Osipov just mentioned, these incidents happened; we are seeking merely the results of the these incidents.

We have included here a document that contains information you provided to us on two U.S. Army Air Force B- 24/Liberators, and possibly a B-17/Flying Fortress, lost on 18 March 1945.

Another incident that we have learned about [is] that the second B-24 apparently caught fire while attempting to land at a Soviet airfield and crashed near Massin. Apparently, seven members of this aircraft's ten-man crew parachuted successfully from the aircraft and were detained by the Soviets. There is no further information on the subsequent fate of this air crew.

Also in this batch of documents provided to us, it is indicated that a B-17 was also shot down 18 March, 1945. The documents concerning the B-17 are very confusing about what exactly happened. The documents reference nine-, ten-, and eleven-member crews and are very unclear as to the ultimate fate of these men.

We request that the Russian Side of the Joint Commission further research the records of the Soviet 16th Air Army and the archives of the Russian Federation Security Service for more information on these events of 18 March 1945. We additionally ask that the records of other Air Armies in the European Theater of Operations and the Russian Federation Security Service be examined for any other similar occurrences.

Colonel Osipov: Very well, we will do this. I do have one remark. On the document you have numbered 289-7, it says that, at the request of the U.S. flyers, the remains of 3 dead flyers were buried, 2 in Nojdam, 1 in Landsberg. The rest of the pilots were sent to the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow. So, why are we searching for them? I mean, if they never reached their destination, we'll look for them. But, if they did...

Dr. Peterson: It's our understanding, that there are 3 individual incidents on March 18. That information

relates to one, we agree.

Colonel Osipov: But this one deals with two incidents. The first American, and the second American. It says, the airplane blew up and the pilot died. This one document deals with two incidents.

One aircraft, from which personnel wearing parachutes ejected...our pilots began to fire on them in the air. Two of them were killed. The other American aircraft landed at the airfield. The flyers who survived were sent to Moscow. The remaining documents, of course the analysis is preliminary, seem to provide clarification for the first incident. I mean, the situation where our people mistook them for German flyers. We are prepared to analyze this material more carefully and respond to your questions.

Dr. Peterson: That's fine. Any clarification will be useful.

I propose to discuss two more brief topics and then break for lunch.

Colonel Osipov: Very well.

Dr. Peterson: The first one is a declassified document from our own archives. This is a report of a debriefing of a German national in 1947, who was a former POW of the Soviet Union. He says that he had been in a Soviet camp in Kashgar. He stated that there were approximately 130 U.S. Navy personnel being held in the camp as well. He states that the Navy personnel were survivors of two U.S. submarines sunk in the Pacific Theater of Operations and were picked up by a Russian tanker. They arrived in Kashgar in July-August 1944 and were isolated from the general camp population. He says he became aware of these Americans through notes thrown over the fence as the German POWs were passing by. He goes on to say that when he left Kashgar in July of 1946, approximately 30 of the Americans had already died. Any information you can provide us about the camp in Kashgar, their recovery at sea by the Russian tanker, or any other information would be useful.

Colonel Osipov: This is completely new information to me. So, I will withhold comment until I check it out.

Dr. Peterson: The final one also relates to the Pacific. This relates to repatriation of U.S. POWs from Japanese captivity.

When the Red Army moved into Manchuria in the summer of 1945, it liberated POW camps that held Allied POWs. The Soviets evacuated some of these liberated POWs by rail and air. And as we have already discussed, some of these POWs were sent to the port city of Darien for repatriation.

During the war, the U.S. Adjutant General's office was tasked with tracking numbers of known POWs in both the European and Pacific Theaters of Operations. However, data for the European Theater of Operations was much more in- depth than for the Pacific. Germany, as a signatory of the Geneva Accords, reported captivity figures to the International Red Cross and allowed POWs to communicate directly with family members. Even so, over 20,000 more POWs came back from the European Theater than the United States anticipated.

For the United States, the war against Japan was much more difficult. The Japanese did not fully observe the Geneva Accords, and we had very little information.

Because we have so little information, we urgently request that you search to find information on prison camps in the Far East liberated by the Red Army. Specifically, we request any camp rosters of POWs held in these camps and any captured Japanese POW records that the Russian archives might contain.

Colonel Osipov: Very well. We'll see what we can do on that. Specifically, I'll ask Mr. Korotkov to search his files. Perhaps he can find something about POWs. Secondly, I might add that when General Volkov and I were on Sakhalin Island we came across a Japanese document. Admittedly, this document has yet to be translated into Russian. So, we really don't know what information it contains. But it is a

document of the Police Commissariat, so, conceivably, it could have some information on POWs. This is far in northern Sakhalin. The local historians told us that we faced one problem, however. Namely, this commissioner, the police commissioner, apparently was an aficionado of ancient Japanese. It would appear we only have one, at best two, experts in the entire country who can decipher, or are familiar with that particular language. Anyway, we'll do whatever we can. Maybe we'll just give you a copy of it, and also try to sort it out ourselves.

General Volkov: I have a few proposals to make in this connection.

Dr. Peterson: Sure.

General Volkov: With respect to the Japanese topics, when we were in the Southern Kuril Islands [Etorofu] we checked out information which pertained to the alleged presence of U.S. POWs on these islands. There was some indirect evidence showing that the Japanese -- at that time these islands were under Japanese control -- maintained a POW camp there, which held Americans. One year ago, we agreed that the U.S. component of the Commission would try to obtain this material through its military attach, in Japan. We contacted the Association of Japanese Veterans, and requested that they clarify this situation. But, we have yet to receive a response.

And, since we're dealing with the Far East, I think it would be useful -- inasmuch as you are preparing a trip there, I believe, in January or February -- if you were to take along someone on your side who is dealing with the Far East issues. The same is true with respect to material on incidents that you had not mentioned previously, and on which we therefore aren't able to comment without searching the records with respect to your submarines.

If you could prepare material detailing the essence of the Far East incident with the submarines while we're still here in Washington, we would then be able to try and see if we can find some witnesses, perhaps, and come across somebody who had actually seen what happened. And, Colonel Orlov has already mentioned that the problem with working with these archives is really the language barrier. All documents regarding these islands are held in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. But, they're all written in, so-called, ancient Japanese. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to derive any information.

Now, I would like to clarify right now a question with regard to the interned U.S. pilots in Tashkent.

As Ambassador Toon said yesterday, your side was planning to visit Tashkent. However, bearing in mind the fact that documents are in Moscow, and [that] it is doubtful that you'll be able to obtain any new information regarding that in Tashkent, if you are prepared to provide to us additional pertinent information we, for our part, would be ready to study this subject further and perhaps try to determine the whereabouts of service personnel from that camp. Thus, in organizing this trip, it would presumably be advisable to include members of the Russian component in the travel to Tashkent.

And getting back to the Far East, I would like you to know, Dr. Peterson, that we have four or five oral testimonies regarding the execution of American POWs on Iturup. But, I emphasize that these are oral testimonies. We have no documentary evidence. The pertinent interviews were all held, and they were conducted in the presence of American representatives, namely, Mr. Connell and Mr. Poltoratsky.

That's all I have.

Dr. Peterson: I would propose that we stop for lunch. After lunch, we spend a little time talking about the report for May. I would very specifically like any ideas you have about the nature, content and length of such a report.

Colonel Osipov: That's fine. I would point out, however, that our plans call for continuing our work tomorrow morning. Do you want to adhere to that plan, or would you rather try and conclude this afternoon?

Dr. Peterson: Let's talk after lunch. Let me talk to my colleagues.

Colonel Osipov: Well, depending on what the decision is, this would affect our activity after lunch. Because, following that my colleagues have yet to work with the families. And, working with the families is the most difficult part of all of our activities.

Dr. Peterson: My schedule shows our last working group session from 1:00 to 2:00 this afternoon.

Colonel Osipov: Right. In that case, there is no problem.

LUNCH

Dr. Peterson: May is very soon. Have you thought about what you would expect to present publicly at that time?

Colonel Osipov: Yes. With your permission, I would present our views, at least with respect to the final result of our efforts by May.

I believe that by that time, we should draft and agree to a report, to be composed of two parts. What I have in mind is that one section be devoted to U.S. citizens, and that the other section would deal with Russian citizens. It would be highly desirable to present them in a very formal fashion and to draw them up in parallel.

We would propose that our agreed report begin with a preamble which would briefly outline the history of how the issues came about. I think the preamble should also cite the basic numbers which would be developed for a subsequent text.

Next, Section One would be devoted, say, to U.S. citizens, and it would be broken up into subsections dealing with the individual topics that we dealt with this morning, for example, U.S. citizens liberated by Soviet troops from German POW camps. This section in turn could be broken down into individual topics, such as dealing with individuals turned over across the front lines, repatriated through the Odessa camp. And, the third topic would cover all those cases which are not covered by the first two. And, conceivably, we would have to deal separately with the military missions, namely, in Bucharest and Hungary. We could conclude this, call it a chapter, by citing the preliminary figure for those individuals whose names we will have been unable to determine.

The Russian section, dealing with Russian citizens, would be devoted to Russian citizens liberated from German POW camps by American troops. The second paragraph would deal with Russian citizens held in U.S. Displaced Persons Camps. The third paragraph would concern Russian citizens who served with U.S. military, and other U.S. forces. The concluding paragraph would, again, provide information that we cannot support by documents, but where we have indirect information regarding things occurring in the British zone, the French zone, et cetera.

So far as the documents are concerned, we propose to present at the beginning of each section a brief reference containing figures. And then, append copies of documents listing names.

So, that is our proposal.

Dr. Peterson: Let me ask a question and make one clarification. The Displaced Persons Camps, I believe, were United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration camps, technically, not U.S. camps.

Colonel Osipov: I am aware of this, but I also know that all camps located within the American zone, were within the U.S. military's sphere of influence, and that the commandants of these camps were Americans. I don't know what happened ultimately to this documentation, but I trust that it ended up in the U.S., rather than at the UN.

Dr. Peterson: We certainly have documents that reflect the activities surrounding the camps and we've committed to looking for that. I was only reflecting that we should probably talk about Russian citizens held in DP camps in the U.S. zone.

Colonel Osipov: That's not entirely correct. The fact is that some of the Russian citizens liberated from German camps did not end up in DP camps. Therefore, we're interested, to begin with, in the number of people who were liberated, because we honestly don't know that number, and only as a second step are we interested in where they went next.

Dr. Peterson: The second problem that I see -- it is a language problem -- is the difference between military and citizen. For the U.S. side, while we have been very grateful for information that reflects U.S. citizens, our principle purpose has been looking for U.S. military who are unaccounted for. Consequently, I would be reluctant to characterize our first section as U.S. Citizens. I would be willing to characterize it as U.S. Military. We understand, however, that you are interested in the larger question of Russian Citizens.

Colonel Osipov: That is all correct. I agree with Dr. Peterson's statements, and we are prepared to call this section, as dealing with U.S. Military liberated from POW camps. You must have noted that the Soviet command and its documentation frequently did not distinguish between military and citizens. We might encounter some problems in terms of this definition. So, this is a problem that the American side will have to tackle. We will provide overall information for both groups, and it will be up to you to distinguish who are citizens [i.e., civilians] and who are military, because we will not be able to do so.

Dr. Peterson: Obviously, we will want to look carefully at your proposal, and we will want to run it by the commission as a whole. I am a little unclear, however, about what exactly you plan to append as original documents. I think I hear you say that you wish to append copies of documents listing names?

Colonel Osipov: Yes. That is exactly what I had in mind, in the sense that we need such a document by way of a working document. As to what will be released, that is a decision to be made in May. I realize that this could be something that would take several volumes and may not be realistic to publish it all. But, so that we might be able to publish numbers, we need to have a database of names. Otherwise, the relatives will not understand the purpose of such a publication.

Dr. Peterson: This is a very large task [to accomplish] by May. Have you a proposal for the timetable of even exchanging drafts?

Colonel Osipov: The Russian side has already carried out a certain part of its work in this direction. In particular, we know all the archives where this information is kept. So, it should take somewhere between a month to a month-and-a-half to assemble all this information in a single database. And somewhere by mid-January we should be able to provide the preliminary draft. Thus, at the meeting in February or March we could arrive at a uniform decision of what we would end up with in May.

Dr. Peterson: I realize that the President of Russia wishes to release more accurate data on losses on the 50th anniversary of V-E Day, but that is a large task. What would be the reaction of preparing an interim report to be released in May?

Colonel Osipov: I don't think that we would object to that because, the ultimate is not to complete the task by V-E Day. The goal is to do quality work. I understand that we've already been working on this for more than two years and that you are only just beginning this effort. We would want to receive information that contains maximum objectivity, not the fastest available information.

Moreover, I myself face a massive translating problem with the huge amount of documentation that has been turned over. I already anticipate that one of our military schools that trains interpreter/translators will make these documents their training materials. I see no other solution.

Dr. Peterson: Let me ask MSgt Blasser to discuss how we acquired these documents to hand over to you.

MSgt Blasser: We went into our National Archives with the goal of trying to further understand what exactly happened during World War II. Our records are incomplete, contain many errors, omissions, and contradictions. At this time, we don't have a very firm grip on what exactly happened with American POWs during World War II, much less Russian POWs. With this goal in mind we went to the Archives and started looking through our official records. The logical place for us to start was with the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force, specifically, the Adjutant General's Branch, that dealt with prisoners of war. We had no idea what we were going to find in these records. But regardless of that, the records were fascinating and gave us lots of glimpses of what happened during World War II and immediately thereafter.

Our initial efforts were to find out about American POWs, but there was a wealth of information in these files regarding Russian displaced persons and prisoners of war. We made a decision that we would copy these records that dealt with Russians to provide to our colleagues. As we delved further into the records of the Adjutant General, we found clues of where to go look for more information regarding not only our POWs, but also Russian displaced persons and POWs.

At the present time, we've possibly gone through maybe 10- 15% of the material available to us.

Colonel Osipov: Is that what those two boxes are? Is that the result of that endeavor?

MSgt Blasser: Yes.

Colonel Osipov: So, I should expect another 20 boxes?

MSgt Blasser: That's possible, quite possible. But, even though with those 3,528 pages that we've provided to you, we spent well over a month just collecting these documents, and not doing any analysis. So, you can have an understanding of the enormity of the task that's in front of us.

The way we went about copying these files, was that if there was any file that had any mention of Russian displaced persons or POWs; we copied the entire file. We didn't extract a page here and a page there, we wanted to give you the entire file so that you could do a complete analysis.

Colonel Osipov: Thank you, but that doesn't make our life easier.

MSgt Blasser: Perhaps you can come up with other questions based on what you read. Often in the course of our work of translating the documents you give to us, we say to ourselves that we would like to have the documents that surround a particular page or a document that you give us, to see how it fits into the scheme of the archives. It would give us an idea of where to go look for more information. So, we wanted to afford that possibility to you. When we copied a file, the first page in the file is the archival citation that is found on the specific box that the file came from. So that if any questions arise in the future causing us to go back and look at this information, you can give us the archival citation and we'll know exactly where to go and find it.

Colonel Osipov: Excuse me for interrupting. But the fact is that, if we want to produce at least some sort of preliminary report by May, it would be extremely useful if, subsequently, the U.S. side, perhaps at a detriment to quantity, would also provide us with a preliminary analysis of the material that you hand over. Because I fear that, considering the volume that is involved, by May I will not even have an idea of what sort of information is at my disposal. And, of course, we would act correspondingly.

Dr. Peterson: The trouble with that is, we do not know what you do not know.

Colonel Osipov: I can clarify that. In contrast to you, which is a paradox, we can answer with not too much difficulty with regard to the vast majority of those Americans who have been under Soviet jurisdiction. But, also in contrast to you, we know virtually nothing about the fate of our citizens who ended up under U.S. jurisdiction. That is, excepting those contradictory figures that I have already cited.

To date, I have been unable to obtain from our General Staff the number of MIAs during that war. We do not have those figures. When you pose a question to them, they quote a figure of 1.5-2 million, quite a range. That gives you an idea of what we know. That was the approach that the State took at the time. An MIA was considered to be either dead or a traitor. And the very task that the President has assigned to us is to abolish this approach, believing that every citizen has a right to have his actions assessed honestly. Even if he's an MIA, he has the right to his honor.

So, we are proceeding from that basis.

Dr. Peterson: At lunch, we were talking with Colonel Mukhin about a very important map that is at the Military Medical Archives in St. Petersburg. It is the best map I have seen in these three years showing the movement of American POWs eastward into Russia, and southward to Odessa. The U.S. has, I believe, photographed it just with small cameras. I simply suggest that this might be an excellent illustration for our final report, and we should consider getting a professional quality photograph.

Colonel Osipov: I have no reason to object to that.

Dr. Peterson: Good. We will have the Moscow team work on it.

Let me summarize then. We will consider this proposed outline for the report. We will discuss with the U.S. delegation. We will come back to you, through Task Force Russia, with our comments on the proposal.

In general, we see the report as a statement with a few associated documents.

Do you have any further documents to pass over to us on World War II?

Colonel Osipov: The documents that we had relative to World War II were handed over to Ambassador Toon during the plenary meeting. Moreover, I'll make copies of the principle numbers that I have at my disposal, and I'll pass that on to you through Moscow.

Dr. Peterson: Fine.

Colonel Osipov: All right. If you'll let me summarize...We take it upon ourselves to prepare and turn over to you by mid-January our basic ideas regarding this report, or statement, but that's only with respect to the American side. This will enable you to ask any clarifying question that you may wish by March. And, at the same time, we hope to obtain from you at least preliminary summary information regarding Russian citizens who found themselves within the zone of influence of U.S. forces.

That's it.

Dr. Peterson: OK. Then, tomorrow, at the closing plenary, I would plan to say four things:

- That we will try to resolve the questions that remain on President Yeltsin's letter;

- That we presented a number of outstanding World War II questions on U.S. military, that, without exception, you agreed to look at;

- That we are impressed with your need for information about your World War II losses, and we'll continue to search for information;

- And finally, that we discussed the upcoming 50th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe, and the nature of a possible report on World War II casualties.

Colonel Osipov: If I may, I would rather not use the word "casualty", because in Russian, "casualties" will come out sounding like overall losses. I would prefer to talk about "clarifying the situation with

respect to a number of issues".

Dr. Peterson: Fine.

Colonel Osipov: Otherwise, Russian historians will complain that we are taking upon ourselves a task that they have been unable to carry out over the last fifty years.

Dr. Peterson: Fine.

Colonel Osipov: For my part, with regard to the concluding report to be made by General Volkogonov, if I'm asked to speak, I would make three points:

- First, that the Russian and American sides came an understanding regarding the importance of clarifying the losses in World War II, in conjunction with the coming anniversary.

- Second, both Russian and U.S. Archives contain information which make it possible to research.

- Third, we plan to release the preliminary results of our work by May.

That's all.

Dr. Peterson: Very good. I believe this has been an important first session. And I would believe that technical talks in between this meeting and the next plenary will help further our progress.

Colonel Osipov: Good. Thank you.

Eleventh Plenary U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POWs/MIAs Korean Working Group December 7 - December 9, 1994 Washington, D.C. First Session

Mr. Herbst : Good morning, my name is John Herbst and I will be taking Steve Pifers' place. I understand your desire to get things rolling. So what we will do is start with the presentation on CILHI.

This presentation is related to the question of how many servicemen from the Korean War are truly unaccounted for. The official answer is 8,100 but other sources suggest that the number is closer to 2,500.

Colonel Orlov: We even have a figure of 2,195.

Mr. Herbst: In order to come up with a definitive answer to this question, we are asking the help of the Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii or CILHI [pronounced sil-high]. CILHI, which houses the world's most sophisticated scientific forensic laboratory, plays a critical role in our efforts to determine how many American servicemen are unaccounted for from the Korean War. CILHI scientists can often identify remains based only on fragments of bone matter. For the last year, CILHI has gathered all kinds of archival material on missing servicemen. This includes personnel records, missing air crew reports, and debriefs of former POWs.

Today, SGT Sullivan and Specialist Schroeder of CILHI will be giving us a briefing on the efforts of their team to assemble a Korean War Data Base. SGT Sullivan has been a computer programmer with the U.S. Army for five years and SPC Schroeder has been a computer programmer with the U.S. Army for four years. I would like to welcome them to our group and turn the program over to them.

Specialist Schroeder: Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Specialist Schroeder and I'll be briefing you on CILHI's Report and Casualty Data Career Computer Data Base and the benefits it has for our research.

CILHI is the only unit solely responsible for the recovery and identification of those deceased from previous wars. The process involves complex components, which include investigation and recovery, casualty data, and forensic laboratory elements.

The primary focus of this is to explain the Casualty Data Office's main role in this mission and to explain the use of the Korean Database in the identification process.

Casualty data has a multifaceted role in the CILHI mission. There is basically nothing that occurs in CILHI without some type of input from the Casualty Data section. This occurs in several different forms. Casualty Data maintains files on bodies not recovered (BNR) from the Vietnam War, Korea War, and, on an as- needed basis, from World War II.

We get these files from various sources, primarily from the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, and, on occasion, from the parent services. We are able to supplement these files with information supplied from next- of-kin when there is a need for additional medical or dental information. These original files are extremely important in the research and final identification process.

Casualty Data also supports the field teams. These are the field teams that actually do the excavation of the sites. Moreover, Casualty Data is prepared to support full recovery efforts with the North Koreans if such operations should take place in the future.

We have compiled this information through the use of Field Search Case files, which can be fully explained later.

We also support the Investigation and Recovery Teams with the most complete information on the site(s) that they will be going to. The importance of this is so that the team leaders and anthropologist are able to develop the most effective site excavation strategies possible. This helps eliminate any surprises that may otherwise be encountered.

We supply the anthropologist and odontologist with the most complete medical and dental information possible on the remains.

In order to limit the list of individuals that could be associated with a given set of remains, we conduct thorough research in our data base and in historic records.

Research on the Korean War is conducted mainly through the use of the 293 File or the Individual Deceased Personnel File. These include anti-mortem files which usually contain the most recent medical information on the service member prior to his death.

This is primarily done through Form 371, which records height, weight and the circumstances of loss.

On the medical side, the 293 File does not contain as complete a medical file as does the 201 Personnel File. However. in some instances we are able to make up for this lack of information by information that we receive from the families. For example, we have received from family members copies of initial entry flight physical which contains quite a bit of detailed information.

In the 293 File we usually find dental records. While not necessarily the best dental records, they are usually hand- written, and are helpful.

All this information, except for the dental data, is inputted into our database which enables us to use on-site anthropological and odontological information.

The dental information is inputted into the Computer Assisted Post-Mortem Identification System. This system helps the odontologist come up with identification on the set of remains.

Colonel Orlov: What is that? [odontologist]

Specialist Schroeder: A dentist.

The reason that we use the 293 Files as one of our primary sources over the 201 Personnel File is due to a fire in the St. Louis record repository in the 1970's that destroyed over 75% of the Korea War era files.

Our other main source of information for research as well as for our computer database is the Field Search Case Files. They contain very detailed incident report information for the entire Korea War period. Sergeant Sullivan will explain the contents of the Field Search Case later in this briefing.

Recently the North Koreans turned over a total of 208 remains over ten (10) separate turnovers from May 1990 thru September 1994.

Congressman Johnson: Army, Navy, Air Force or what?

Specialist Schroeder: All of them.

Mr. Troyan: With regard to those 208 sets of remains, you mean ten different times they handed over a set of remains?

Specialist Schroeder: No, 208 is the complete number. Between May 1990 and September 1994, they turned over ten sets of remains varying in size from 5 to 34 remains at a time.

Mr. Troyan: So it took them [North Koreans] ten times to do it?

Specialist Schroeder: We have been able to identify four (4) sets of remains, with more identifications possible in the future.

This is a fine example on how the casualty data, together with use of the database, help provide assistance in the identification of remains. We researched the turnovers with a combination of anthropological, odontological, and area information.

The area information was supplied to us by the North Koreans. We conducted a 20 kilometer search of all personnel that might have been in the area during the war.

Congressman Johnson: The area information was provided by the North Koreans. We then took that information and looked at our records of how many U.S. personnel were in that area at that time and compared the information.

Specialist Schroeder: As in many sets of remains, the North Koreans, for instance, told us that there was a set of remains recovered near the Chosin Reservoir. And then we would try to find all personnel that were possibly in that area. For example, this might include POWs that may have travelled through the Chosin Reservoir area en route to a POW camp. All military units, all POW camps, and all cemeteries that are in that 20km search radius are included.

First, the anthropologist examines the set of remains. He will give us, to the best of his ability, a biological assessment of the set of remains. This includes for each set of remains, an assessment of the individual's race, height, and age at time of death.

[Shows an overhead slide]

What we have here is a search for a set of remains that were found by the Chosin Reservoir. According to anthropological and odontological analysis, the individual in question at the time of his death was taller than 72 inches and over 25 years of age.

As we see here, twenty-two (22) individuals match this set of parameters. We continue this process of whittling down the number of possible candidates with each bit of new information. Once we have achieved to the best of our ability the smallest number of associated names with a given set of remains (given the data available), we submit the records to the anthropologist and odontologist in the forensic

laboratory for further research.

This concludes this portion of the brief. Now Sergeant Sullivan will provide further file and database information.

Congressman Johnson: Did you ever get it down to just one?

Specialist Schroeder: We have never gotten it down to one. We have had it down to maybe three or four possibilities.

Congressman Johnson: How did you try to resolve it at that point? **Specialist Schroeder**: At this point, the odontologist will look at the criteria, compare it to records, and apply additional information supplied by the next-of-kin. For example, if an individual broke his arm when he was seven years of age, evidence of this break can be found in the bones. And information such as this can be critical in determining the identification of a set of remains.

Sergeant Sullivan: Good afternoon, I'm Sergeant Sullivan [from CILHI]. I will now go into more detail about the Korean War Personnel Database.

One of the main reasons for us starting the Korean database was demonstrated earlier by Specialist Schroeder. Using the computer data base, a search can be conducted in about two hours.

Before the database was created, one would have to manually go through over eight thousand individual deceased personnel files and about two thousand field search cases to find information.

At this time, Specialist Schroeder will pass out information to the group. These packets contain sources of information on sources of information to create our database.

Congressman Johnson: Do you think we have all the information on Korea that is available ?

Sergeant Sullivan: No sir, we don't have all the information. We make a trip to the archives in Suitland about twice a year, maybe more. A lot of the information we have now is not 100% correct. It takes a lot of man hours....

Congressman Johnson: Do you personally go through the archives or do you have people that do that?

Sergeant Sullivan: I have done it myself, sir. **Congressman Johnson**: You do it? **Sergeant Sullivan**: When we go to the achives, we only take about three personnel. We are only about twenty (20) personnel strong for South East Asia, World War II and Korea. The Korean War database is the most complete.

On the first page of the packet we have a printout. This is a printout from our Korean War database. The person involved in this packet is George Aaron. He was identified about two to three months ago. He was one of the personnel just turned over by the North Koreans.

If you turn to Tab 1, we have the Case Status Card. This card contains a synopsis of the information concerning the loss of an individual.

Congressman Johnson: Are those grid coordinates accurate?

Sergeant Sullivan: That depends, sir.

Congressman Johnson: How did you get them? Does the military write them down?

Sergeant Sullivan: This card was prepared by the Graves Registration service back in the 1950s. These cards are all pretty old.

On Tab 2, we have the Casualty Data Card. This is another card on the individual that contains more anti-mortem information.

Congressman Johnson: But where do they get it from?

Sergeant Sullivan: I am not sure where they got the information from, sir. I believe they may have gathered the information from either the 201 Files or 293 Files. Following on Tab 3 is an example of an Individual Deceased Personnel File [IDPF or 293 File]. As you flip through this packet, you will find information concerning anti-mortem information, casualty reports...

Congressman Johnson: Question... If they say the search was unsuccessful, how in the world can they provide that [information]?

Sergeant Sullivan: One of those reports is a Non-Recovery Report and that was the form they used if they could not find anything.

Congressman Johnson: So you are saying these forms may be inaccurate?

Sergeant Sullivan: It is accurate! As far as the search they did in the 1950s, they did not find anything.

If you turn to Tab 4, you will find the Field Search Cases [FSC]. FSC contains information on the incident. We have two types of FSC: Army - which covers ground losses and Air Force - which covers aircraft crashes. This is an example of an air crash. As you flip through this, you will find a summary of incidents, map overlays, information concerning the aircraft, etc.

On the final tab - Tab 5, we have a photo of the roster of U.S. dead in Korea.

Mr. Troyan: That's not a total loss of U.S. dead, is it?

Sergeant Sullivan: No, that's just the first page. The book that has the total list in it is about this thick. [He shows thickness with his hands.]

Colonel Orlov: We have even a thicker book that you gave us.

Sergeant Sullivan: Looking at that final page, you can see some of the problems we have with this information. The information was compiled over forty years ago. Some of it was stored on very low quality paper. You can see the damage to that when they made copies. Some of the other sources of information include: POW Camp Rosters - those were compiled by Big and Little Switch interrogations. We have Cemetery Rosters and Veterans Administration Rosters. **Colonel Orlov**: How about Russian documents? **Sergeant Sullivan**: Sorry we don't have too many of them. At least not where I work at CILHI. **Congressman Johnson**: Have you ever run across any other nation's casualties? **Sergeant Sullivan**: As a matter of fact, we do have information on United Nations Forces. The only thing we have from the Russians are some interrogations on shoot- downs.

Our database was created starting with the cards I showed you and later followed with the Roster of U.S. Dead in Korea. We update this database on a daily basis. Currently there is in an excess of forty thousand personnel listed in our database.

Colonel Orlov: Is that in all wars?

Sergeant Sullivan: That is just Korea. It contains all body not recovered [BNR] personnel, personnel returned to U.S. control [RMC], and resolved personnel including KIA.

Congressman Johnson: Do you have all the names there?

Sergeant Sullivan: I can't say for certain, but we are updating the database all the time.

Congressman Johnson: Do you have any data on names not in the database?

Sergeant Sullivan: Yes sir, basically on anyone that has died. We even have a very small portion of U.S civilians.

As far as our database mapper format, which is a computer software package, there are 768 characters of information for each person in the database.

A database record will include such items as name, rank, and serial number as well as information on how many people from each service were taken prisoner.

At this time, two of the most important reasons for our database are to conduct research into repatriations as well as for preparing packets for joint excavations.

We are, of course, constantly updating our database with information from Case Study Cards, Field Search Reports, and 293 Files, and, when possible, from 201 Personnel Files as well. Yet, as I have already mentioned our database is still not 100% accurate. Among the problems we face are the following: First, we have problems reading the data. And then, of course, there are always contradictory reports. Third, the fire in the Records Repository in St. Louis in 1973 destroyed many of the most valuable records.

At this time I would like to answer any questions about CILHI operations.

Colonel Orlov: I have one question regarding pilots/air force. Can you tell us with any amount of accuracy, say, for example, within the number ten (10), how many disappeared or were imprisoned in Korea?

Sergeant Sullivan: Off the top of my head I cannot get within ten (10). I believe Air Force, not including crew, less then seven hundred (700).

There are eight hundred and twenty six (826) Air Force field search cases one for each lost aircraft. (Includes all services of aircraft), not counting the crew.

Colonel Orlov: Do you know the number including the crew?

Sergeant Sullivan: I would have to access the database for that. I couldn't give that off the top of my head.

Congressman Johnson: Will the database give you that number?

Sergeant Sullivan: Yes.

Congressman Johnson: Can it also tell you which ones have been resolved?

Sergeant Sullivan: Yes.

Congressman Johnson: So you can come up with a fairly accurate number.

Sergeant Sullivan: We don't have the database here but if we did, we could have that information in less then a half hour.

Colonel Orlov: What we would like for the next session is numbers at least for the Air Force -- because we're looking for people.

Congressman Johnson: I would like a further question. You are both computer men. Why can't we get access [to your data bases] from Washington?

Sergeant Sullivan: The database right now is not set up for access by a modem at this time.

[Joking about Congress cutting money] **Colonel Orlov**: I have just one wish for my colleagues in uniform, that you stay for at least today to see what documents that we have for you.

I want to thank you personally for your great work. [Colonel Orlov then stands up, crosses the room, shakes their hands, and presents them with a souvenir *znachki* pin from Russia.]

Second Session

Congressman Johnson: At this time, I would like to give John Herbst the opportunity to say a few words.

Mr. Herbst: I am delighted to join this group. The importance of our work, I think, is evident. It is a symbol of great changes in the relationship between Washington and Moscow. And it answers the great humanitarian needs of Americans and Russians whose loved ones have disappeared in foreign wars. That is all I have to say. I am very glad to be here.

Congressman Johnson: Do you have someone from your group you would like to introduce?

Colonel Orlov: [He introduces Colonel Mukhin, Colonel Mazurov, General Lezhikov, and Mr. Korotkov]

Congressman Johnson: Do you want to begin or should I?

Colonel Orlov: If you allow me, I would like to continue in terms of what we would like to discuss. As I already said today during the opening plenary session, we suggest we discuss the following problems. Of course, the first question is the main one. The reason why the commission began work and why we exist: Were there any prisoners on the territory of the USSR?

During the last session, I think we all came to the conclusion that there was no evidence up to that session that any Americans were on the territory of the USSR. At this time, I am sorry to say, we cannot add anything to this or shed any additional light on this matter. In other words, we are continuing to search for those documents, but so far have not located any that would indicate there were any [Americans in the USSR]. Although we have looked at a tremendous number of documents from various archives, we have not found a single trace that would indicate that possibility.

Congressman Johnson: We determined that in Stalin's archives, there has been very little if any research conducted. If we had an opportunity to get into them it would be very helpful. According to our information, if someone was taken to the USSR, it would have been under a fairly secretive process that would have probably only have been known by someone at a very high level. And that is why we asked for extra help on your side to determine whether or not there were avenues to explore to resolve these questions.

Colonel Orlov: We understand your questions. And, of course, we are cooperating. Today we will pass to you two documents from Stalin's archives. The first is a discussion between Chou En-lai together with his accompanying personnel and Stalin from 20 August 1952. The second is a discussion between Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and Pak Shen En from 5 September 1952. [Colonel Orlov passes documents to Congressman Johnson].

Congressman Johnson: Thank you very much.

Colonel Orlov: I must say these are not all the documents but only extras that concern the POWs. But that does not mean that we are trying to say, 'No, we can not find anything else'. Therefore, we do not exclude the possibility that additional documents may be found. But we feel 100% certain and we believe you do, too, that any kind of mass transfer of prisoners did not take place.

Congressman Johnson: No, I feel that if there were some taken, it would have been for a specific purpose and not en mass. But I have said before, and, I think you agree, that many answers lie in China itself and with the information you have received. Obviously your leaders were talking to the Chinese leaders at the time and, perhaps, there can be more documentation uncovered from these conversations.

Colonel Orlov: I would like to allow someone more competent in archival work to address that issue.

Mr. Korotkov: This is the first time I have participated in the work of this particular section of the Commission. But it does not mean that the actions in Korea did not fall into the archives of the President. But, of course, our mission in the archives is to provide to the Commission any data that is relevant to the Commission's needs. Already copies of archival material related to the Cold War, Vietnam War, and Korean War have been passed to the U.S. side.

I must say that the entire complex of documents that is located in the Presidential Archive is being examined. I, of course, want to right away remove the possibility of a disaster occurring. I want to guarantee to you that the Stalin [era] documents are being examined and are being separated [for placement in other archives], as are any other documents that are related to the work of the Commission.

I am sorry to say that documents from the Stalin period are distributed over numerous archives and only a portion of them [the documents] is located within the Presidential archives. I am sorry to say that the Presidential archives do not include any research material relative to foreigners or that in any way, shape, or form were **not** related to governmental activities at the highest level.

The limited number of people that have access to these archives, of course, creates certain difficulties in that there is an insufficient amount of time to conduct work in search of new documents that are of interest to our Commission. An important clarification to this is a reminder that our work is conducted continuously, not periodically. And the search for additional documents depends on the development of new facts that are derived from documents acquired in other archives.

The material from the military archives passed to us by Colonel Mukhin showed that Soviet interpreters were involved in interpreting the protocols from the interrogations of U.S. POWs in Vietnam. Of course, we feel this is a very important and new factor that will help us find in our archives additional information regarding these activities.

There are certain specifics regarding the documents within our archives.

Of course the specificity of these documents lies in the fact that they were targeted at the highest level of government and had a more general type of data rather than very specific data. Most often, these documents did not include specific details that would allow one to learn specific information about an individual case.

If I may express my thoughts - the search for secondary information is often very difficult, and it is hard to find because of its general nature. However, at the same time, it [secondary information] can have a very important impact. Nevertheless, the work of the Commission in the archives will continue regarding all stages of the Korean War.

I must say that there is no opposition that will get in the way of our work regarding this Commission. There is only the factor of time which limits us. Objectively speaking, all the conditions are there so that we can continue this work into the future. We are very interested in both the search and discovery of any new data that will help the Commission because we understand the great humanitarian meaning of the Commission's work. If there are any questions, I am prepared to answer them.

Congressman Johnson: Thank you very much. I appreciate your effort in attempting to help us. Until you have families come and attack you, then and only then do you realize the importance of your work. I think you understand.

Mr. Herbst: With that in mind, I would like to ask a question that may be a bit sensitive. You mention that access to the Presidential Archives is very restricted. It would be helpful to us as we prepare to meet American families here, if we were able to send some one to look into the archives - perhaps, with your assistance. Is this possible, and, if it is not, what should we tell the families?

Mr. Kortokov: I want to repeat one more time that the status of the Presidential Archives is such that it just forbids or prevents any access by foreigners, and not only just foreigners but even [Russian] citizens that are somehow not related to activities of the government. If we are talking about individual documents that somehow relate to the Commission, they will be passed to you as Colonel Mukhin said. They will be passed to you and will be made available to you.

I also want to add that also according to a new Presidential decree, there is an entire effort to declassify many documents that were formerly highly classified - including documents in the Presidential Archives.

In the final analysis I anticipate that the majority of the documents will eventually be declassified and everyone will have access. I would also like to mention the Presidential Decree that has ordered us to transfer all documents written before 1963 to the Central Russian Archive. This activity will be completed, in my judgment, in 1995. Starting in early 1995, all those documents that will have been transferred will be accessible to virtually anyone - including, of course, citizens of the United States.

Congressman Johnson: Let me just thank you and say that Iþm impressed, and request that you will continue with your vigilance to help us.

Colonel Orlov: Thank you.

Congressman Johnson: Thank you.

Colonel Orlov: Therefore, since we canþt add anything else regarding this particular question today, I propose the following conclusion. We conclude, that at the present time, proof of the transfer or arrival of U.S. prisoners-of-war on the territory of the USSR has not been determined. We will continue to pursue this route [of inquiry].

Mr. Herbst: I wonder if instead of the word 'proof' or 'evidence' if we should use the phrase 'no conclusive proof or evidence'?

[Both sides argue over the semantics of the closing statement on this issue.]

Colonel Orlov: Let's say 'no documentary evidence'. [Both sides agree with this choice of wording.]

Congressman Johnson: We have 1,2,3,4,5 items to discuss and I do not want them to be over looked this time. [NOTE: Congressman Johnson emphatically counted from 1 to 5.] The last time I met with you we ran out of time. We want to ask a series of questions and we want some answers. We have asked you some already in a letter that I gave you earlier. Those questions still have not been answered. Several sessions ago, we asked questions to which we still do not have answers. So I donþt want to say that the session is over and we are not going to do anything tomorrow. I want to finish some today and continue tomorrow until we come to a conclusion or compromise on both sides.

Colonel Orlov: Yes, of course. Please go ahead. **Congressman Johnson**: You continue and tell us what you were about to say. Then if itþs OK with you, we will begin with these questions.

Colonel Orlov: We have a list of aircrew, not just pilots. Why do I speak specifically about the Air Force crews? Because we have the greatest progress in that area. In the near future, perhaps we can resolve some of the issues surrounding some aircrews. Because if we widen the search now, for example, we have our greatest chance of learning more about Air Force crews. **Congressman Johnson**: What happened last time was that you asked us for a list. We said we did not have a complete list. So you said you would take what we had. We gave it to you but we continued to refine it so that it would be more

accurate. This one is a list [pointing to the list of naval aircraft losses] that probably has less names in it than the last one, but it is still not the final product.

Colonel Orlov: The problem is that both Colonel Mukhin and I checked this list. But our experience from our searches is that other than airmen, we donþt find anybody else. Itþs understandable because our whole experience was with your aircrews.

Congressman Johnson: OK. Does that say you have no documentation with the North Koreans and/or Chinese concerning ground forces? You found nothing? Can you explain why that would be?

Colonel Orlov: We had no direct contact with ground forces.

Congressman Johnson: So then, all the Russian interrogations were with pilots? But, I recall some discussion of interrogations with mechanics of aircraft. **Colonel Orlov**: But they were also Air Force. We look at them as pilots. We call them by the general description - airmen. Our ground forces had no contact with Americans. And we have no documents showing contacts. Our anti-aircraft personnel and pilots or airmen were the only ones with whom had contact. Therefore, we have no documents.

Congressman Johnson: Were all the anti- aircraft locations in North Korea and China?

Colonel Orlov: There were four divisions. Two were defending the capital [Pyongyang]. I know there will be questions regarding the other two divisions . And I wanted to answer two questions that are coming regarding them. Therefore Iþll answer it ahead of time. The 35th Division which defended hydroelectric stations - Iþm sorry to say or, maybe, thank God, - didnþt shoot down too many aircraft -- only five. **Congressman Johnson**: Was this near the Chosin Reservoir? **Colonel Orlov**: No, Suxpon hydroelectric station. Of course, here are the documents that characterize the shootdowns done by the 35th Anti-Aircraft Division from the AAA archives.

This is the report and table. Also there was a witness statement from the village soviet [council] by the Koreans. It is here, as is a map of the location where the aircraft was shot down. Therefore, to our young people at the CILHI labs, it will be interesting. Therefore, I now give you four sets of documents. To continue along this line regarding the air defense divisions, we have one division remaining - the 92nd.

The 92nd defended a bridge between China and Korea. There were not too many attempts to attack while the unit was stationed there. There is only one archival reference regarding the times of its activity.

Regarding the other three divisions, I have already given you complete documentation. There is the report of the shoot down that notes the type of aircraft, provides a map, and a statement of the village soviet signed by witnesses, etc. As for the 92nd AAA, there are no such documents.

Congressman Johnson: OK. Thank you very much.

Colonel Orlov: And, in conclusion, Colonel Mukhin has a concern. I would like to pass four names of our pilots who did not come back from combat missions [from the Korean War] who are missing in action. Maybe in your documents you'll find something regarding these four soldiers.

Congressman Johnson: Do we have dates and times?

Colonel Orlov: Yes, we do. And, now, of course, we would like to hear questions from Congressman Johnson.

Congressman Johnson: We will look for these four. Now I would like to ask a question. We have given you three pieces of information already, one of which proves that Colonel Lovell was aboard the RB-45. This is the aircraft that we have been discussing previously as Captain McDonoughþs aircraft. I guess what I am asking is would you see if you have any further information on Lovell as far as interrogations are concerned? He was in the same RB-45 as McDonough.

Colonel Orlov: Tell me all the information you have and then we will give you the answer tomorrow.

Congressman Johnson: OK. There is one new issue that I would like to address. In recent months, there have been articles in the Russian press about the special purpose camps. According to the press reports, as well as testimony from a Russian sourcewhom we have interviewed, these were super-secret camps set up by the NKVD, later the MGB, to assist in the construction of the Soviet atomic bomb.

The author of one article even wrote that the LONs, as they called them so highly classified and so few witnesses survived that they are neither described in books by Solzhentysn or by other authors who studied Stalin. Since Task Force Russia began its interview program in Russia, information on the Stalinist camp system has interested us and General Kalinin has been helpful in our efforts to visit these camps in the past and the present. Since these articles are now appearing in the Russian press, our interest in that camp system is renewed and this is especially true of the camps that were supposedly super- secret and engaged in high-tech endeavors.

Colonel Orlov: The question is very clear.

Congressman Johnson: The idea is that perhaps Americans were taken to help you in your high-tech efforts, and we would like to have your assistance in confirming whether they existed or not. If indeed they did, could you give us their names and locations, the location of the camp archive, and access to those archives and or the camps and the names of any foreigners at those camps, especially Americans?

Colonel Orlov: We understand.

Congressman Johnson: New issue. Do you have that issue?

[Russian members discuss among themselves the issue of the LON camps.]

Paul Vivian: I can give that to you. [Showed Colonel Orlov notebook with section on LON camps]

Congressman Johnson: I'll give you what I just said. [Hands notes to Colonel Orlov] At an earlier plenum, you provided us with AAA reports from the 28th and 87th divisions and they were very helpful. According to a report from a subunit an F-80 was shot down on 16 July 1953, and a parachute was seen. A search party, consisting of a Major Kalin, a sergeant, and a private was dispatched to find the parachute. It's unclear whether the search party found the parachutist because the report talks only of the effort of the firing battery to get credit for the kill.

During the war, we did the same thing. We shot down one of your PO-2s and there were fifteen [units] that claimed credit for it.

A review of the U.S. records indicates that on the same date, we lost a F-84 piloted by a Lt. William Anthony Voss, who was not repatriated after the war.

The historic record indicates he radioed that he was ejecting, which makes us believe that he got out. It tracks with the fact the Soviet gunners saw a parachute, but they called it an F-80. We called it an F-84. The confusion of battle may have caused the difference and could account for an incorrect identification of the aircraft. The similarity makes us think it is the same aircraft, and all we would like from your side is any additional information you might provide us, especially the results of search groups that saw the parachute, the daily operational reports from the 64th for that period, and anything that might help clear that up...Oh! is that it right there!

[Colonel Mukhin hands papers to Congressman Sam Johnson]

Congressman Johnson: That solves the problem there, OK. [laughter]

Colonel Mukhin: On the same date the search party found the aircraft next to the village of [Kamandu]

and took, as proof, part of the turbine with the number.

Congressman Johnson: Do you have the number there?

Colonel Mukhin: Yes.

Congressman Johnson : We can track it.

Congressman Johnson: We have only a few more minutes to do this so I am going to get through as much as I can. One of the most bothersome issues facing the Korean War Working Group, is the issue of the MGB or Security Service involvement in the interrogation of American POWs. After the last plenary, which I apologize for missing, you were shown two documents, each of which shows MGB involvement in the interrogation of Americans. Do you recall this?

Colonel Orlov: I have those documents and will be ready to answer tomorrow.

Congressman Johnson: OK, we need not go further. What we are asking is whether you try to tell us what role the MGB played in those interrogations?

Mr. Troyan: He said [referring to Colonel Orlov] we are ready to answer regarding the role. As you ask us the question; we will answer what we know.

Congressman Johnson : Tomorrow, we will do that tomorrow.

Mr. Troyan: That completes four issues.

Congressman Johnson: I have some family issues that...

Colonel Orlov: I also have questions involving families.

Congressman Johnson: Good! Tomorrow morning. Is that satisfactory?

Colonel Orlov: Yes.

Congressman Johnson: Because I think the day is growing long. We are in the midst of organizing in the Congress and we are too close -----[Voice tapers off and is inaudable]

I would like to thank our friends from CILHI for being here and for the presentation that you made. I apologize ahead of time for missing this evening's event with you. I will be with you tomorrow in the Capital. I hope that you have a good time. Tell him [pointing to Colonel Orlov] - don't tell too many stories!

Third Session

Congressman Johnson: Thank you for the data you gave us yesterday. However, at the last plenum, Colonel Mazurov told us that we would be provided with Soviet material from the 510 List. It was compiled from the security services' archives, and I was wondering if it was obtained and is it coming to us?

Colonel Mazurov: We worked the list of those listed as MIAs in Korea. As soon as we finished that work in 1992, I reported to the Commission the results of that work. A letter was sent to General Volkogonov. That letter was published in the Independent newspaper. The article in the newspaper is titled "Russian Intelligence Does Not Forget About Glasnost". The first part of that article talks about POWs and activities on POWs in Korea.

In the archival material of the external intelligence agency, we found data from 1951 related to 510

military servicemen of the U.S. Army. Also found were data on 27 persons that were without citizenship who were located in prisons of North Korea. The data was received from the Korean and Chinese side. Based on the protocols of interrogations of American military personnel, participation by representatives of the Soviet intelligence did not occur. The final fate of these people is unknown to us.

In other words, the list of 510 was based on material we received from the Koreans and the Chinese. They are the source of the data.

Congressman Johnson: Well, are we saying that the North Koreans and Chinese lied?

Colonel Mazurov: I don't know.

Congressman Johnson: We just can't prove the information. Is that what you're saying?

Colonel Mazurov: What we received from the Chinese and Koreans we openly and honestly put on the table. If we had other materials that would somehow support these, we would have passed them to the Commission. In fact, later we found some more data on four additional U.S. servicemen that were POWs in Korea and informed the U.S. side right away. We're really talking about 514 persons. To say with absolute certainty, that we have no other materials, is not possible. No one could say that. We have continued to search for any materials regarding U.S. POWs and should we find any, you will certainly receive it. I think that based on this data, you have both the moral and legal right to conduct talks with the Koreans and Chinese.

From the Russian perspective, for us to broach this subject with either the Chinese or the North Koreans, would, first of all be unethical, and second of all, from a political perspective, would be interfering in their policy.

Congressman Johnson: We have problems internally with our policies as well. (Jokingly suggests we join forces- laughter)

Okay, thank you, we'll start with another subject if we may. I would like to come back to the case of McDonough. We gave you information that indicated that Lovell was in that aircraft as well. I was wondering since you said Captain McDonough died in the presence of a Soviet officer, could we obtain the report that talks specifically of that day?

Mr. Vivian: We understand from Paul Lashmar, who interviewed Fyodovich Andrianov, the pilot who shot down the RB-25, there was a Soviet officer named Filanov or Firanov who was present when McDonough died. What happened was that apparently McDonough was killed by a mob of North Koreans.

Colonel Orlov: I can say the following things regarding this incident. We gave you two documents that were signed by Krasovskii, the main Soviet advisor in China. In one of the documents it says that McDonough was taken into the prison in a wounded state. He had stated that "one" member of the crew was killed and the third crew member, ran away.

The second report that came ten days later, stated that he [McDonough] died on his way to the camp. That's all the evidence we have. As concerning the interview with Filanov and Lashmar, I am aware of that; I participated in that too. But I don't know what the interview was between Lashmar and Filanov. The fact that he died apparently comes from the interview. This is the first time I've heard that a crowd beat him and killed him.

From the three people in the crew, the best that I can ascertain is "one" ran away, "one" was killed and "one" died. There was no mention of Lovell anywhere, and he's "not" on the Air Force list. [Note: Unclear which list he refers to; at Plenum, U.S. side provided a document to the Russian side that indicates that Colonel Lovell was on the McDonough RB-45.]

Congressman Johnson: That is why we want to get into this again, because I think we have these people mixed up.

Colonel Orlov: That's possible. You are welcome to talk to Filanov again.

Congressman Johnson: The idea that I have is that Lovell was put on the aircraft late and was not on the manifest.

Colonel Orlov: That's possible. We just don't have the data.

Congressman Johnson: One hypothesis argues that the man that went to prison was Lovell. and the man that was stoned by the people in a cart was McDonough.

[Discussion among Americans and Russians]

Colonel Orlov: One minute please. Who was Lovell? Was he the one killed out of three?

Background voice: ... Were there four?...

Colonel Orlov: But McDonough talked about three.

Congressman Johnson: My point is, that I believe in some of your archives there is information on Lovell. He was, like some of you, an Intelligence Officer and therefore not listed as part of that crew. And I feel you knew it and treated him that way. I'm not trying to contradict or belittle the way you do things because we'd probably do the same thing. We just want to find out...what happened to him. Was McDonough the man in the cart who was beaten up by the Koreans and was in fact Lovell killed in prison? That would solve the whole case for us.

Colonel Mukhin: Here is your questionnaire in front of me. I gave a copy of it to Podol'sk and they checked on whether those names are listed. I'm showing you this then, their notations right here that were completed by the archivists. Next to Charles McDonough there's a plus [mark]. This indicates there are documents showing that he was listed, and, next to Lovell, there is no mark.

Colonel Orlov: And may I add something? Don't forget, McDonough we found ourselves. We didn't know anything about Lovell. If he was there, we would have also his [name]. But everything we knew about the crew, we passed.

It was the daughter [Nancy Lovell Dean] of Lovell who writes, maybe he went to a Chinese camp. She writes that there was a transmission of some kind about a LTC Morell and that maybe there is an error there [this is the daughter writing] and that maybe they meant that it was Lovell. But that's also an assumption.

And now in relation to the supposition 'Was it worthwhile to hide the names of such a high ranking intelligence officer?" As evidenced by the experience of the Korean War, as soon as there was any high-level individual, immediately they used him for propaganda purposes. It was that way with Arnold Black, and staff officers. [Russian members cite various names as examples]

Congressman Johnson: That is their style. But could I just ask that you keep looking for that name for us? It may be in some other archives.

Colonel Mukhin: In this article everything is stated. Soviet intelligence did not participate in interrogations. There is a difference between political [MGB/KGB] and military intelligence. Political intelligence did not participate. Only military intelligence participated and the tactical ones shookÞem. [Colonel Mukhin gestures a shaking motion.]

Congressman Johnson: New subject; I'd like to discuss Major George Davis. At the time of his shoot

down in February of 52 [1952], he was the leading American Ace. The leadership of the 64th viewed the shoot down positively, and the pilot credited with the kill was awarded the Order of Lenin. Based on the report of the wingman, we believe he parachuted and could have survived.

There was a Chinese Officer named Xiu [pronounced shoe] who claims to have turned over to the Russians in February 52 an American pilot named Davis or David.

Colonel Mukhin: When?

Russians: The same month.

Congressman Johnson: 10th of February 52 was when he was shot down.

Mr. Troyan: No, No when does Xiu claim he passed him [to the Soviets]?

Congressman Johnson: That same month. We feel the Soviets in the 64th would have made an effort to find him as well as locate the wreckage of the aircraft. And therefore we wonder if we could have any copies of search reports for the period of 10th of February as well as any information in February from the Chinese that might lead to Major Davis.

Colonel Mukhin: Regarding Davis, we already did two complete searches, both along the lines of flight documents and documents of the Anti Aircraft [64th]. In neither location did we find his name. Most likely, we believe the Koreans seized him and did not show him to us.

Colonel Orlov: More likely to Chinese since there was this Xiu.

Colonel Mukhin: Koreans? Chinese? Well maybe Chinese. Anyway I will note it again and look one more time. I need the exact date.

Congressman Johnson: 10 February 1952.

Colonel Mukhin: What area?

Congressman Johnson: I don't remember.

Colonel Mazurov: From where did you receive the data that the Chinese turned over an American pilot?

Colonel Orlov: I just want to remind you that according to U.S. data you have one aircraft shot down that day and according to our data there were two shot down that day.

Colonel Mazurov: The last question I have is about dates. Do you have the date he was shot down by AAA or aircraft? But if the Chinese shot him down, then he most likely ended up in a Chinese camp. The Chinese, compared to the Koreans, didn't always tell the Soviets.

Congressman Johnson: Yes, except the information we have indicates that he was turned over to you. Let me just tell you there is a television documentary being made by BBC and I understand that part of this may be included in it.

Colonel Mukhin: We will need the exact name, first, last, etc.

Congressman Johnson: We'll have that for you later on today.

Colonel Orlov: I will get together with the producers and find out all their names.

Ms Smith: We understand that most of the information they got from Podol'sk.

Colonel Mukhin: Most of the data is the same as that here in Paul Cole's book [pointing to Paul Cole's Rand Corporation Study on Korea, Volume 1]. These are people that work with Gavril Korotkov. Here are their addresses [list of names and addresses passed to U.S. side]; you can talk with them if you like. This filming group came under my strict control. We sat this old man down[who was giving most of the data during the interview], and they filmed it. They asked me to give an interview, but I refused. You can watch the film but you'll never find Mukhin. [everyone laughs]

Ms Smith: Colonel Mukhin, were you there while they were filming?

Colonel Mukhin: Yes, of course.

Mr. Troyan: They just handed a book to some man that was sitting there and said here are the archives of Podol'sk.

Congressman Johnson: Did they [BBC] actually look through the archives?

Colonel Mukhin: No. The old files, like those on Korea, are kept in an old storage area that's not very well kept. We can't show foreigners these bad looking storage areas. (laughter) So we took them to a new building, and gave them new books, the first book we found. And Mukhin was the director. (laughter)

Congressman Johnson: That's the way the movies work.

Ms Smith: Did he hand them operational summaries that Americans were found because that's what they're telling us?

Colonel Mukhin: No, No. Just what we have passed to you. Photographs of destroyed aircraft, data plates, one file. The total time spent there was an hour and a half.

Congressman Johnson: No kidding, no kidding!

Ms Smith: That's our problem with this. They are building it up to us as if they saw things that we have not seen.

Congressman Johnson: Well, let's go on. Another important case is Colonel Robert Martin, who was Commander of the 34th Infantry Regiment. According to one of the documents that you gave us, which is on the overhead [Enc. Telegram No. 406466] the capture of this commanding officer was reported to General Zakharov with copies to Stalin. Based on the date of the telegram, plus a review of U.S. records, this telegram could have only referred to Colonel Martin who is carried as MIA on our rolls and is a ground officer. However, you claim you never talked to him.

Colonel Orlov: Of course, I don't personally know about this document. How do you know that it deals specifically with ground forces?

Congressman Johnson: Because it's the only person it could because of the date, place and all the ...

Mr. Vivian: Because it says the 34th Regiment. [pointing to overhead]

Colonel Orlov: I understand. We're not saying never. What we're saying is the majority of the cases were all aviation. For example, General Dean [Commander, U.S. 24th Infantry Division], was interrogated. And, of course, there were others but we are citing just the cases we have found. And again you must remember that the advisory apparatus was running this operation before the creation or assignment of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps there in Korea. The 64th didn't get there till November. [1950]

Colonel Mukhin: I would like a copy of this so I can examine it closer. [Mr. Vivian then passes photocopy to Colonel Mukhin]

Congressman Johnson: Thank you. Anything you can find.

Colonel Orlov: The next question concerns foreigners in special camps that were mentioned yesterday.

Congressman Johnson: Ah yes, yes do you have something.

Colonel Orlov: General Lezhnikov is ready to answer you.

Congressman Johnson: Oh, go ahead, please.

General Lezhnikov: This is not a new question. The question regarding special camps or camps of special designation is not the first time its been raised. And more than once General Kalinin and I both said, "Yes there were camps of special designation." But again I repeat that foreign citizens, I have in mind prisoners-of-war, military prisoners, and especially Americans were NEVER MAINTAINED IN THOSE CAMPS [General Lezhnikov becomes animated and states this emphatically]. There is an adequate amount written about it in literature. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, for example, writes about it in his book First Circle. In some camps there were very important Soviet scientists - people like Tupolov and many others. Special situations were created for them so they could continue to work. The situation around all these camps was unquestionably very secretive. As for access by any foreign prisoners to those areas, it was unthinkable. We discussed this with General Kalinin yesterday. We are ready to show you every one of these camps. We can organize trips there to show your people. Members of your side have already been to many camps. I would like to emphasize one more time that that people are writing about these camps today. In our press there is a lot written about the various camps, both factual and a lot of fictional material. Foreign military prisoners, to include Americans, were NEVER HELD [General Lezhikov once again becomes emphatic] in these camps.

Congressman Johnson: We have people in this country who would say that there was "a" camp for Americans inside Russia, perhaps inside Korea, perhaps inside China. I recognize there is no positive evidence to support this but you can't categorically say there is no, nor was there ever a camp for American POWs inside the Soviet Union.

General Lezhnikov: Yes, that is true, with the exception of the 14th Tashkent Camp.

Congressman Johnson: [to U.S. side] Do we know about this?

[U.S. side discussion]

Mr. Troyan: We know about it but we haven't been there.

General Lezhnikov: If it was our territory, you would have gone there already.

Congressman Johnson: We've got several more [issues] that I wish to bring to your attention rather quickly. In fact, we can give you copies of this later, and you can answer later if you can't do it today.

Congressman Johnson: Okay, The fourth case is that of LT Robert Niemann. We know from Viktor Bushuyev that LT Niemann survived the crash of his aircraft. We also know his personal effects were collected by Soviet authorities and cataloged. He's listed in a Soviet document as having passed through an interrogation point, but we do not know what ultimately happened to him. It seems likely that there would be some report in the files of the 64th that might show how he died and where his remains were disposed. We wondered if you had any further information on that case.

Colonel Orlov: Well, of course, there is Bushuyev's evidence in this book [shows Paul Cole's book]. But from what I know, what Bushuyev says is that he personally never saw him. He only saw the document. And Donets [Gennady Semyonovich Donets- former intelligence officer with the 64th FAC] says, those documents passed through his hands as did many of your pilots.

Based on all this information from Bushuyev and Donets and the other data that we had in previous sessions, I thought we came to the conclusion that both Tenney and Niemann had died.

Congressman Johnson: The reason I ask this question again today is because members from his family will be here today as part of their family forum. We just want to be certain there was nothing new.

Colonel Orlov: The only thing we can say is what we've already said. We can only assume their death is based on witnesses but not on any documentary evidence that we have.

Congressman Johnson: Why don't we take a five minute break.

Colonel Orlov: That's fine.

BREAK

Colonel Orlov: We would like to clarify the questions regarding the documents a copy of which we have, the documents from Ignatiev.

Congressman Johnson: Good. I was going to ask you about that.

Colonel Orlov: We have a lot of uncertainty regarding this document. First of all, this copy of the document is not signed by anybody. Is it possible this is not a document but portions of a document? In the document itself, there is no mention at all of any participation of our people in this.

Congressman Johnson: This is a document you gave us.

Colonel Orlov: Most importantly, we cannot find the source of the document. Mukhin didn't give it to us, Pikhoya didn't give to us, Korotkov didn't give it to us. In different documents, you have exact archival information. In this one there is nothing. We cannot find anything...

Mr. Troyan: Excuse me for interjecting, I see a note here TFR-76-23. That's probably what we sent to you.

Mr. Vivian: We gave them that copy.

Mr. Troyan: But the TFR-76-23 is your notation and not from us but from Moscow?

Mr. Vivian: That's correct.

Mr. Troyan: Because anything we send them [from TFR Moscow] we log what it is.

Colonel Orlov: The only signature is...(discussions on both sides)

Colonel Orlov: Colonel Mukhin gave this document to us, the attachment. However, the first one could be from the KGB because of Ignatiev.

Mr. Troyan: Looking at these things at the top, could it be from the presidential office?

Colonel Orlov: No, No.

Colonel Korotkov: Most of the document is not signed but because of the high level people on it, it could have been a project of some kind.

Colonel Orlov: We're very interested in seeing the original the document. Possibly next to these names, which is what normally happened in those days, there would be some notation as to whether to provide help to the Chinese or not to provide help.

Congressman Johnson: Yes, I've seen those. You've shown us those documents. But when we get the documents from you...you take all that out. So it's difficult for us to provide the original.

Colonel Orlov: We had incidents where sometimes a document would be written to be forwarded to the higher levels, but somewhere in the chain somebody would say this letter is not going to be sent. The first three copies were destroyed and the last copy was left in the file. Here it is usually noted that the letter was not approved and destroyed by so and so.

This paper just throws a shadow on top of a shadow. We have no way of telling where it came from. We need to know the source.

Congressman Johnson: When you give us documents, all we can do is accept them at face value. The point is, I don't think you disagree that the MGB did interrogate Americans and that there probably are other documents like that in your...archives. It suggests that there are other documents like that in your files that possibly we need to look at to try to resolve some of these POW issues.

Colonel Orlov: We agreed a long time ago that the specificity of your Intelligence services, namely in relation to recruitment of personnel for agent type work or espionage, is conducted all the time regardless of whether there is a war on or no war on. So to begin looking at things like that, it doesn't matter whether it was the Korean War or not, is beyond the realm of our commission. We cannot take it upon ourselves to start looking at every intelligence operation.

Congressman Johnson: Even though they refer to American POWs that were interrogated?

Colonel Orlov: It's possible because we do not know how relations were between our security and intelligence services and the Chinese intelligence services. The only document that was found, of course, is the 510 document. We cannot determine where this document came from, or what its source is.

Mr. Troyan: It is my suggestion that you task us in Moscow and let us look through what we have because we keep copies of virtually everything. We have at least some sort of notation such as received on this date from so and so, etc.

Congressman Johnson: But the second document that does have a cite number...

Colonel Orlov: Yes that one is very clear but this is from a completely different source. It is obviously from a military organization, but this one is different and we cannot find it. In the service of Intelligence, such a document has not been located.

Congressman Johnson: Well, let's close that issue for the present, leaving it open for discussion. Let me tell you that we just discussed Davis, George Davis. Here is the complete information on him which we have obtained just now, and I'll pass it to you. [passes document to Colonel Orlov]

Mr. Vivian: He crashed 12 miles Southeast of Sanchung.

Colonel Orlov: Thank you. We will go to work on this as soon as we get back.

Congressman Johnson: Let me continue if I might with some of these other families. The reason I'm going through these names again is that some of these families are going to be here today.

Congressman Johnson: The name Layton we discussed before. He parachuted out on 2 September 1951 near the mouth of the Chong Chong river and was picked up, according to reports, by persons aboard a large power boat operated by the enemy. We wonder if you have any additional information on his demise.

Colonel Orlov: We have a list of 35 airmen that did not return. After that, we clarified a number of these cases, and we have remaining 13 people. If we consider that Tenney and Niemann are acknowledged to

be KIA rather than MIA ,then we have 11 people. Of course, if we manage to solve the fates of those 11 people, then we will be very successful.

Congressman Johnson: But do we know that Tenney and Niemann did die? Are there facts to support that?

Colonel Orlov: Well, there are two witnesses. There are documents and of course Donets. He states he heard him scream over the radio [Tenney]. In fact he wanted to write a letter to his father, Admiral Tenney. Regarding Niemann, of course both Bushuyev and Donets saw the documents.

[Discussions on both sides]

Congressman Johnson: How about Montgomery? What do you have on him?

Colonel Orlov: Well, first of all we should clarify all the lists because here's a list of just F-86 pilots. We have a number of lists. Here's one list given to us by the U.S. side that is called the list of 187 even though there are only 150 names on it. And it's an official Air Force manual. Also there is another list that we gave you of 59 people of which 56 were confirmed by you. Then there's this list with 32 names provided by the U.S. side. Additionally, there is the Rand book that talks about a list of 42. Finally there is the list of 262 names of people who passed through Interrogation Points. From the official data from the Air Force, the total number of air crewmen for whom the fates are unknown and who did not return from prison, was 249. So the question arises, why do we have 262? We cannot find that list of interrogations but we can assume that, based on the list of 59, with errors and repetitions, the percentage of errors is five percent. So if you compare the 249 number to the 262 number, you'll find that it happens to be exactly five percent.

[Congressman Johnson and Mr. Vivian discuss lists]

Congressman Johnson: Can we copy those three lists so that we're all talking about the same material..

[Long discussion on lists on both sides]

Congressman Johnson: All right, all right, let me rephrase it without using the list. Do you have any information on Mandra or Montgomery or O'Meara ?

Colonel Orlov: First of all, I would like to continue my thought. We've been working together for two years and we've been working in a piecemeal method, making the main strike at the main enemy. The main direction of our efforts should be the Air Force. Why I say that is that was what was the greatest interest to the Soviet intelligence agencies. Therefore, we have the greatest number of documents regarding those people. Also, we have the greatest degree of progress in that area regarding airmen. I propose that we concentrate our efforts on the Air Force. So if we do that - that is, answer the questions on the few remaining names where we're uncertain - we can say the main enemy has been overcome. That question is finished.

Congressman Johnson: These three names I just gave you are Air Force personnel.

Colonel Orlov: Please let me finish. Everything that concerns the Air Force, of course, we've been concentrating on and we're searching very actively for. There are other lists. Last week we received this list from the Navy, and now there are some more additions regarding the Marine Corps. Of course, we continued our search based on these lists. If we managed to find anything at all regarding airmen of the Air Force, we can't seem to find anything at all regarding the Navy or the Marine Corps personnel so far. There is an additional factor, the relatives. As far as relations and family members are concerned, they don't' care what we concentrate on or what we know or don't know. They have lost a dear one and it doesn't matter if he was Infantry, Navy or Air Force. They want to know what "his" fate was. But I think we should state very honestly and up front that as little information as we manage to find regarding the Air Force, the chances of finding something regarding the other services is even less to none because

Soviet intelligence was just not interested. In a nutshell, that is where we stand at the present time. If they were Air Force, there is at least a chance that if they ever passed through our hands, we would have something. I recommend that with the Navy and Marine Corps MIAs you should start with the Chinese and Koreans.

I received a letter from the daughter of Lawson. He was in the Marine Corps, 7th regiment. You might compare where the Marines were located and where Soviet aviation was located. There are many cases like that. We shouldn't fill the family members with false hopes or illusions.

Congressman Johnson: Well let me make two points, if I may. Your AAA reports from your regiments are very important in our research. If there were any Navy aircraft shot down, they would have reported it. They may have "called" it Air Force.

Colonel Orlov: Yes, that is a very important fact you brought up. All they cared about was that the aircraft was shot down.

Congressman Johnson: Whatever additional AAA records we can get to try to resolve this, we can pair up ourselves [Navy vs. AF], if we had the shoot down information. It would be very helpful.

Colonel Orlov: I agree.

Congressman Johnson: There are documents that I mentioned earlier, TFR 300-1 to 300-2 and 148-6 to 148-7, that talk specifically of Soviet intelligence reports on infantry and tank captures which are definitely ground forces. Now, I don't know when those happened. But they happened and for us to ignore any ground based troops would be wrong. We have to look at all of them. I grant you there are a lot of soldiers who are buried in Korea today. We haven't gone back to get their remains because of the problems with that country. But some of this was in your intelligence arena, and if such information is there, we would like to know about it to try to resolve the deaths.

Colonel Orlov: I don't disagree with you. However, most ground forces came to us from the Koreans and Chinese through advisors. Don't forget that was the beginning of the war and the 64th was not even there yet.

Congressman Johnson: Did they make reports?

Colonel Orlov: Yes, of course, they did while there were prisoners. But in 1951 there were no more prisoners.

Mr. Herbst: We agree that there is more information on air-related issues. We do have from your documents instances where our ground forces may have come in contact with your forces. In these cases, we have an obligation to pursue what happened. We want to know even the general points from your documents. Taskings were given by the General Staff to collect information in this area. For that reason also, it makes sense to see if there might be a large collection of documents that might pertain to our ground forces. This might not be the main thrust of your efforts, but it cannot be ignored.

Colonel Orlov: I would just like to repeat that our main objective is not to deceive the relatives. We will get difficult questions, but we shouldn't deceive the family members.

Congressman Johnson: We agree that they have died, but if we can find something to show their fate, let's do so.

Colonel Orlov: I would like to emphasize that I would like the U.S. side to join me in telling the family members that with regard to the Air Force, there is a greater possibility that we will be able to find something.

Congressman Johnson: No problem. Can we have more access to your operational summaries? They

have been very helpful. [overhead example]

Mr. Vivian: There are gaps between entries.

Congressman Johnson: We would like to examine them further.

Colonel Orlov: Unfortunately, ours are just not organized and even with access, we can't find them. Colonel Mukhin said there were documents that spoke of operations in general.

Congressman Johnson: Whatever you can find.

Colonel Orlov: For example, the 262 List. It is a small portion of a larger document. From the overall document, however, it is the only portion that relates to this issue.

Congressman Johnson: Have you reviewed the letters I sent you? I am interested if you can answer any of the questions in the letter.

Colonel Orlov: Yes, I have here the two letters. I will answer in the sequence that I received them. We've already discussed the 262 document, and the fact is that there is a five percent error margin. I know if Trudy Peterson were here, she would say "No, there were 262"! Also, there are very large differences, even in this document. In this document it insists that we knocked down 600 F-86s, but the Americans state we only shot down 110. The letter goes on to list and confirm about 59 names. Then there are questions about Tenney and Niemann, but I think we decided we have at least two witnesses. Based on them, Tenney and Niemann both died.

Then there were the 56 airmen of whom 51 were returned. This means there are four remaining, two of whom are Tenney and Niemann. So there are three remaining. Eleven (11) remain from the list of 32. That's in answer to the first letter.

Regarding the second letter, you requested access to the archives. We brought the chairman of the Presidential Archives here. You heard him yesterday. If necessary, we can bring him back. You also requested data from the 35th and 92nd divisions. What we found we passed to you yesterday. Again you requested access to the Presidential Archives. Korotkov answered. Regarding Podol'sk, I was there with Jim Connell and Colonel Semenec, and they brought six files from the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. We reviewed the reports of Razuvaev, Ambassador to Korea, and the Commander of the 64th. We concluded that the information we did not pass to you was not relevant to the Commission; it dealt only with operational issues.

Of course, there was also the aircraft, F-86, that was taken to Moscow and the helicopter in Korea. I will give you a report regarding that particular question after we finish this letter.

You also asked us to clarify the personal papers of General Shtykov and Razuvaev. We looked at the reports and the individual files and determined there were no points that concerned POW/MIA issues. In the files was information pertaining to their assignments, promotions, etc. Part of Razuvaev's papers of his life prior to the war were published by Volkogonov in "Ogonyok" a popular journal. There is a film being made on Korea that includes an interview with Razuvaev's Chief of Staff, but contained no POW information.

Again, Tenney and Niemann we already discussed. Then, of course, regarding the document about MGB involvement, we already discussed that we do not know the source of this document. Regarding the RB-29 that was shot down on the 4th of July, there is no new information. Niemann, McDonough, Lovell we already discussed. Finally, there is SGT Phillip Mandra for whom we have no new information. Regarding the seven names we received from family members so far, we have no information.

Colonel Orlov: Specifically, I can address the F-86 and the helicopter. Prior to leaving Moscow, I talked with Professor Ruzhidskiy, who, together with Professor Koval'skiy, was responsible for describing U.S.

military equipment at that time. It was confirmed that only one aircraft was delivered. During this war, as in all wars in which we were involved, we tried to get one sample of a particular type of aircraft. There was no pilot. That is confirmed by the workers at the institute who took apart the aircraft. A report made by Derskiy [a Soviet senior advisor to a North Korean division] that there was a pilot [sent to the Soviet Union] cannot be confirmed.

The aircraft was taken apart and its various major components were sent to various institutes. Engine to one, wings to another, and therefore the people who worked with it all knew that they had an F-86. Professor Koval'skiy also informed us that there were portions of another aircraft. That's all we know regarding the F-86.

Congressman Johnson: That brings up a good point. We've been trying to get the tail portion. Do you have the tail of the aircraft ? The paint color on the tail would determine the unit.

Colonel Orlov: That is very important.

Congressman Johnson: This picture [shows photo on cover of book] -- that's the 51st TAC Fighter Wing. The 4th Wing had a solid yellow tail. Do you know what color the tail was?

Colonel Orlov: No, we didn't know to ask.

Congressman Johnson: I've asked you before, but were there any photographs?

Colonel Orlov: Of this aircraft?

Congressman Johnson: Of anything, the aircraft, people, etc. Also, you were telling us you couldn't find any photos in the archives; but let me tell you that the BBC says they have photos, and took them in Russia.

Colonel Orlov: That I don't know, but I'll check into that. If they were amateur photos, then, of course, anyone could have taken them.

Congressman Johnson: You must have had photographs; otherwise you wouldn't have this tail.

Colonel Orlov: They also took photos from this book.

[Discussion of BBC on both sides]

Colonel Orlov: Now, concerning this helicopter there were two witnesses. One is General Colonel Sosinov, who was the advisor to the Chief of Staff and Razuvaev's Deputy. He says that in July of 1952, near Pyongyang, a Navy S-51 helicopter was shot down. The pilot was alive. He was captured and taken prisoner. But we lured in this helicopter. When he started descending, he received AAA fire so he was forced to land. There was a crew of two people. They were given to the Koreans. Both their personnel and our people were there. The helicopter was taken apart, put in containers and taken to Moscow. There's evidence from Professor Ruzhidskiy who was working on it. All data plates were removed from the helicopter, and the helicopter did not sustain any damage whatsoever. In August 1952, the helicopter was taken apart and sent to three different institutes for study. Why it was done that way is because it was an old model, and we didn't have much interest in it. Ruzhidskiy personally worked with this helicopter and during our next session in Moscow, we can invite him.

Congressman Johnson: Where was it that it went down?

Mr. Troyan: Pyongyang.

Congressman Johnson: You had an Anti Aircraft Battery there?

Colonel Orlov: Yes.

Congressman Johnson: And those were the people with the North Koreans?

Colonel Orlov: Yes. There were a number of witnesses who had direct participation.

Congressman Johnson: Do you count that as a shootdown?

Colonel Orlov: Yes, yes, of course. But because it was a helicopter, especially a rescue helicopter, we don't consider this any great victory. (everyone laughs)

Congressman Johnson: Do you have any other questions?

Russians: No.

Congressman Johnson: If there's no other questions, we can go ahead and adjourn.

Eleventh Plenary Session U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POWs/MIAs Cold War Working Group December 7 and December 8 1994 Washington, D.C.

The Cold War Working Group of the U.S. - Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs met twice during the Eleventh Plenary Session. The first meeting was held in the afternoon of 7 December 1994 in the Washington B Room of the Hyatt Regency Conference Facility in Crystal City, Virginia. Attendees on the American side were: Co-Chairman Mr. A. Denis Clift, Mr. James MacDougall (DPMO), Dr. James Connell (TFR), Major Bob Bishop (TFR), Major Dave Moore (DPMO), and Sgt. Victoria Bingham (notetaker). Attendees on the Russian side were: Co- Chairman, General-Major Anatoli Krayushkin, General-Major Yuri Kalinin, Colonel Sergei Osipov, and Major Sergei Nagin. Mrs Galina Tunik-Rosnianski served as interpreter.

Colonel Osipov: First, I am pleased to inform you that I'll turn over a set of documents containing information on 30 violations of Soviet air space by American planes in the 1951-1952 timeframe. The documents were originally sent to the Soviet Politburo. Two of the shootdown incidents on our agenda are among the incidents cited.

Mr. Clift: We will examine this new information as we go through our case-by-case review.

Colonel Osipov: On a procedural note, there are three cases of U.S. planes which were shot down in the area around Port Arthur during the time period of the Korean War. Do they belong on our agenda or that of the Korean War Working Group?

Mr. Clift: I will provide those cases that fall within the purview of the Korean War Working Group to their group.

Colonel Osipov: General Kalinin must leave today's meeting early. I would ask that if you have questions for him that you pose them at this time.

Mr. Clift: General Kalinin, you have been extremely helpful facilitating access to psychiatric hospitals and special prisons. During the last Plenary meeting in Moscow in August you provided a status report on our efforts to visit and review the card files of the psychiatric hospitals and prisons in the former Soviet Union. Would you please provide an update?

General Kalinin: I think that Jim Connell could more thoroughly brief you on the status of hospital and prison visits. I will add that our work need not be limited to just hospitals and special prisons. If you

desire, we can move forward with a plan addressing the entire camp system of the former Soviet Union.
Dr. Connell: Since our last meeting we have visited three special prisons: Zlatoust, Verkhniy Urlask and Tobolsk. At Verkhniy Urlask we checked the entire card file which contained approximately 10,000 names. At Zlatoust there were significantly more cards. We checked approximately 25,000 cards at random, making a specific effort to locate names such as Sanderson and Reynolds. Our team went to Tobolsk but the camp is now closed. The archives from the Tobolsk prison are currently located in Tyumen. At present, one prison remains on our list of those we desire to visit. It was formerly known as Perm 35 and is now a regular prison colony.

General Kalinin: It is still there. It is a special prison colony where persons convicted of crimes against the State are incarcerated. There are eight prisoners who have been convicted of treason there. You can visit Perm 35 as well as the site of the former Perm 37.

Dr. Connell: We have done some preliminary planning and certainly intend to visit that prison. We have also visited some camps since our last meeting. Last month we went to Kazakhstan where we visited the camps of Zhezkagan and Balkash. We were not able to visit Karaganda, but hope to return there. In the Kazakhstan capital of Almaty we provided a list of names of U.S. servicemen missing in action to the Kazakhstani government. We are currently negotiating with local archivists who will research the names during their off-duty time. The former Kazakhstani KGB, now known as the KNB, have been very helpful. They provided a list of some 1100 former prisoners of Zhezkazgan who still reside in the area. Most of the people on the list were Ukrainians/Lithuanians. We interviewed some of these individuals. No witness with whom we met could confirm reports that U.S. fliers were in camps in Kazakhstan. As I said, we intend to return to Karaganda. At that time we will conduct more interviews.

General Krayushkin: If you have additional questions for General Kalinin please ask. Otherwise, we will pass them on to him later. **Mr. Clift**: I have a request rather than a question. Our work depends on thoroughness. We will depend on you to point out areas for further investigation. There could be areas of which we are not aware. The number of camps was indeed vast.

General Kalinin: It is possible to study the entire camp system. We could map out the distribution of former camps and visit them one geographical area at a time. This would be a major undertaking and is perhaps not feasible. I can say that, at this point, we have no additional information. Also, I say with all assurance that there are no POWs currently located in Russia.

Mr. Clift: Let's take inventory of the camps as they relate to the Cold War Working Group. We have visited the camps we believe were most likely involved with any survivors of the Cold War shootdowns. There was one camp about which Korotkov told us in a previous meeting when he stated that during his period of service as an interrogator in the Korean War, Americans were sent to KGB camps.

General Kalinin: We went through all of the archives but did not find anything. We did not find any confirmation of possible facts that Americans were transported to the USSR. All the possible individuals accused of spying, foreigners, always went to Perm colony numbers 35 and 37. I can say that number 37 does not exist anymore. We do have card files.

Dr. Connell: We spent several days in Dubrovlag.We did find several Americans we knew had been there such as Mr. Hopkins, Sidney Ray Sparks. We, of course, did not check the entire card file. There were more than one million cards.

Colonel Osipov: Yes, there is a tremendous amount of cards there.

Dr. Connell: Of course, there is great deal of work. We could perhaps give you a group of people to help in this work. When we finish we have work to do in Karaganda. We can then look at the broader question. I want to return to Taishet and Krasnoyarsk to look at the entire card file. The other thing, when we interviewed people in Kazakhstan we asked if there were any American fliers held from shootdown incidents. The reply was generally that if such fliers did exist they would most likely be in "closed prisons." My question to Yuri Ivanovich [General Kalinin] is: "Could it be that there were prisons not

known to the MGB, the predecessor to the MVD? That is, were there any special prisons for which no records exist?

General Kalinin: The issue here is that during the Cold War all of the prisons and camps were under the administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) with one exception only. That was Lefortovo. All are currently included in our research. Upon our return to Moscow we will compile a memorandum on all camps complete with a history of each. This we will provide you.

Dr. Connell: I understand the answer to be that Yuri Ivanovich believes that no prisons existed that the MVD did not know about.

General Kalinin: Exactly, that possibility is absolutely excluded. Let me repeat, I promise we will do everything possible to see that we support your efforts in this work.

Mr. Clift: Thank you again for your work. Your offer to undertake new work will become a very important part of this commission. It will take us beyond the fragmentary knowledge that we had during the Cold War.

Colonel Osipov: Yes, and our main goal should be to remove any doubts, which I regret to say, still exist. I promise we will do everything possible in our power to carry out careful checks and resolve any complications.

Mr. Clift: Good, General. See you in the morning.

General Kalinin leaves. Mr. Clift: To begin the next section of our work, I have two documents that I'd like to give you. One is general in nature. It is a report I received from the Executive Director of the National Security Agency. It is a promise to search thoroughly for information relating to Soviet servicemen missing from the war in Afghanistan. It is dated 22 November 1994 and states that it will take up to four months to complete the search. Secondly, I wish to give you copies of a letter we received from the daughter of the commander of the RB-29 shot down on 7 October 1952. It's a three-page, single-spaced letter which expresses her thanks. The letter states we have lifted the burden of more than 40 years from her shoulders. I wrote to thank her and let her know that the letter would serve as an inspiration to our work. It's important that you and those working with you also have a copy of this. It will help you fully understand what our work together means to the families of the missing. Finally, I believe you have a document for us related to WWII-era U.S. fliers in Tashkent.

Colonel Osipov: This document was passed to Ambassador Toon today.

Mr. Clift: Thank you. At this time, I would welcome your words. General Krayushkin.

General Krayushkin: I think that Sergei Nikolaevich (Colonel Osipov) can point out the steps we have taken as well as what steps remain for each individual case under review. We can then determine what still needs to be done.

Mr. Clift: Before we review each specific case I would like to find out what additional information you have discovered since our last meeting. I'd also like to ask Dr. Connell and Major Bishop to report on their work since we last met. The reason is two-fold; it will be useful in our discussions, and it contributes to the reports that we are able to provide the American families of the missing.

Colonel Osipov: Thank you Mr. Clift. We discussed with Anatoli Afanaseyevich (General Krayushkin) how to proceed. I can say that it would be our pleasure to hear the questions that your experts have. I will methodically prepare answers tonight and give you detailed answers in the morning. To summarize the work we have conducted since the last meeting, I will make the following comments. In general, we attempted, on behalf of the families involved, to do three things. First, we continued research in the Border Guards archives. We have an assortment of documents on the individual cases.

Mr. Clift: Do these documents represent new information?

Colonel Osipov: Yes, new information. It will have to be discussed with General Volkogonov. You will be acquainted with some documents that have yet to be declassified by us. They are in the process of being declassified. Hopefully we can provide them to you at our next meeting. The second area in which we have been working is the conduct of meetings and interviews with pilots and other witnesses and participants in the shootdown incidents. Dr. Connell will report on the results of this work.

Mr. Clift: Yes, Dr. Connell will report case by case.

Colonel Osipov: Then the third request, is a special request on the part of the relatives of Sanderson. All of their specific requests have been carried out by the Russian side and this is what I can tell you before you present statements.

Mr. MacDougall: I would like to make a suggestion concerning your first point. In addition to the work in the Border Guards archives, let's widen our archival search to include all documents and evidence whether it be in the Border Guards archives, the Ministry of Defense archives or the Naval archives. We don't know where pertinent evidence may be located. Let's not narrow our search.

Colonel Osipov: Upon the request from the United States we went through all archives and checked documents and papers documenting events throughout the Cold War period. In particular, we've checked for documents from three archives: the Presidential Archives of the Russian Federation, the archives of the Ministry of Defense, and the archives of the Border Guards. We contacted all possible archives but turned up no additional documents. There was simply nothing there. For example, in the former KGB counter-intelligence archives we personally searched for information on our cases and asked questions, but simply nothing at all was there. We not only inquired in the Moscow archives, but in every possible place all over our country where documents have been kept. This is what I can tell you.

General Krayushkin: Perhaps we have reached a stage in which hardly anything new may be found in archives, and we should concentrate our focus on what information may be obtained from witnesses still alive. Of course that doesn't mean that with the development of our work, should something arise in the archives that we will not pay attention to it.

Mr. Clift: I think the Border Guards documents mentioned by General Volkogonov this morning are important. I look forward to looking at these with you. I'd like to reach an agreement concerning these Border Guards documents you mentioned earlier. I'd like to set the ground rules on access to these documents with General Volkogonov. The reason I say this is because it is important that I report on this to the families tomorrow afternoon.

Colonel Osipov: We acquainted your working group in Moscow with all of the material that we have available. There have been no dramatic discoveries that would change previously considered information. What we have found to date merely supports that information which we have previously handed over to you. While these documents are secret, they have nothing by way of revelation to offer. And since practically all the people involved in the declassification of documents (General Krayushkin, Col Mazurov, Col Mukhin, Natalya Krivova) are here, they will not likely be declassified until a later date. The declassification should certainly be resolved at some point. In any case, I'd like to say, as I've said before, that I wish the work could proceed in terms of dramatic discoveries though progress is more likely to appear by way of thorough review of each detail and each piece of information that becomes available.

Mr.Clift: Thoroughness in our work is essential.

General Krayushkin: I emphasize we will hold nothing back. We will give you these entire documents as soon as the declassification process is complete.

Colonel Osipov: I'd like to hand over the names and whereabouts of those colleagues of Colonel Korotkov whom we have been able to locate. Interviews with them will either confirm or refute his

previous statements. This step is something we decided upon during our last meeting.

Mr. MacDougall: It was point #9 of the nine- point plan agreed upon for further inquiry into the 29 July 53 incident.

Mr.Clift: This is a valuable step forward. We also agreed to plan a trip to the seamans' club in Vladivostok.

Colonel Osipov: I spent almost a week in finding out that there is in fact no seamans' club in Vladivostok.

Mr.Clift: Let's discuss that further when we do our case-by-case review. For now, I'd like to know if there are any other new documents?

Colonel Osipov: No, everything that was prepared to be handed over today was done so.

Mr. Clift:I will now ask Dr. Connell and Major Bishop to report on their findings and the key issues they are pursuing.

Dr. Connell: My remarks are general and should go first. First, we are very systematically approaching the list of Cold War witnesses. We've had trips to Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan as well as to other Russian cities in attempts to locate witnesses. I report that the easy ones have already been found and interviewed. They include, primarily, those for whom we had been provided addresses. Since the last meeting we've found information on four or five Cold War witnesses but only with great difficulty and expense. I thought we'd go through individual cases beginning with a word about our most controversial case, the 29 July 1953 shootsown. In the first place a successful interview was conducted with the pilot Yablonovsky. The other pilot in this incident, Rybakov, preferred not to speak with Americans. This gives the interview with Yablonovsky, conducted in a joint setting, greater significance. The interview is provided here on videotape. Also on the 29 July 53 incident, I've been in touch with the consulate in Vladivostok several times. I've confirmed that there is no seamans' club. Nevertheless, on our upcoming trip to Vladivostok we intend to locate additional Cold War witnesses and interview them. Last night, I spoke to Victor Mukhin. He confirmed that charts we've been trying to photograph since last year are not in Moscow but in Gatchina. We agreed to go to Gatchina together with a competent photographer to photograph the chart and fulfill that particular requirement.

Colonel Osipov: Permit me please to ask a question on this point. I don't understand two things. On the one hand I don't understand our military people. They've already handed over black and white pictures. On the other hand, what do you gain from color photography?

Mr. Clift: When we were in Gatchina with Ambassador Toon, it was agreed that we'd be able to take color photographs of charts, that was already 1 1/2 years ago.

Colonel Osipov: Yes, I don't object, neither does our military, I simply don't understand the need to spend the time.

Mr. Clift: Color is a more accurate product. The chart itself is color coded. It is simply a matter of a better understanding.

Colonel Osipov: What does it offer you in your search?

Mr. Clift: It is a more accurate statement of your side's depiction of the incident.

General Krayushkin: Let us believe that in the color version, it will be closer to the original.

Mr. Clift: Exactly. I'd like at this point to go back over some issues so that you can research them this evening for a report in the morning. Before I leave the 29 July 1953 incident, I'd like to touch on a couple

more points. Today you've taken two important steps forward by providing us the names and addresses of several men who served with Colonel Korotkov. We have sought this information for some time. Also, General Kalinin's offer to compile a memorandum relating to camps is important. As relates to archives, I'd like to let you know that I, too, have been working in our archives. I'd like to give you two declassified documents. One is from the National Security Agency. It identifies Soviet Naval units that were deployed at the time the plane was shot down. Several specific names of ships are cited.I'll give this document to you. Specifically, the cruiser Kalinin, and the minelayer Voroshilovsk are mentioned. Various other types of other units and vessels are referenced. This should help us further our work at Gatchina.The second document is from the files of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. It describes U.S. search and rescue activity at the time of the shootdown. It states that at 17:40 local time off Vladivostok on 29 July 1953, U.S. air rescue crews deployed life boats to four survivors. It seems to me that this also may be of help in your research. Let me pass these to you for your records and for further work in Gatchina. The documents I have passed to you help to put in the proper perspective the interviews with the Soviet pilots.While two pilots involved in the shooting down of the plane say they saw no survivors, we all know, for certain, that some survived.

Colonel Osipov: Yes, there was at least one survivor.

Mr. Clift: It would be interesting for both sides to see the video interview.

Colonel Osipov: I'm afraid the video is back at the hotel.

Mr. Clift: OK, we can view it tomorrow. Does the new information from the Border Guards archives relate to this case? That is, do you have additional information on the shootdown?

Colonel Osipov: There was a document which mentioned torpedo vessels which were sent out, but didn't find anything.

Mr. Clift: Jim, anything else?

Mr. MacDougall: I'd like to reemphasize the document from the National Security Agency. Based on the fact that the specific names of several ships and the types and numbers of other ships which were in the area of the shootdown were listed, it provides highly valuable leads which will enable us to focus our archival work. In contrast to past requests when we simply asked for a search of naval archives, we are able to ask now that you search the naval and other archives for specific ships and their activities. Also, in the same document several airplanes are mentioned. This fact should point us to whatever Air Force archives may be relevant. Point #6 of the nine-point plan developed during the 10th Plenary session referred to efforts to locate the records of the 782nd Regiment of the 165th Air Division. At our meetings in November, Colonel Osipov mentioned that LTC Chuvashin would update us on this effort, as well as the archival search, in general. LTC Chuvashin did not make the trip here to Washington. Will these issues be covered during our working group sessions?

Colonel Osipov:The point is, we don't have separate archives for the Air Force. All Air Force documents are kept at the Ministry of Defense archives. We carried out the task in relation to points #6 or #7 in other words, a check for documents. Regarding this case, there is no documentary information at all on a level lower than that of major command. All relevant documents are on a high level.

Mr. Clift: Have there been any approaches by General Volkogonov to the security services following recent discussions in Moscow with Ambassador Toon? We were discussing in Moscow the fact that information we're seeking on this shootdown may not be in archives.

Colonel Osipov: It seems self-evident that if it doesn't exist, we can't find it.

Mr. Clift: People still exist.

Colonel Osipov: Yes, people remain. We found Yablonovsky and he named other people who

supposedly were there. If necessary we will try to find and contact these people. This circle can be widened by adding information. We spoke to both pilots who shot down the plane and have all the information from all the archives which could possibly contain information. We also considered all the documents of the highest level in the Politburo and the Central Committee, that could exist on this incident. Yuri Ivanovich (General Kalinin) checked the names of all the crew members against his lists. The last thing we could do if you provide us with fingerprints, we could check these against people who were in the camps. In that case, even if the names changed, the fingerprints would not have changed.

Mr. Clift: Let me discuss this with my colleagues. I'd just like to go back and discuss the issue of people in the water, the cutters on the scene, and the statements from those who saw parachutes and those who tried to interview the captured Americans.

Colonel Osipov: Yes, absolutely agreed, we should try to do everything possible.

General Krayushkin: The thing to do is to accumulate all information sufficient to prove facts.

Mr. Clift: You will appreciate, we are like the dog with a trouser leg in his mouth. We're not going to let go; we're going to doggedly pursue this.

General Krayushkin: And we are going to help you.

Colonel Osipov: In order to finish this case, there will be added some information that you will see in the interview with Yablonovsky. When he was told that Captain Roche was saved and that he had heard the noise of cutters, Yablonovsky started laughing and said that he had never heard of a single incident when Soviet cutters caught up with a sinking flier before he went under.

Mr. Clift: He is wrong. Captain Roche was in the water for nearly 24 hours.

Colonel Osipov: 19 hours. Additional witnesses may be instrumental in getting results. To this point, we've done everything in the archives.

Mr. MacDougall: I would like to raise the subject of a trip to Vladivostok. For such a trip, planning and logistical preparation is critical. I suggest we begin preparation well before we get there in order to maximize the possibility of favorable results. In contrast to our work in Murmansk, to which we have frequently travelled and where we are seeing some results, we won't be able to go back and forth to Vladivostok with such ease. I, therefore, suggest we plan carefully and diligently. Along these lines, some advance notice in the media would likely help our efforts.

Colonel Osipov: This kind of preparation has been carried out already by Dr. Connell. He ran an announcement on the radio in Vladivostok. Additionally, before coming here, General Volkogonov conducted a major press conference on these issues. Special mention was made of the hard to crack cases like the 29 July 1953 shootdown. Appeals have been made to anyone who may have information to contribute in regards to these cases.

General Krayushkin: I agree that it would be particularly helpful before the arrival of an American delegation to make TV and radio broadcasts, to ensure that if there is anyone out there with information to contribute, they will come forward.

Colonel Osipov: The only thing is TV and the media are strictly commercial now and quite expensive. We cannot compel them to cooperate.

Mr. Clift: We should do it. It's worth a try.

Major Bishop: Repeated broadcasts are what would yield the best results. One person may or may not see a given broadcast. Perhaps they are not listening in, or they are away at their dacha, etc. Multiple attempts greatly increase the chances of finding that one person with information to contribute.

Colonel Osipov: Yes, perhaps we could have something in the way of a commercial announcement set to be played several times.

Mr. Clift: Yes, that's agreed. Let's take a 5 minute break.

Colonel Osipov: As you wish, we have no objections.

Five minute break Mr. Clift: I'd like to ask Major Bishop to discuss his work as it refers to the RB-47 shootdown in the Barents Sea and then tomorrow we will continue by conducting our case-by-case review.

Major Bishop: As you know, I traveled during October and November of this year to Murmansk and conducted radio, magazine, newspaper and television appeals to the general public.We also showed the McKone/Olmstead video tape on Murmansk TV. I interviewed several witnesses concerning the shootdown. During the October visit, we found out about the existence of a helmet reportedly belonging to an American flier. Let me correct that, just before the October visit. At this time I'd like to publicly thank Colonel Osipov and General Volkogonov for helping in the recovery of this helmet. The Russian who had it would simply not give it over to an American. He wanted assurance that this was OK.With their help he did give the helmet to us during our November visit. According to the words of Russian witnesses I interviewed, in October 1960, "Soviet Authorities" recovered the body said to be that of Major Eugene Posa. One Russian witness who served on a trawler fleet reported that the body was recovered and sent to Grimikha or Yokanga, where it was kept at military headquarters for a week. A witness also stated that, during a search, airplane parts were found, and taken to Severomorsk. Another Russian witness interviewed was part of a search attempt in February or March of 1961. He reported that they found a complete body and that it was the body of an American and was transferred to a military ship.We went back in November, reinterviewed the witness and he stated that the events had actually been in November 1961. He was part of a search attempt and his trawler found a complete body of an American. This was also transferred to a military ship. All these witnesses said that bodies were transferred to military ships and that they didn't know what happened afterwards. They didn't know the names of the ships. I believe there are many people in Murmansk who participated in these search attempts and if we continue to make appeals in the media and possibly with help from someone on the Russian side, perhaps more of these people will come forward. I say that also because on several occasions people called radio or television stations following a broadcast and said, "I have information, but I don't want to tell you my name. I'll call back". But they never did. That summarizes my work.

Mr. Clift: To put this in perspective, when we started this work about two years ago, we knew that two Americans were rescued and subsequently imprisoned. One body was recovered and returned and that there were still three members of the crew missing. We had information that part of a body with identification, indicating that it was Major Posa, had been discovered by a trawler three months after the shootdown. What we have now discovered, thanks to the help you have given us, is the probability of at least one dead member of an American crew having been taken ashore. And this trail has led us in the direction of Grimikha. My understanding from researchers is that when you start looking in cemeteries in that area, it's very complicated. Local authorities discourage any search. People are buried in up to three layers. What we need to do now is determine how you can help us gain access to cemetery records. Your assistance with the local authorities is needed. Also, we need your assistance publicizing the cooperative nature of our efforts and gaining access to pertinent archives. In particular, finding out which ship actually carried the body of Major Posa, to which port, might point us in the direction of the correct cemetery, much like a Border Guard report led us to the American remains located on Yuriy Island in the Pacific Ocean.

Colonel Osipov: General Krayushkin did some work in that respect and he'll tell you what he found.

General Krayushkin: There are, perhaps, some new directions in which we could go with reference to this case. As far as Yokanga, there is a naval base there. Since there were only parts of a body found, it is possible that it was buried according to maritime tradition, in other words, one can not necessarily even speak about cemeteries. We have inquired at our oblast archives and military intelligence archives.We

turned to those port authorities who were in place at that time and no one gave us any information. No one gave us any information that was reliable regarding what may have happened to the remains. It might be worthwhile looking at some cemeteries in port areas. Maybe there are burial places. At the base there is a new cemetery. Maybe there are places we could look.

Colonel Osipov: Such work can be done, but only by the Russian side. It would create serious problems if the American side delved into our cemeteries.

General Krayushkin: Yes, this is clear.

Colonel Osipov: We had already sent in such a request, and it was denied.

General Krayushkin:Well, the naval base authorities object to having Americans show up in the vicinity of this naval base.

Mr. Clift: What if they were accompanied by an official representative of the Russian side?

General Krayushkin: We could attempt to raise the issue on a higher level in order to obtain permission to get this dilemma solved. Otherwise, we might rely on the findings of the Russian military.

Mr. Clift: Ambassador Toon raised this issue this morning. We would like it raised to a higher level because there have been Russians who said that, yes, a body was taken aboard, and that, yes, it was taken ashore.

Colonel Osipov: I could go there by myself and take care of the military aspect. If anything is found we could raise the issue of exhumation to higher levels. Anything is possible. We need to plan this as carefully as possible to guarantee the highest probability of success.

Mr. Clift: I am sure that, if necessary, General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be willing to communicate with his counterpart. Secretary of Defense Perry would also be willing to communicate with Defense Minister Grachev on this humanitarian matter.

Colonel Osipov: We will be only too happy to have your help. At my level I can turn to the Chief of Staff of the Navy. General Volkogonov can turn to the Chief of the General Staff or Chief of the Minister of Defense's staff. These contacts are not at the level of Secretary Perry and Russian Defense Minister Grachev.

Mr. Clift: I suggest that, before tomorrow's session, you consult with General Volkogonov to determine at what level he thinks this action should be taken.

General Krayushkin: I will do this. At this time, I'd like to turn to the issue of our military. That is, our own servicemen who have disappeared. Colonel Mukhin asked me to convey to you his request that you continue to research information on the fate of our men. We have heard from the American side that nothing was found in respect to them. I'd like to ask you to take another look in the archives or in other sources. (Hands over document)

Mr. Clift: We will act on your request.

Colonel Osipov: With your permission, Is there anything about the list of our 290 servicemen missing in Afghanistan? What was stated this morning by Ambassador Toon was not clear.

Mr. Clift: I think the important thing he said was that the Central Intelligence Agency was working on the question with the Department of Defense. He mentioned that he needed some clarification of names and that someone on your side should be identified to work on this question.

Colonel Osipov: The Ambassador stated that people died. On what basis was this statement made? Why

are they assumed to have perished?

Mr. Huber: My name is Hans Huber. I have been working on this list. The information that the Ambassador mentioned in his opening remarks this morning is based on information contained on the list which was passed to us.There is information that there are witnesses to indicate death, but nothing concrete.

Mr. Clift: We must strive for good communication to ensure we are not at cross-purposes. We will work with you to clarify any misunderstandings about your list of 290.

Colonel Osipov: I am very interested in this information. There is some confusion, however. Currently the Ministry of Defense considers the 290 men missing in action. I would prefer that you refrain from publishing any figures on this until we have had a chance to discuss this further.

Mr. Clift: Agreed. You should plan on discussing this matter with Mr. Huber tomorrow, or when you have the opportunity. Given the hour, we must adjourn for today and plan on meeting tomorrow morning at 8:30.

The second meeting of the Cold War Working Group, during the the 11th Plenary session of the U.S. - Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, was held on Thursday morning, December 8, 1994 in the Lincoln Room of the Hyatt Regency Conference Facility in Crystal City, Virginia.Attendees on the American side were: Co-Chairman Mr. A. Denis Clift, Mr. James MacDougall (DPMO), Dr. James Connell (TFR), Major Robert Bishop (TFR) and SGT Victoria Bingham (notetaker). Attendees on the Russian side were: co-Chairman General Anatoli Krayushkin, General Yuri Kalinin, and Major Sergei Nagin. Colonel Mukhin joined the group in the second half of the session.Mrs. Galina Tunik-Rosnianski served as interpreter.

Mr. Clift: Today, I would like to proceed case by case to review the current status of our efforts as well as the next steps. First, we'll look at the 8 April 1950 shootdown in the Baltic Sea. This case involved Lt. Reynolds. We are very pleased to hear that you will be placing a photo and article in a psychiatric journal in early 1995. I'm sure Jane Reynolds-Howard will be with us at the meeting of families this afternoon and this will be of great importance to her. We have been looking for the pilot, Sataev and would still like to interview him.

Dr. Connell: We sent members of TFR to attempt to locate and interview Sataev. We left Moscow for this meeting before learning the results of their efforts. We will follow up on this opportunity. **General Krayushkin**: We planned to interview Bespalov. The other pilot died. To date, we haven't located Bespalov. We will continue to look.

Mr. Clift: Did the interview with Sataev take place?

General Kalinin: Not yet. The interview with Sataev will take place.

Dr. Connell: They probably made a great effort to find him. We haven't yet seen the messages. We're working on that.

Mr. MacDougall: The other major issue is the absence of archival material from 8 April to 21 April 1950.

Mr. Clift:I wonder if there is anything in the new Border Guard documents that you have, maybe something is there.

General Krayushkin: On this incident there is nothing.

Major Bishop: Colonel Osipov stated that during technical talks in Moscow, that no search was done during that time because it was in international waters. **Mr. MacDougall:** Do you have any documents, at

all, related to this case?

General Krayushkin: I just wish to say that whatever we had on this incident we already gave you. There's nothing new.This is exactly why we focused on the question of fliers who participated in this incident.

Mr. MacDougall: During General Volkogonov's remarks it was said that the photograph of LT. Reynolds and a short article would be appearing in a psychiatric journal. Could you tell us the name of that journal?

General Krayushkin: I don't remember at this point. It comes out four times a year. I'll find out during the break.

Mr. MacDougall: Also, will an article appear with the photo? This was not sufficiently clear yesterday.

General Krayushkin: Yes, a photo and an article.

Mr. MacDougall: Who will write the article? I'd like to suggest that a cooperative effort be undertaken between you and our staff in Moscow.

General Krayushkin: Yes, it will be done in the name of the commission. We have this data.

Mr. Clift: That will be in our mutual interest. We will address points that Mrs. Reynolds Howard wanted in the article.

General Krayushkin: We accept the proposal that the publication be a joint one. Are there any more questions on this particular case?

Dr. Connell: If necessary, we could reinterview General Shinkarenko. To the best of our knowledge he moved from Riga to Star city.

General Krayushkin: Yes, around Moscow. We have a feeling his story is well known due to being interviewed both by us and by Mrs. Reynolds.

Dr. Connell: We had a cordial meeting with him in Riga in November of 1992. We don't plan to bother the kind General again unless someone has specific reason to do so.

Mr. Clift: Thank you. Our next case is the 6 November 1951, shootdown of the Navy PV-2 over the Sea of Japan. Here again we still seek interviews with the pilots: Shchukin and Lukashov. According to our information Lukashov lives in Nikolayev and Shchukin lives in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast.

Dr. Connell: We were there , there is no town of Nikolayev in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast. When we were in the larger city of Nikolayev, we checked to see if there was an error.So we gave the information to the head of the Department of the Interior for Kiev. We're still trying to determine the status of Mr. Lukashov.

Mr. Clift: We'd like to ask the Russian side to help us to find Lukashov.

General Krayushkin: We're leaving the interview with Lukashov as a task for the immediate future. I do have a copy of a special statement from the Border Patrol that we will hand over.

Mr. Clift: One family member, Mrs. Pat Dickinson, the sister of crew member Jack Lively, had specifically asked if there were reports from the Border Guards. Tell me, was there any mention of a crew in these last reports?

General Krayushkin: It states that due to counterfire by our fighters, the American plane was shot down

and sank in the sea. It is stated here that the American plane started shooting at the fighters. There is nothing about people bailing out or parts of the plane.

Mr. Clift: What is the date?

General Krayuskin: This report is dated November 9th. The report was put together immediately and was signed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chief Border Guards Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR.

Mr. Clift: Is there only one new document relating to this?

General Krayushkin: Yes.

Mr. Clift: We had another pilot that we wanted to interview - Shchukin.

Dr. Connell: Shchukin in on our list. He lived in Primorskiy Kray as of November, 1951. When we go to Vladivostok, Mr. Shchukin will be a person we will try to seek out. It's better to combine such a search with this trip, than to make a special trip to find a person about whose address our information is so old.

Mr. Clift: As I understand it, he was the pilot of a Soviet reconnaissance flight that went out after the incident took place.

Mr. MacDougall: We got Shchukin's name from the list of witnesses which the Russian side gave to us at the 9th Plenary session. It contains only names. We know neither what roles these individuals played nor in what units they served.

Dr. Connell: As Jim points out, most often we don't have a good idea what particular role these individuals played in these particular Cold War incidents. Is this because that is all the information you have?

General Krayushkin:We thought three of the men on the list may have participated in this incident, but now we do not think so. If it is necessary to contact these men in order to confirm the fact that they had nothing to do with this incident, then we will put them on the list to contact.

Dr. Connell: We believe it is necessary even if they didn't participate.

Mr. Clift: Please do put them on the list.

Mr. MacDougall: By way of clarifying one point, we have the name of a pilot - Dyatlov. How was he connected?

Dr. Connell: We have tried to locate Lukashov. We have had difficulty finding Dyatlov. Maybe we should include Dyatlov. One of the problems is that he's in Sevastopol. We sent a diplomatic note to the Ministry of Diplomatic Affairs of Ukraine. We included Dyatlov and also the pilot Polyakov and one more whose name I don't recall. They answered our note with another note and raised some questions that we're still trying to work through.Why do we want to talk to retired military officers? Do we not know that Sevastopol is a closed city? Why don't we have a Ukrainian-American committee on POW/ MIAs? All this was asked despite the fact that we cited an October 1992 meeting between Ambassador Toon and President Kravchuk and then Prime Minister Kuchma, who is I think now the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and other high ranking officials. They said that perhaps the Commission should make another trip to Kiev. Well, it's been two years. The bottom line is that we're making every effort possible to interview people in Sevastopol.

General Kalinin: I would like to get a list of those whom you are trying to contact. There is the diplomatic way, yet there is another less direct way through personal contacts. This second way is oftentimes more productive and less tedious.

General Krayushkin: I would say it is hardly realistic to set up a new commission for each of the former republics to look for lost fliers. So in cases where we are faced with difficulties, let's use our personal contacts. We will be glad to help you.In general, if a person was on active duty in 1950 or 1960, they maybe moved to a new place or possibly aren't even alive any longer. Or, they may have established a new place of residence. It would be simpler to have them come to Russia than to go to their many locations.

Dr. Connell: I sent a request for help in ascertaining names and addresses of various people to Colonel Osipov nine months ago; time goes by so fast. To date I have had no response. This is the next step - to attempt to proceed through different channels. **Mr. Clift:** In this U.S. - Russian joint effort, we've become good at locating many people in the former Soviet Union. However, when we raise questions pertaining to our searches with officials in other Republics who haven't been involved in this type of work, they often can't understand what we are doing. It is for this reason that we ask that you consider whether or not you may be of assistance.

General Krayushkin: We will talk to Colonel Osipov and discuss these matters. It may, in fact, be easier to proceed through personal contacts.

Mr. Clift: Let's now turn to the 13 June 1952 shootdown of the RB-29 over the Sea of Japan. I believe family members will wish to address this case this afternoon. There has been some confusion surrounding our efforts to interview the pilots - Proskurin and Fedotov. I believe we have cleared this up , but, let's be sure. My understanding is that both pilots are dead.

Dr. Connell: We went to Nal'chik and talked to Proskurin's neighbors. Unfortunately he had died only a month prior to our arrival.

General Krayushkin: It says here that he died on 15 August 1994.

Dr. Connell: Yes, we were there in September.

Mr. Clift: Family members were upset because we did not clarify with certainty the status of Fedotov. There was some question as to whether he was dead or alive.

General Krayushkin: There were attempts to establish he whereabouts, it was found that he also died.

Dr. Connell: He died in 1978.

General Krayushkin: Yes, 1978. In any case, let me restate, as I said, we are trying to find every person on this list, as well as anyone named by these persons. We'd welcome additional names.

Mr. Clift: My understanding of your point is even though these pilots are dead, some of their colleagues, such as the wingmen in their squadron, might be alive.

General Krayushkin: Yes, we'll try to do everything possible to find these people. At his time, allow me to acquaint you with some new documentary materials. One is a statement from the Deputy Minister of State Security to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs - Zorin. If I may paraphrase, the Border Guards ship did not discover fragments of the plane which was shot down. There were no equipment parts, no crew discovered.

Mr. Clift: What is the date of that document?

General Krayushkin: 21 June 1952.

Mr. Clift: Then there is one new document relating to this incident.

General Krayushkin: That is it.

Mr. Clift: There is another major concern relating to this case. Members of the crew of another B-29 which was shot down 4 July 1952 were captured and interrogated by the Koreans. They were asked about Major Sam Busch, the flight commander of the RB-29 shot down on 13 June 1952. This logically causes families of the missing to think that maybe Major Busch survived the shootdown. We've been seeking any further clarification as to why interrogators would have been asking after the name Busch. We first discussed this in August.

General Krayushkin: I don't understand the question. Who is looking for him? It's not clear.

Mr. Clift: He was shot down on 13 June, another plane was shot down on 4 July and that crew was captured alive. When they were interrogated they were asked about Sam Busch. When we discussed this in August, you suggested that Busch's name might have come up in signals intercept reports.

General Krayushkin: That's possible. Let's leave it as a question for further analysis.Due to the fact that material from radio broadcast intercepts is not kept for a long time, it may not be possible to find such a report.

Mr. MacDougall: The information about Major Sam Busch's name being asked about during interrogations is contained in interrogation protocols which were passed to us by the Russian side. The 4 July 1952 incident falls under the purview of the Korean War working group. May I suggest you coordinate your efforts with your colleagues on the Korean War working group to ensure information is not missed?

General Krayushkin: We will of course coordinate our efforts with the Korean working group. Mr. Clift, I wanted to ask if there has been any success establishing contact with the Koreans so as to further our goals in these areas.

Mr. Clift: No, there has been some progress on the return of remains from the Korean War, but we've had no broader discussions relating to the work of this Commission.

General Krayushkin: What about the Chinese?

Mr. Clift: No, the situation is analogous. They provided us with some information relating to fliers who were shot down over China during the war in Vietnam. But they do not want to talk to us about the Korean era.

General Krayushkin: Everything on the international scene is changing quickly. Maybe in the future you'll have some luck in your diplomatic relations with the Koreans and Chinese.

Mr. Clift: Regarding the 12 June 1952 incident, I would like to discuss two newspaper articles. One appeared in a 1991 issue of the Nezavisimaya Gazeta and the other appeared in the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda in 1992. One of the articles says that the fliers Berg and Busch were seen in a hospital in Magadan.

Mr. Nagin: Who wrote them?

Mr. MacDougall: Belyaninov wrote the article in Komsomolskaya Pravda.

Mr. Clift: I asked Mr. MacDougall to locate these articles and have a look at them. Perhaps he could clarify this issue.

Mr. MacDougall: Let me put this issue in context. Some believe that the U.S. Government has information that, "The pilots Edward Berg and Samuel Busch, who were shot down in June 1952 over the Sea of Japan, were seen in a hospital in Magadan." In fact, we don't have this information. It is the above-cited newspaper article which says, "There are witnesses who say that both Raoul Wallenberg and Robert Reynolds ... had been seen in psychiatric clinics. The pilots Edward Berg and Samuel Busch ... were seen

in a hospital in Magadan." In other words, the journalist says there are witnesses. If there are, we would like to locate them and interview them. Here is a copy of the articles in English.

Interpreter reads the article.

Mr. MacDougall: To finish my point, given that the general nature of this information is hearsay, we must try to follow it to its original source. Perhaps our colleagues at TFR in Moscow could contact the journalist. Who are these witnesses? If they exist, let's find them and interview them.

General Kalinin: No problem. This can be easily done.

General Krayushkin: We're happy to do whatever is necessary. Yuri Ivanovich (General Kalinin) has always assisted you in looking for people. Different versions of the Wallenberg story come up continuously. In the case of Americans seen in Magadan, there has never been any confirmed information.. Through his channels, Yuri Ivanovich [General Kalinin] contacted people who worked in Magadan. Card files were checked, co-workers interviewed. No foreigners, no Americans were kept in Magadan. I am saying this so that there would be clarity in our midst. Though if you feel it is necessary to go there again and check out everything, we will do it.

General Kalinin: Because I've a very good relationship with the editorial boards of the two newspapers you cited, I can simply contact the authors and arrange an interview to determine from where they obtained their information.

Mr. Clift: May we do that with you?

General Kalinin: Of course!

Dr. Connell: We are well-prepared to address the concerns of the families. We've been to the psychiatric hospitals. Some, like Sychevka, we've been to two times, and yet a third time with Mrs. Reynolds. At every prison and every gulag we visited we checked for the names Wallenberg, Reynolds, Busch and Sanderson. We're well aware of the issues involved.

Mr. Clift: It is agreed. We will plan joint interviews of those who wrote the articles. At this point we'd be very pleased to hear from you, Colonel Mukhin.

Colonel Mukhin: Thank you. General Krayushkin probably told you about the issue we would like to raise. We'd very much like to have copies of archival documents which address the questions which I now raise. And as the military archivist, I'd like very much to visit the Naval Archives and to talk to my colleague Bernard Cavalcante. Let me raise three issues. First: Are there any documents related to the crash of one of our planes next to an American aircraft carrier? Also, how was the operation to recover bodies from the water conducted? Are reports on this operation available? Second: There is another issue on which I would like clarification from the U.S. side. Are logs from the submarine, "Swordfish" available for that period of time? Is it really true that the Swordfish hit an iceberg? Third, in connection with the recovery of our "Golf" class submarine, you have provided us very little information. Perhaps the documents we seek are not in the Naval Archives, maybe they are in the CIA archives. I'd like to know how this submarine or its parts were raised from the depths. I am thankful to the American side for handing over the video tape and the bell. But we'd also like copies of relevant documents. Some of them can be given to the families of those who perished. Therefore, I'd very much like to ask Mr. Clift to be of help in this area. Considering the Ministry of Defense has, in fact, done a few useful things for our joint work.

Mr. Clift: Your requests will be reported as part of the plenary session. I'll do this, mindful of the fact that Ambassador Toon reported on the loss of your submarine during the 10th Plenary session. At that time, he stated that we had done everything possible to research this incident and had provided you everything we had on the incident. That's why it is important that we understand the nature of your continuing request on this incident.

Colonel Mukhin: Thank you.

Mr. MacDougall: Colonel Mukhin, your first request is somewhat unclear. Where you referring to one plane or many? Also, on what date did this incident occur?

Colonel Mukhin: It involved one plane.

Mr. Clift: The details of this case have been discussed previously. In fact, a year ago I provided a some information on the loss of the Soviet plane. I believe I have those documents with me.

Colonel Mukhin: I seem to recall these documents as summary reports of some kind. I would much prefer to see the original archival documents, rather than summaries.

General Krayushkin: I'd like to relate why it is so important to us to receive what Colonel Mukhin has been asking for. I'm not going to cite the purely human or moral aspects. Those are clear to everyone. I'd like to touch on the political aspect of this problem. At this time there is opposition in the Duma, to the perceived one-sided nature of the work of the Joint Commission. Many of our politicians are criticizing us for working only for American interests on the Commission. Colonel Mukhin, they say, is selling our native land. In their words we are "working for American imperialists." They say, "Russia's losses of people are certainly not less significant than theirs", which certainly is natural for them to feel. In overall context of the relationship between our two countries, it would be important for you to render active assistance to us on this request so that we could inform members of the opposition in the Duma and the Russian people that the American people are providing information and are assisting us in locating our own people who were lost. Such assistance would certainly stabilize our position and that of course pertains to the fate of our prisoners in Afghanistan. Of course the political opposition is using the current situation to their own advantage.

Mr. Clift: I understand your concerns. I can state that we are working for you. I am working to provide information to you. I asked our State Department official, Mr. Hans Huber, to prepare his computerized data on this list of 290 so that it can be provided to you this week.

General Krayushkin: To underscore the point, we are in agreement that at some point the work of the Commission will be published. In view of this, visualize the huge quantity of requests for information from the American side and the massive archival materials from the Russian side in support of the requests. On the other hand, there will be practically nothing from the American side. Can you imagine what position we will be placed in?We would very much like to say, at that time, that our cooperation has produced mutually beneficial results.

Mr. Clift: We are dedicated to the two-way, bilateral nature of this Commission. We help you and you help us. Our Chairman, Ambassador Toon, has said this on many occasions. In the Cold War Working Group we've given you considerable information to include accounts of pilots and ships' logs. Sometimes I believe the complication arises when we provide documents to your Executive Secretary. He must then distribute them to the members of your side of the Commission. We'll give you more on your requests while you are here. If you wish to visit the Naval Archives while you're here, this can be arranged. I have worked hard to locate information in response to your requests. You have raised the issue of the "Golf" class submarine again. We have attached such importance to this that two Directors of Central Intelligence, Mr. Gates and Mr. Woolsey, have addressed this personally at the highest levels of your government. Gates turned over to President Yeltsin a video on what we knew about the recovery of the crew.It's for this reason in fact that Ambassador Toon said, "I've given all I have." Ambassador Toon and I have met with the highest officials in our intelligence organizations on this issue. It is for these reasons that Ambassador Toon reported as he did to the 10th Plenary of the Commission. I will report your request to him.

Colonel Mukhin: The information we obtained on the submarine does not fully satisfy us. We're still interested in what was raised up. According to our thinking, the section you raised should have contained more bodies than were buried in accordance with maritime traditions. We're still researching all kinds of

magazines, newspaper articles and radio communications in order to find out more about Operation Jennifer. In the framework of our commission we have received there is nothing but the ship's bell and a video tape. There is also very scant information about the fact that the Swordfish collided with an iceberg and was being repaired in the port.

Mr. Clift: It is important that you make your requests as specific as possible. This incident is so important it has been addressed at high levels of our governments, much higher levels than our Commission. To repeat, as Ambassador Toon has said, we've given you everything we have on this incident.

General Krayushkin: Colonel Mukhin will specifically formulate our requests and pass them to you.

Mr. Clift: It would be most helpful to have specific requests. I'd like to return now to shootdowns of U.S. planes. The next incident for review is the 7 October 1952 shootdown of the RB-29, the Dunham case. I had hoped to have forensic experts here from Hawaii to tell us about their work on the remains. I am told that maybe while your delegation is here this week, there will be progress on this issue. The process is now not in the hands of the Commission but in the hands of the U.S. Air Force which coordinates the work on remains. Everyone assumes it is Capt. Dunham, but specialists are proceeding with great care. I also gave you yesterday a letter from the daughter of the pilot in which she expressed her thanks for the work which has been conducted. This year we've interviewed the Pilot Zhiryakov. He said no one could have survived. Yet, General Volkogonov pointed out yesterday the fact that the recollections or witnesses are sometimes at odds.This is illustrated by the fact that another witness said he saw two parachutes. Can you elaborate on this, Jim?

Dr. Connell: Yes, Mr. Panov stated that he had seen two parachutes. We went back to interview General Zhiryakov a second time. He repeated his prior statements that the plane exploded in the air. He believed there was no possibility of parachutes.

Mr. Clift: Who was Panov?

Dr. Connell: Panov lives in Podol'sk. Captain Panov, Vasily Matveevich, formerly a navigator, born in 1922. He served with the 368th Fighter Aviation Regiment.

Mr. Clift: The witness Panov has introduced an element of doubt. We have to address this as part of our work.

General Krayushkin: So this indicates we should have more witnesses to confirm or refute that which was said by Panov. We'll attempt to do so. We'll attempt to locate and facilitate the interview of additional witnesses, as well as those already on our list.

Dr. Connell: Along with two other witnesses who live near Moscow, there is a Mr. Kochnev who, according to our most recent information, is from Bryansk. Bryansk is not far away.The other two witnesses are Vartanyan and Panchenko who is in Moldova. As I said earlier, we've interviewed the easy ones. The remaining ones are more difficult. They live in far off republics. We will, however, continue to try to interview every one on the list.

General Krayushkin: We have yet a lot to do.

Colonel Mukhin: I'd like to ask Jim a question. [Dr. Connell] Did Panov really serve in that position or did he only say he did?

Dr. Connell: I believe we should ask Colonel Osipov that question.

Colonel Mukhin: I myself will look to find out if he was on duty that day or not.

Dr. Connell: We must also ask ourselves if, in fact, he was on ground control duty that day, he'd have

likely been inside.

Colonel Mukhin: He sat inside in front of a screen. **Mr. Clift:** I'd note Mr. Saiko said he saw no such parachutes. He was on deck at the time. I do, however, support a follow up program as we discussed.

Dr. Connell: We may be able to see the actual interview with Panov and Yablonovsky this afternoon at the family meeting. We are currently having to convert the tapes from Russian to American video format.

Colonel Mukhin: At the 10th Plenary session, Sergei (Colonel Osipov) mentioned possibly finding a map concerning this incident. Among the documents we've passed to the American side is one which details 30 violations of Soviet air space by American planes in 1951-1952. The flight plan and location of the shootdown of the plane under discussion is included among these documents.

Mr. Clift: Thank you, we look forward to a careful review of this document. Turning to our next incident, we have spent a good deal of time on the 29 July 1953 RB-50 shootdown. We are following up on Ambassador Toon's request of yesterday morning. We discussed planning for a trip to Vladivostok and various ways to use the television and media there. People with information who wish to come forward will know our Commission is coming.If you would be good enough to provide us with the list of people who served with Colonel Korotkov at that time, we will set up interviews.I have provided you with documents declassified by our Department of Defense identifying Naval vessels that were in the area at that time. I believe that with General Kalinin, we agreed to focus our efforts to make sure we would examine any prison facility or camp that might be related to this incident. Am I correct in remembering that you mentioned a document from the Border Guards archives related to this case?

General Krayushkin: Among the documents is one very short statement concerning Border violations in the Pacific region for 1953. As far as the B-50 is concerned from item #17 of this overall report states that on 29 July 1953, an American aircraft violated the border in the region of the island of Askold. The plane was shot down. In this report there are no other details.

Mr. Clift: When we met in Moscow in August, one of nine points laid out for follow up was our hope to obtain the records about the 782nd Regiment of the 165th Air Division. In November, Colonel Osipov told Mr. MacDougall that LTC Chuvashin would address this subject and I wondered if there was further information on it.

Colonel Mukhin: We have already given all of the names to Colonel Osipov of all the officers of this regiment who participated in this particular case.

Mr. Clift: We would appreciate receiving those names so that we could develop a witness list.

Colonel Mukhin: We gave it to Colonel Osipov.

Mr. MacDougall: To the specific request made by Mr. Clift for documents, do you have any records from this unit?

Colonel Mukhin: Yes, there are.

General Krayushkin:Is there a problem? [question directed to Colonel Mukhin]

Colonel Mukhin: I think we have handed in all the reports on this plane.

Mr. Clift: We will check with Colonel Osipov.

Colonel Mukhin: If we speak of documents of division and regiment, they are literally, very sparse.The primary interest in these incidents was at the highest levels. All these questions on documents are at too low a level. Such records are not retained. You will find many more statements in reports presented to Stalin than you will find in low level military reports.

Mr. Clift: I have two more items. I reemphasize the document we passed to you yesterday which lists Soviet vessels which were in the area. Please research any leads that this document provides. Also, please work with our TFR Moscow colleagues to plan a trip to Vladivostok. Is there anything else on this case? Let's turn our attention then to the RB-47 shot down off of Kamchatka on 17 April 1955. We have interviewed the pilot Venediktov. Does that ring a bell, Jim? [referring question to Dr. Connell]

Dr. Connell: Viktor Aleksandrovich Venediktov had no details on the April 1955 shootdown. I can give you only a couple of sentences.

Mr. Clift: Please.

Dr. Connell: Venediktov was a wing Commander in the 865 fighter aviation regiment. He stated, first of all, that he did not wish to speak with our representative in person. He stated that he did not participate in the shootdown of the aircraft and that he had no information pertaining to the crew or the aircraft. That's it.

Mr. Clift: One other area we are pursuing with you was that of the crew of the cutter Komandor, a ship which may have been in the area..

General Krayushkin: Among the documents we have found in the Border Guards archives is one which relates to this case. I'd like to acquaint you with its contents. It states that the Border Guards Chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs General Antonov, reported that on 26 April, 1955 border guard post #45 reported they found pieces of an RB-47, a life vest, topographic maps of the Chukotka and Alaska areas and technical drawings of a plane with accompanying information in English were found. Everything that was discovered was transported to the Border Guards post and subsequently to the Chief Intelligence Directorate at the General Staff.

Mr. Clift: That is the GRU.

General Krayushkin: Yes. It was also established by a radio intercept that an American plane gave an SOS three times. These materials will be handed to you as soon as we can get them declassified..

Mr. Clift: I'd like to ask that we ask Captain Sivets and General Ladygin to check the GRU archives to see if relevant documents exist there. It would be very helpful to see if they have this information in their archives.

Dr. Connell: I wanted to point out in connection with this case, that we did make a trip to Chernigov. We tried to reach Petr' Berkhov as well as other Cold War witnesses from the Chernigov area. The search was unsuccessful. We will, of course, include these names on the ever-growing list we'll give to General Kalinin.

Mr. Clift: The next case for our review is the 10 September 1956 shootdown of a RB-50 over the sea of Japan. At previous sessions you have stated that you reviewed your files and found nothing.

General Krayushkin: Yes, this is correct. We have not been able to find anything.

Colonel Mukhin: We looked in the archives of the Ministry of Defense and the logs of the Border Guards. In addition, we could find nothing in the logs of the Air Defense forces.

General Krayushkin: We checked names against the list and regret to say that we have not uncovered anything.

Mr. Clift: I have no further questions at this time, do you, Jim? The next incident I wish to discuss is the C-130 shootdown over Armenia on 2 September 1958. Do you have any new documents on this case?

General Krayushkin: Yes, including a map.

Mr. Clift: Any new information as it relates to the crew?

General Krayushkin: No, nothing.

Dr. Connell: I believe we did find Gavrilov's address in Shchelkovo. We're going to get permission to go to Shchelkovo to interview him.

Mr. Clift: The new report you are providing will be welcome by family members. They have been trying to receive documentation on the shootdown. Could you tell us anything about the document?

General Krayushkin: This is a special report of the Chief of Staff, the Main Directorate of the Border Patrol of the KGB of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, by General-Lieutenant Bannik. It's dated September 3, 1958.

Mr. Clift: Was this the KGB Chief of the Armenian USSR?

General Krayushkin: No. This was in Moscow. This special report was compiled on the basis of information from Armenia. It says here that the remains of the officers and fragments of the plane were guarded by the Border Guards at the site.

Mr. Clift: This is a document of importance, and we're pleased that you will be giving it to us. One family member involved in this case has asked for more documentation. This should assist. **General Krayushkin:** I have a note here from Colonel Osipov to establish who was the forensic expert. He will tell us how he traveled to Yerevan.

Mr. Clift: We have sought to locate the third forensic doctor, a man named Vernik. He signed the forensic report which you provided previously. His signature block lists him as being a Lieutenant Colonel in the 35th Mobile Field Sanitation Detachment.

Mr. MacDougall: When we met in November, Colonel Osipov stated that he was unable to locate Vernik due to the fact that no further information was available. The information cited by Mr. Clift should provide leads to Vernik's whereabouts.

General Krayushkin: Yes, he should be looked for again.

Mr. Clift: Good. We will be discussing this with the families this afternoon. Our next case, one on which we spent a lot of time yesterday, is the 1 July 1960 RB-47 shootdown over the Barents Sea. This is, of course, the Posa case. We agreed that we will look to you to explore new avenues of inquiry within your government. You'll do your best to see what may be found in the local cemeteries. Finally, based on what you find out, you may recommend that we address this at the Minister of Defense level. For our part, we will continue to conduct interviews in the region.

General Krayushkin: Yes, good, agreed. Let's at first look into every possibility to exhaust other ways first, before we turn to higher levels. Let's concentrate on witnesses. Maybe we could try to do television appeals and press releases again in the area of Severomorsk. I myself promise that we will look into the criminal records of fliers subjected to criminal proceedings in order to be absolutely sure that we missed nothing when we looked for documents for the Commission. Anything that might throw light on the fate of crew members we will locate and give to you.

Mr. MacDougall: There is one other request. Our Moscow representatives have mentioned a military museum in a town called Safonovo. They are not allowed access. Perhaps you could help. **Dr. Connell:** We've already made a formal request to the Russian side of the Commission.

Mr. MacDougall: Our TFR representatives were also told of the existence of Trawler Fleet archives in the Murmansk area. Perhaps Major Bishop could elucidate on this point. In any case, if such archives exist, we would like your help gaining access to them.

Major Bishop: We've made a request. We'd also like to look in the archives of the northern Naval fleet in Murmansk.

General Krayushkin: I don't belive there are such archives. Naval archives are centralized at Gatchina.

Colonel Mukhin: There are archives at the Staff Headquarters of the Northern Fleet. They keep documents there for only five years and then send them to Gatchina. It is therefore totally useless to look for documents dated 1960. These documents would have been dent to Gatchina long ago.

Mr. Clift: The RB-57 shootdown on 14 December, 1965 is the last case on the list. The RB-57 was lost over the Black Sea. You told us last August that you had no further information on this incident.Do you confirm this still to be the case?

General Krayushkin: Yes, that is correct. Allow me to say that, for our part, this has been a very valuable round of working group sessions. I'll be working with my colleagues to prepare brief points for tommorrow's closing plenary session. The main point is that we continue to work hard and continue to obtain new information.

Mr. Clift: Yes, I thank you for your work and look forward to our afternoon meeting with the family members.

Session adjourns.

Eleventh Plenary U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POWs/MIAs Vietnam Working Group December 5 and 7, 1994 Washington, D.C.

U.S. Participants:

Congressman Pete Peterson, Co-Chairman, Vietnam Working Group Ambassador Peter Tomsen - U.S. Department of State Ms. Suzanne Farmer - Chief of Staff, Congressman Peterson Mr. Dino Carluccio - Office of Senator Smith Mr. Nick Pokrovsky - Vietnam War Analyst, JCSB Ms. Galina Tunik-Rosniansky - Interpreter SSG Bruce Stapleton - Notetaker, JCSB SSG Henry Eastman - Notetaker, JCSB

Russian Participants:

Dr. Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Co-Chairman, Vietnam Working Group Colonel Vyacheslav Petrovich Mazurov, SVR Representative Colonel Vladlen Vasiliyevich Klokov, Advisor to Gen. Volkogonov Ms. Nataliya Aleksandrovna Krivova

Congressman Peterson: I want to welcome my Russian colleagues to the second [plenary and] working group session held in the United States. The other commission members and I hope that you enjoy your visit. In addition to the serious work of the plenary and working groups, we have tried to include some other activities into your schedule.

We have our usual group here, and I know you have one new member whom you may wish to introduce.

Dr. Pikhoya: This is military Colonel Vladlen Vasiliyevich Klokov. He is now working as an advisor to Dmitri Antonovich Volkogonov.

Congressman Peterson: We welcome you and our other colleagues here to our Eleventh Plenary session. We hope that your visit will be both stimulating and enjoyable. If there is anything that we can do to improve your stay, you just need to let us know.

As the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Vietnam Working Group, I believe your visit provides an excellent opportunity to once again emphasize the importance of the POW/MIA issue from our perspective, and you will once again see the family side of this issue when you meet the families.

The events of the coming week should allow you to experience the many facets of American public involvement with the POW/MIA issue. This week you will once again have an opportunity to hear from family members of missing Americans; they are the people that we serve in the most direct way.

We have also rescheduled the trip to Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, and have taken steps to insure that the weather is not a hindrance. We will take you to a place that no Russian representative has been before - the place where Army technicians work with captured foreign material. I am confident that you will find this visit very interesting.

At this point, we would ask that if there are any documents which you have brought to be passed to us, that you would pass them to us now. This way we could look at them and ask questions during the course of the week.

Dr. Pikhoya: I am in somewhat of an awkward position, though it is not that complicated. Dmitri Antonovich Volkogonov is supposed to hand over a number of documents from the Korean War period - very interesting ones. He asked me to allow him to do this himself. I find it hard to say no to a general.

Congressman Peterson: There is nothing involving the Vietnam era that you know of which will be turned over?

Dr. Pikhoya: I will give you some new information on the Vietnam issue. I will be able to tell you in greater detail later today. However, this new information does not represent anything dramatically new.

Congressman Peterson: We look forward to hearing from you on that.

I look forward to another productive and interesting week in the work of our Commission. I think we will have the opportunity to discuss a number of new ideas. I would invite my colleagues, if they have something to add or a question arises, to please ask so as not to be left out.

In previous meetings we have touched on the idea that it's time to discuss the future of our work. As our Co-Chairmen examine the question of the future of our Commission, it is necessary for us to provide them with a perspective on the short- and long-term outlooks for our work. We feel that it is important to look at the future during this visit so as to focus our energies in the most productive way.

Today, I will present an informal paper for your consideration. We call this paper a "snapshot." It represents an interim - and I emphasize "interim"-- report to the working group designed to define our work, both past and future. It's not a press release. Each copy of the document is numbered to underscore the fact that it is a working document, not one intended for widespread circulation. This is to avoid the problem that happened with the Korean War Working Group when one of its working papers was released to the press, and the document's intent was blown out of proportion. This document contains no final assumptions or conclusions. It contains the following sections:

- Essays on the four major questions before the Vietnam Working Group. These essays are written from the American perspective.

- Summaries of every document provided by the Russian Side.

- Summaries of every interview done with Russian witnesses.

- Other information including statistics, and remarks on both the short-term and long-term prospects for continued work.

I want to highlight that when we discuss the short- and long-term prospects for future work, I will stop for detailed discussions of the specific open issues that remain to be resolved within the Vietnam Working Group. Regardless of the progress we have made to date, there remain many issues that require continued aggressive investigation. We cannot talk of closing the work of our working group until these lines of investigation, especially the ones that have remained open for many months, have been resolved. We must also continue to investigate new lines of inquiry that have developed from our ongoing efforts.

As I said before, I want to emphasize that the paper is a preliminary work. It is not considered conclusive, and does not represent a final analytical perspective. It was written in order that we might define what has been accomplished up until December of 1994. To establish a baseline, so to speak. Though the "snapshot" is not a final report, it might serve as a model for such a final report, based on acceptance of the format and contents by both sides.

Let's take a few moments to go through the contents. If you will turn to the first page, you will find a table of contents. Page one is an introduction. It states that this report is in no way conclusive or comprehensive. It also states the purpose of the paper, which is: to define the work accomplished by the working group to date; to postulate preliminary observations regarding the four questions under investigation; to review the short-term and long-term prospects for continued work; to provide a potential framework for a future definitive analysis of this issue.

Page two is the executive summary, which we will discuss in detail today. A series of four essays begins on page six. Each essay stands alone. Each addresses work completed, as well as work to be done on each of the four principal questions that guide our investigation. The essays also include preliminary observations regarding the activities of Soviet officials vis-a-vis American prisoners in Vietnam.

- Essay 1 starts on page six, and addresses the issue of possible transfers of American prisoners to the territory of the former Soviet Union during the Vietnam War.

- Essay 2 starts on page thirteen, and addresses the issue of possible contact by Soviet officials with American POWs in Vietnam.

- Essay 3 starts on page 21, and addresses the issue of what Soviet records might contain about numbers and policies regarding American prisoners in North Vietnam.

- Essay 4 starts on page 27, and concerns the issue of information from Russian witnesses and documents on specific incidents of loss in Vietnam.

A series of four appendices begins at page 31:

- Appendix 1 begins on page 31, and it contains summaries of all the documents provided by the Russian side to date.

- Appendix 2 begins on page 66, and it contains summaries of all interviews conducted with Russian witnesses.

- Appendix 3 begins on page 80, and it contains summaries of the plenary and working group accomplishments over the first 10 plenary sessions of the Commission.

- Appendix 4 begins on page 83, and it contains statistics that support essay 4.

The contents of this paper are too complex to discuss in detail in our working session. Today, I would like to present only the executive summary. Remember, the intent of this document is to stimulate creative thinking about our future work. As I read through the executive summary, I want you to note that we have focused first on the preliminary analytical observations regarding the issue, and then on prospects for short- and long-term work. Detailed discussion of each issue is contained in the original paper.

As we go through the prospects for future work, I will also discuss outstanding initiatives, in order that we might discuss the status of each area. As we read through the executive summary, I'd like to invite all to participate. Feel free to interrupt at any time. But before I begin to read the executive summary, perhaps you'd like to comment.

Dr. Pikhoya: Mr. Congressman, Mr. Ambassador, we welcome the opportunity to meet here in Washington. We highly value your hospitality and work done in organizing this meeting. It is very significant that this document came about as a result of our efforts. We will talk about many issues, but I would like to note for the record one very important fact - this document will be a basis upon which we can continue American work by filling in the results of Russian work. I presume that our contribution will boil down to additional factual material, and I'm convinced we will have some questions as well. But our work will take place on a new level which has been achieved as a result of this work.

I fully realize your careful approach to this particular paper as preliminary and unofficial. It is very important that the basic information is there. There will also be a Russian version that will be based on this analysis. We will be able to continue together to come up with some sort of summary. And I agree with your view that we should look towards the future and develop future research issues. I don't doubt the fact that we should insure that all questions are answered. Some questions have been answered and some have not. But in a number of cases, we will be forced to change the direction that our future work takes. Of course, the main questions before us can't be changed.

It is clear that the issues were posed by both sides in the beginning without the information that is now available to us. For example, from the beginning, we did not consider the issue of the relationship between the Soviet Union, Vietnam and China. After the dramatic removal of Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership attempted to improve relations with China at the expense of relations with Vietnam. At that time, they did not understand how the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship would develop. From the Vietnamese point of view, they needed Soviet technology, but they did not want Soviet specialists. All of this can be documented by considerable amounts of materials. In the relations between Vietnam and the Soviet side during about 1965, they were speaking about limiting the involvement of Soviet specialists.

Everything I'm talking about does not pertain directly to American POWs. But if you don't understand these issues, it's not possible to explain the other aspects of the question. Whether we like it or not, in developing this document, we should have a general statement presenting the diplomatic scenario at that time.

I see our work developing in two directions. First is the formal or traditional line of our work that has continued from the start, complemented by this paper. The second is a proposal that we should provide the information we have to the scientific, academic and press communities. And I mean facts, not ideas or conclusions, but facts.

I think that's about all I have to say until later.

Congressman Peterson: We appreciate your views on this. As you read through this and as we go through our work today, you'll see that we've taken a first try at postulating some of the issues on paper, and we look forward to your comments and your assessment.

Colonel Mazurov: [Can we comment] On this project?

Congressman Peterson: As we read through the Executive Summary, there will be plenty of opportunities to speak up. Let me read through the Executive Summary here and you can interrupt at any time.

For nearly three years, the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission has investigated the extent of possible Russian interaction with American POWs during the Vietnam War.

Let me stop here and make a statement about your last comment. This document is not ready for

historians or the press. It will be grossly distorted because this is only one side. This is the first time you've seen this document. It is vitally important that you have ample time to comment and help us bring this to a totally factual document. There will be a time to do what you suggest. Now back to the Executive Summary.

Many in the public believed that Soviet military and intelligence officials had access to U.S. POWs and Vietnamese records compiled from prisoner interrogations. To date, through extensive investigation in the former Soviet Union, Southeast Asia and elsewhere, no credible evidence has been discovered to support the allegations that Soviet officials were involved with American POWs, or that U.S. servicemen were transported from Indochina to the former Soviet Union under their supervision.

This paper summarizes the working hypotheses used to guide the investigations into the four major questions regarding possible Russian involvement with American POWs. It also outlines the results to date and the necessary follow-up to formulate a final analysis of the Russian/Vietnamese aspect of the POW issue.

On the four major questions before the Vietnam Working Group of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, the following preliminary observations have been made based on information gathered as of this month (December, 1994).

QUESTION 1: Did any organization or individual of the Soviet government transfer or transport one or more American POWs from North Vietnam to the former Soviet Union, or to any other location?

Colonel Mazurov: I think this issue has been closed.

Dr. Pikhoya: What is being done with this document is just a listing of the issues.

Congressman Peterson: Understand, Mr. Mazurov, that we are just establishing the baseline. Anything that this commission has addressed should be captured in detail in one document. As we proceed, you will see these answers coming out in this paper. As I proceed, you will hear the preliminary findings.

Preliminary Finding: *A deep and broad investigation into the activities of Soviet officials in North Vietnam during the years of the Vietnam War has yielded no credible evidence to date that American prisoners of war were taken from North Vietnam to the former Soviet Union.*

Dr. Pikhoya: Are we going to examine the issue of American deserters who came to the Soviet Union?

Congressman Peterson: That is captured in one of our interviews. It's in the document as part of some of the interviews, but it's not considered part of our investigation.

Dr. Pikhoya: You don't want to be sidetracked by minor information?

Mr. Pokrovsky: We don't consider it a minor issue. The co-chairmen of both sides have said many times that they consider people who voluntarily crossed the border in another direction, of their own choice, to be outside the scope of what we're looking for.

Dr. Pikhoya: I understand.

Congressman Peterson: For the short term, the U.S. side continues to believe that interviews with former KGB Officers, MFA Officers, and GRU Officers are important (by contrast, the American side of the commission has interviewed an ample number of military veterans with service in North Vietnam). Though there is no evidence that they are concealing the transfer of American prisoners, such interviews provide the best insight on what did, and did not occur in North Vietnam concerning the most critical questions of the American POW issue.

I want to make special note that no witnesses from the KGB have appeared before the commission. Given

that the KGB is the subject of most founded or unfounded accusations regarding American POWs in Vietnam, it would be helpful to the commission to get the testimonials of former KGB officers in Vietnam in response to the four critical areas of investigation before the Vietnam Working Group.

In the long term, the question regarding the transfer of prisoners to the former Soviet Union should still be the first question in every interview and line of investigation, for as long as the USRJC continues to function. Our experience has shown that with every interview, our understanding of the Soviet position vis-a-vis American prisoners improves - and with the investigation of every lead or allegation, we learn even more, not only about what did occur, but about what did not occur. Though this issue has not been investigated to a definitive conclusion, a great deal of positive work has been done to dispel the myths and assumptions of the Soviet role in North Vietnam.

Mr. Pokrovsky: If you please, I'd like to add just a few comments on the subject at hand. I feel that the question of having a KGB officer appear before the commission to be an important one. Our most effective work to date with interviews has been conducted with members of the International Department of the Communist Party [such as Glazunov], and members of the GRU. In fact in our last session in Moscow we spoke about an officer named Shport, and he has been successfully interviewed. When we spoke with Mr. Kobaladze of the External Relations Department, he said he knew the names of at least six officers who had served in Vietnam.

Nechiporenko was the officer who went in 1973 to conduct the interview with Webber, which has always been a case outside the scope of the commission, a case which has been resolved to mutual satisfaction. In order to perhaps save time, I can show you the interview with Mr. Kobaladze where we spoke of a specific list of officers who served in Vietnam from 1966 to 1972. We're very appreciative of the remarks by Mr. Nechiporenko, but I have tried in portions of the analysis to demonstrate that it would be very important to the working group to have a KGB officer who served in Vietnam during the critical war years to answer, for the record to the working group, on critical issues such as participation in interrogations and so on, questions that arise from public perceptions of Soviet activity in Vietnam.

Dr. Pikhoya: I think it is reasonable.

Congressman Peterson: I would add that without KGB input into the analysis, there will always be doubt as to its accuracy.

Colonel Mazurov: What contribution can be made by those agencies that remained after the KGB broke up?

Congressman Peterson: We're talking about interviewing people who served in Vietnam during a critical period of the war. Regardless of the reorganization in Russia, the facts of their experiences can help us. I think that to get the kind of witnesses necessary to fill this void, it will require a great deal of work on the part of our Russian colleagues here at this table to get those people to come forward. I hope my colleagues on the Russian share our view as to the importance of this.

Ambassador Tomsen: When we finished our talks in Moscow at the last plenary, I flew to Hanoi. I also went to Phnom Penh and Vientienne. My main topic was MIAs on each stop. To reinforce what the Congressman just said, in Vietnam there is no credibility to what is done unless the security and intelligence services are involved in providing the information. The Vietnamese have agreed to establish, in the Ministry of Interior, a group that has tentacles down to the local level. They will contact people who have information and documents. I met the Vice Minister of Interior, and he has set up these teams that go down to the local level. We are anxiously looking forward to results from these investigations, that will involve security and intelligence from around the country, and who also have documents on what happened. So we expect to get information and we will not proceed in a robust way on normalization until we get it.

Let me mention once more something Ambassador Toon and Congressman Peterson have said from time to time. Our objective is not to look behind the veil at the KGB or Russian intelligence services to get

information on sources and methods, things any intelligence agency would not want to divulge. Our work is humanitarian. To the extent you can help us with witnesses and documents without compromising the parts that you don't want to show, we will make a lot of progress.

Congressman Peterson: As the saying goes, history is always written easier when all participants of the period are dead. We are tasked with writing current history. To do it properly and accurately, we must gather evidence from the people who were there - it is very important. Again I appeal to the Russian side to help us in getting individuals from the KGB before the commission who will be able to help us fill out the voids in our information.

Colonel Mazurov: Primakov in Moscow met the two Senators in February, 1992, and two KGB people were invited. In addition, there was the man in charge of the KGB representation in Hanoi -- in other words, the person who was in charge.

Mr. Carluccio: I was there for both of those meetings in 1992. Perhaps we can discuss it during the break, but there were some issues that required follow-up.

Colonel Mazurov: Please come out specifically with all the details of that meeting so we can continue working on this issue. We're prepared to answer your questions, just give us specific questions.

Mr. Carluccio: We are attempting to do that.

Congressman Peterson: I would like to ask Dino (Mr. Carluccio) also [to provide these records]; we have no record copy of that. **Mr. Pokrovsky**: With deference to the remarks of Mr. Mazurov, there's a good chance I'll have to work with my colleague in Moscow and go back over some of those tracks.

Congressman Peterson: The main point though, and I know [Mr. Mazurov] that you are a great defender of the security services, we have not exhausted the opportunities that exist for us to investigate on our humanitarian mission. I reiterate that this document, or any other we create, will have no credibility unless we have all the players cooperating in it.

Colonel Mazurov: Let me mention again that I represent only the external intelligence services and I can be responsible only for the documents in their possession.

Dr. Pikhoya: One little item, and this is a bureaucratic issue. I want to say everyone is correct here. The commission was organized in July, 1992. For that reason, the documents on this meeting in early 1992 have not been reflected in the commission materials. So for that reason, one should have either a new meeting, or should find the old materials.

NOTE: Following the morning break, Congressman Peterson resumed reading the Executive Summary.

Congressman Peterson: QUESTION 2: Did any organization or individual of the Soviet government have direct contact with American POWs in North Vietnam during the years of the Vietnam War?

Preliminary Finding: *A deep and broad investigation into the activities of Soviet officials in North Vietnam during the years of the Vietnam War has shown that the Soviets conducted in-depth, intensive and focused intelligence gathering against the American target in Vietnam - but no credible evidence exists to date that American prisoners of war were interrogated or directly exploited in North Vietnam by officials of the former Soviet Union.*

For the short term, the U.S. side continues to believe that interviews with former KGB Officers, MFA Officers, and GRU Officers are important. Though there is no evidence that they are concealing direct contact with American prisoners, such interviews provide the best insight on what did, and did not occur in North Vietnam concerning the most critical issues of the American POW issue. We are particularly interested in pursuing an opportunity to interview Boris Nikolayevich Ponomaryev, whose key position in the International Department of the CPSU makes him potentially very knowledgeable on the key

questions before the working group.

Dr. Pikhoya: We can give you his telephone number; it's available in any academic listing. I think the American side should contact him by themselves because we have no contacts with former Politburo members, and because I know the American side has good experience in interviewing former Party members. I know this type of work is done by the Hoover Institute. Perhaps they will be more useful to you.

Congressman Peterson: We will take that into consideration. We appreciate your comments. In the long term, the question regarding direct contact with American prisoners should be asked of every potential witness. In some interviews conducted in the past, this question has led to discussion of former Soviet officer knowledge of specific incidents of loss. Though this issue has not been investigated to a definitive conclusion, a great deal of positive work has been done to dispel assumptions about the Soviet role in North Vietnam.

We're to the point of investigating QUESTION 3: What information is available in Soviet archives regarding names, numbers, status, fates, and policies regarding repatriation of American prisoners of war in North Vietnam?

Preliminary Finding: *Searches conducted in Russian archives to date have failed to produce any significant documents regarding names, numbers, status, fates and policies regarding American prisoners of war in North Vietnam. Documents provided to date strongly suggest that Soviet interest in American prisoners of war was tangential, and not direct, among Soviet information gathering priorities.*

For the short term, efforts should continue to examine any records, no matter how remote, of the former-Soviet structure that may plausibly contain information, direct or tangential, concerning American prisoners of war. Current initiatives include the following search requests for any information on American POW:

1. The Russians have accepted a request to search the records of the 10th Directorate of the Soviet General Staff for the years of the Vietnam War.

2. The Russians are searching for documents from all organizations of the Soviet government involved with the war in Vietnam for instructional communication or correspondence to Soviet officials in Vietnam that detail policies of what Soviet officials can, and cannot do, vis-a-vis American prisoners.

3. The Russians have accepted a request to search the records of PVO [Air Defense] units and institutions, both those that participated in North Vietnam, as well as those in the Soviet Union who benefitted from the "lessons learned" of the war.

Dr. Pikhoya: I would like to clarify. It seems the main issue of POWs is obscured here. These are technical issues. Any technical issues are of value only in specific cases. If the question concerns people, some editorial work is needed on the question. You're talking about the locations of air defense units in Vietnam?

Congressman Peterson: You will see here from some of the information we've derived from the air-to-air contact (fighter on fighter), that we've been able to correlate precisely the times, dates and place of American losses. We're interested only in data on specific loss incidents.

Dr. Pikhoya: Perhaps the Congressman's formulations should be recorded here. **Congressman Peterson**: We're specifically looking for information from the triple-A, that is the anti- aircraft artillery units, because we haven't heard from that side in the same way as we have from the aviation side. We could redefine that question with more precision.

Mr. Pokrovsky: I would like to make a remark if I could. The preparation of this document occurred right up until Friday. There are other probable references in here that may not clearly enough specify that

in every request, only core questions apply and only answers concerning POWs are sought.

Dr. Pikhoya: This is why I understand it to be a simple editorial issue.

Congressman Peterson: And that of course is exactly why we're making it.

Number 4. Requests from previous plenary sessions included requests to examine records of the Soviet Red Cross, MFA participants in international observer groups, MFA international law departments, and the records of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 5. The Russians have agreed to a request to examine the records on American equipment taken from North Vietnam to the Soviet Union, in search of information regarding the fates of the aircrews or prisoners associated with the equipment. This request also applies to manuals and documents taken for technical exploitation by the Soviets, and which may bear names, flight information, and other data relating to Vietnam War losses.

For the long term, this issue will likely remain unresolved during the period of transition - from a direct issue within the work of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission to a historical question for historians and scholars. No different than the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War is nearing the point where scholars, historians, and participants will be ready to write the true history of the war. Much of this effort will be based on new access to both Russian and American archives: some opened by a new sense of openness, others declassified by the effects of time. Current efforts include the Cold War International History Project, and seminal works such as "The Vietnam War and Soviet-American Relations" by Ilya Gaiduk of the Institute of Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences.

The final word on this issue is the need for balance. Both sides have consistently pledged their efforts to support the mutual work done by the Vietnam Working Group. For the American side, this means continuing to focus the search as narrowly and precisely as possible so as not to stretch the sparse resources available to the Russians. As for the Russian side, it is hoped that the searches are conducted as thoroughly as possible, with thought given to the likelihood that the documents sought will not be identified by the name on the file folder.

Dr. Pikhoya: I think this is correct.

Congressman Peterson: I think we'll stop now. I think on this particular question, the archives, we have not investigated this issue with the intent to prove what we've already got. It's been a very professional, factual search. And for that I think the commission needs to be commended. As an archivist, you know it's easy to find documents to prove what you want without looking at the whole picture. We want the whole picture.

NOTE: Following a lunch break, Congressman Peterson resumed reading of Executive Summary.

Congressman Peterson: We left off on QUESTION 4. What information is known to Soviet citizens that may improve American understanding and analysis of specific incidents of loss in North Vietnam?

Preliminary Finding: *Information from Russian archives and witnesses has substantially added to American understanding of certain events surrounding specific incidents of loss over North Vietnam.*

For both the short and long term, this area of investigation should not only remain open, but should also be pursued vigorously throughout the life of the commission and beyond.

Dr. Pikhoya: As long as these investigations in particular can yield information concerning third countries, namely China and Vietnam.

Congressman Peterson: That's what Ambassador Tomsen was talking about earlier. The Vietnamese have agreed to set up a special commission within the Interior Ministry to conduct those kinds of interviews. Though it is impossible to expect that the commission can interview every former Soviet veteran of the war in Vietnam, there are methods by which knowledgeable witnesses can be identified and

interviewed. These include working with veterans' organizations, using print media to elicit information, and acquiring leads from the continued search for relevant documents. Success is measured by the resolution of cases for the families of missing men - and therefore, it is this line of investigation that holds the most potential for achieving results that reflect the highest aims of the U.S.- Russia Joint Commission.

That concludes the Executive Summary and we leave it now in your hands to analyze the work we've done. But as you can see, we have achieved a great deal, and both the results of our work to date, and the work to be done in the future, are taking shape.

I ask you to remember that success for our working group will only be achieved by conducting a complete and thorough investigation of the issue. We will not be praised for our investigation, no matter how well done, if it has not been followed through to the last lead, document or witness. I think it's noteworthy that we won't be praised in any event.

Dr. Pikhoya: I'm afraid you're right.

Congressman Peterson: Emotions run very high on this issue. There are those who would like to find materials to support an already-established position. The opportunities for the conspiracy scenario will continue to exist. Nevertheless I ask you to redouble your efforts to seek information in documents on key issues, and to help find witnesses who can provide testimonials on the events of the Vietnam War that concern our commission.

We want very much that at some point in time this document will represent the true work of the commission -- a document that would be credible in the eyes of historians, academicians, and most important to the families of the missing persons. We're not there yet. With your help and your analysis we have the potential to move ahead and in the future to do very constructive work.

That concludes my initial presentation. We've agreed to get together at the hotel where we will hold the plenary session, one hour early at nine o'clock on Wednesday morning. And tomorrow we will work on the trip to Aberdeen to establish our statement to the plenary for the closing plenary session. I'm interested in hearing your remarks on Wednesday. And with that I'll stop and thank you for your patience and your comments, which were very constructive. I'll ask my colleagues if they have anything to add.

Dr. Pikhoya: I'll also ask my colleagues for comments.

Colonel Klokov: My impression is that the commission has been working for two years and in principle the work is very clear. The fact is that the U.S. side underlines the fact that after interviews with witnesses, this document will acquire a new quality. I'm afraid it will not necessarily lead to that, but I think we should take advantage of it. In principle, it would be better to say that that would confirm the view of the commission.

Mr. Pokrovsky: Just to respond to what Colonel Klokov said, we never tried to portray that there was something new and phenomenal to be gained in our interviews, but I would like to offer that there are some interviews and some lines of research that are extremely important to insure that our investigation is complete and thorough, and only with that will we gain the appropriate credibility behind our investigation. This is important, particularly so that the public, that we are responsible to, is well served.

Congressman Peterson: I believe that rather than a new dimension, we're talking about completed staff action. The final part of that is that with a completed staff action comes credibility. A case in point is the meeting that was held with KGB personnel prior to the formation of the Joint Commission. And a further analysis of information gained through our organizations that focus on Vietnam, in order to compare our analysis with theirs.

One of the things I want to reiterate today, aside from the request for witnesses, is the danger one has in searching archives. That danger is to assume that one could go through an index and find the series of documents they want. It would seem that the investigators for the information we're looking for would

have to be very creative. It's more likely that we'll find more information, as we do in the POW issue in the former Soviet records, by accident, rather than what we will find through direct research. As I recall even some of our witnesses so far have said that they submitted reports from Vietnam back to Moscow that we've still not found. I think we have a lot of potential here to improve the investigation's credibility, and that is ultimately our objective.

Dr. Pikhoya: I assume that today's meeting was extremely important historically, but I'm afraid if we use the word historical, it would be redundant. You've already used it in reference to the Congress and the Senate [reference to the 1994 Congressional elections].

Congressman Peterson: Is my "historical" more important than your "historical" (laughter)?

Dr. Pikhoya: The Congressman expressed this same view as they have a right to do. I'm a humble civil servant and I will continue to be so. These first pages are a very responsible effort to provide a political and moral dimension to our work. Probably it reflects the results of the past two years. And turning this page, I agree that we should exclude every possible alternative version of events by investigation. What I mean to say is that alternate theories are excluded, because specific facts are more important than anything. I feel there is a reason to return to some of the facts, and to have Mazurov organize some of the meetings for interviews. In a number of cases, these meetings provide information ahead of what's in the archives. But in the process of finalizing the document, we may find some additional information that comes from the archives that may prove to be very important.

I would like to express my appreciation for the very careful work from the American side, and we will attempt to make a superficial analysis by Wednesday. Some statements have already been made. The main work is still ahead of us, in the area of studying these materials and finalizing them. I'd be happy if there were two headings on this document by the next meeting, one of the U.S. side and one of the Russian side.

Congressman Peterson: Yes, and that's exactly why we're making this presentation today. I will tell you, to be honest, I'm somewhat disappointed that we couldn't be reporting more than we are in this document.

Dr. Pikhoya: Be kind to yourself until Wednesday.

Congressman Peterson: We shall do that. And now I must go. I have a meeting . . .

Colonel Mazurov: I would like the U.S. side to reformulate paragraph two on page six where it discusses Yeltsin's visit in 1992. For me and all the other Russians, he is the chief military leader in Russia.

Congressman Peterson: I'm going to let you deal with this, Nick, because I'm going to have to go. I apologize but I have another meeting. (Congressman leaves)

Colonel Mazurov: In the American press, the statement was published without the word "if". His statement was that "if there is even one POW in the Soviet Union I will do everything in my power to return him. This word "if" indicates the conditionality of the situation, and the American press left it out. I will permit myself to return to the example that forced Yeltsin to make this statement. Twenty-four hours before Yeltsin made the statement in Congress, there was a telephone call for Yeltsin from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to check whether an American named Markin was in Camp #5 in Pechora. So a day before his presentation, this call came in, and in the evening of the same day a telegram arrived from the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Pokrovsky: We know this case very well and I think I can find a shorter path to what you're looking for.

Colonel Mazurov: This information was hidden from us in spite of the fact that meetings took place from the twenty-ninth of May to the second of June of 1992. If we had had this information in time, we would have taken care of it.

Mr. Pokrovsky: Let me offer to you the following. When you have a specific and well-written translation of this document into Russian, it is my belief that you will find that the discussion is not the statement by President Yeltsin. The discussion over three or four paragraphs is the anxiety over the headlines in the newspapers and how it has complicated perceptions of the issue. No one associated with this issue has ever suggested anything dishonorable on the part of President Yeltsin. I grant absolutely that we should make some editorial changes to this paragraph to insure that it is clear to everyone. Perhaps there is a way to say it clearer than it's written in it's current way.

Dr. Pikhoya: It's not an issue about the report, but about the atmosphere in which it originated.

Ambassador Tomsen: Again, as the Congressman said, it is a draft. Please come up with the rewording as you see fit.

Mr. Carluccio: I just wanted to say to Colonel Mazurov, I can understand his concerns. I will simply state, because I know how Senator Smith feels about some of the things we've discussed. He was directly involved and followed closely the remarks of Yeltsin and the timing of his remarks in relation to the Markin case -- when he addressed Congress, when he spoke to the Dateline program on the plane ride on the way over. I can understand your concerns.

I will just conclude by saying that I saw this report for the first time this morning and I would say that it truly is a draft report and I would say that Senator Smith would take strong exception with several statements in this report as currently written . That's why we need to go through this process to make sure that we are dealing with all the facts before the Vietnam Working Group. It's fine to use this as a basis to stimulate discussion on these issues, but in no way do we support all the statements in this, as well at this point. So there is concern on both sides.

Ambassador Tomsen: Mr. Pikhoya, you've spoken very eloquently. Do you want to end this session?

Dr. Pikhoya: I'd be happy to conclude this session by stating that results have been achieved. The results are that we have come closer to resolving the goals that were placed before us in the early 90s. I would like to congratulate those who worked on this paper and wish success to both sides.

Second Session - Vietnam Working Group (Meeting reconvened at 9:00 a.m., 7 December 1994)
Congressman Peterson: As we ended our session on Monday, we agreed to meet early today prior to the plenary for the Russian side to make further comments.

Dr. Pikhoya: The Russian side has directed our efforts to a number of issues discussed on the Vietnam situation. Several avenues can be discussed. The first avenue is direct reference to documents on a high level of Soviet leadership. The second issue is the possibility of associating items of American technology with human beings. The third is the search for documents in the Russian archives on the Vietnam side.

As far as item one is concerned, we continually study and search for documents at a high level of Soviet leadership. These documents have been perused by Colonel Osipov and I have personally studied these documents in the archives.

Congressman Peterson: Is your research widespread enough in academia and other research groups in Russia so that if a researcher happened on a document, would they know to notify you of its discovery?

Dr. Pikhoya: These issues are alive today because of the position of the Vietnamese leadership. The Vietnamese are nervous when a secret document is declassified and becomes public in Russia. But your question is extremely meaningful in terms of what we were talking about at the last session. So if we attempt to conduct a thorough scientific search, by all means we will make these documents public.

The type of materials available from negotiations between Brezhnev and the Vietnamese Defense Ministry -- the issue of POWS -- was not raised in these talks, and that to me is a problem. Nevertheless we are prepared to review all these materials and prepare an index and an assessment of these talks. It is

important to highlight this problem because the problem of Vietnamese POWs was not as important to the Vietnamese as the problem with the Chinese. We raised the issue of creating a formal group of Soviet military advisors from the Soviet military specialists stationed there, and there also, in talks, this subject was not considered at all.

On the second issue of captured American technology, one could assert that the situation is identical to what we saw yesterday (referring to the trip to Aberdeen Proving Grounds) -- a lot of iron, but no people. Yesterday's visit was interesting in that sense -- a lot of technology was mentioned but no mention of human beings. The third aspect . . .

Congressman Peterson: May I interrupt? The equipment we saw yesterday, as you say, was interesting. We clearly had no lead on who may have operated that equipment on some battlefield. But like the equipment you have, you use the term "iron." The iron has serial number identification. I took the liberty of pulling the serial number off one of the T-55 tanks that was there yesterday. The intent is that with that number, you could go back to your manufacturer and through the transactions, perhaps tell us who the human beings were who were operating that equipment on the battlefield. And what we're looking for with the American iron, is to take those serial numbers that you allow us to have and conduct an analysis as to where those pieces of equipment were at the time of the battle, and perhaps ultimately link that to one of our missing persons.

Colonel Osipov: I'd like to clarify this question. We never denied the fact that serial numbers can be used to establish the person operating it. Although it's very complicated, it's theoretically possible. Therefore, we've made it a practice to give the American side all the serial numbers or tags off American planes that we get. As far as Korean field technology is concerned, we've managed to give you a lot of serial numbers. Now we've managed to find a few items on Vietnam as well, but not very many.

I must say that we don't have a collection of captured equipment and technology as we saw yesterday. But as far as even transmitting an entire airplane, we were not able to find the airplane because apparently it was disassembled and thrown away. So we'll continue to do everything we can to find such numbered items, but, I repeat, it will be very difficult.

Dr. Pikhoya: I'd like to state again that we have every intention to continue this work, searching for such items, but it's very complex. Whether it's used for scientific or teaching purposes I must say it is decentralized. For example, if you have two planes, why do you need a third? If you have an intact plane, why do you need parts? The young sergeant we talked to yesterday said you have $17 million worth of materials there. For us now, in our case, it is nothing but scrap iron. Yet at the same time your question is absolutely justified. We must continue to work on this issue.

The third issue, as I mentioned before, is the search for information found by our intelligence people working either for Vietnam, or against the Vietnam target. In this connection, we do have some information that we're working hard on comparing, testing and verifying right now. It was made available maybe a week before our departure. These are based on the potential existence of Soviet translations from Vietnamese of interrogations with American military personnel, interrogations of American military officers, which is actually a translation from a translation. It confirms what we were talking about yesterday. It is actual proof of the fact that the Soviets did not have anything to do with these American officers, since in order for the information to be obtained by the Soviet side, it had to be translated from Vietnamese.

Colonel Osipov: I'm working on it right now. Let me make it clear that we don't have these materials in our hands. What we do have is just the statement that such materials might be in existence.

Congressman Peterson: Are these the questionnaires that we were led to believe existed and we had made a search for previously? The questionnaires that Soviet advisors would create and give to the Vietnamese as part of the interrogation process?

Dr. Pikhoya: We can answer that question after we locate the documents.

Colonel Osipov: It is very possible that they are these particular ones but we haven't seen them yet. All we know is that we were told . . . We have in writing a statement that it might be possible to have access to these materials in the future.

Congressman Peterson: Do you have any idea of the volume of these documents that might be available?

Colonel Osipov: No. We understand that it is so-called disseminated or spread information. In other words, as far as we know, the information is not located where it should be located. From what we see, this occurrence was not something that was permanent. It was one episode. We do not wish to repeat what we said the last time. The last time we spoke of how the Vietnamese side constantly obstructed us from doing this kind of work. There were many complaints from Soviets doing this kind of work.

Congressman Peterson: Was this discovery a result of your declassification efforts?

Dr. Pikhoya: No. It's been the result of persistent efforts to obtain these materials. When we have these materials, they will of course be declassified.

Congressman Peterson: This is a very important discovery because it may contain names of individuals. Do you have any idea of the timeframe that you may have access to those documents?

Dr. Pikhoya: I'm afraid of making assertions now, but before our next serious meeting they should be available. If we have these documents, we will be able to inform the American side in a working mode. Maybe we shouldn't wait until our next meeting.

Congressman Peterson: I agree.

Dr. Pikhoya: And we're looking at this material as a chance to complement the documents that you have.

Congressman Peterson: It's interesting that you mentioned they're located in places where they shouldn't be located. Would it be logical to assume that you discovered these in civilian channels rather than military channels?

Colonel Osipov: You see, the situation is the following. And this at the same time applies to your former question. There are three types of archives where Vietnam materials may be available: diplomatic or foreign policy archives, military archives, and archives of the higher leadership of the country. We have agreements with the directors of all three types of archives. We have an agreement that if a request comes into one of these archives from anyone at all, these documents have to be reported to us. This is in connection with this type of work. And in reply to your question directly, it was found in the military archives.

Dr. Pikhoya: And I might say this was a direct result of our organizational efforts.

Ambassador Tomsen: As someone involved in activities in Vietnam to discover the fate of MIAs, I'd like to reinforce the Congressman's point that this type of document is very useful for our efforts. Some of them may involve a flyer whose remains we've already discovered and been repatriated to the family. What you find may be another piece of the puzzle which may lead to new discoveries.

Dr. Pikhoya: As we say in Russia, anything can happen.

Ambassador Tomsen: I agree, and we hope you can give us as much as possible from your files.

Dr. Pikhoya: We wouldn't be sitting at this table if we weren't doing so.

Congressman Peterson: And it's important enough not to wait for the next plenary. You can work with our representatives in Moscow.

Dr. Pikhoya: Yes I think it's possible. I'd now like to draw attention to the aspect relating to the continuation of this work. Of course work will continue with the archives of all three groups. Yesterday afternoon I consulted with Colonel Mazurov, and General Krayushkin of the Federal Counterintelligence Service of Russia.

With this I'd like to draw attention to an avenue that the American side is not considering, but is still promising. I'd like to make a proposal. Here in the United States you have a large Vietnamese emigre community. It is natural to assume that most of these people here are from the southern part of Vietnam, but they could have contacts in the north and probably have relatives in North Vietnam. And we all know that Vietnamese from North Vietnam show up now. I don't know how efficiently interviews could be conducted in North Vietnam right now; you know better than we do, but here in the United States you could obtain this information in a much simpler way than we could.

The second aspect deals with the very ticklish issue of informing the public. We are fully aware of the dramatic nature of this entire search. There are certain traditions and stereotypes. Ask any journalist and they will tell you exactly where the POWs are located. Compared to us, they know exactly. They will tell you American POWs are located in Siberia and trained bears are watching over them. I propose that we recommend the establishment a scientific conference to provide serious realistic information to the public. Perhaps it's desirable to include such a project into our general agenda. That's all I have to say.

Colonel Osipov: If you permit me, I'd like to add a few words. On the continuation of the work we discussed, I'll be in charge of organizing it in Moscow. We'll be organizing work as we discussed. The second avenue is to set up meetings with a couple of people who could have been the ones to transport the documents, and to tell the truth, were KGB members at that time. Mr. Krayushkin already agreed that he will do everything in his power to help in setting up such meetings. And it is possible this will draw wider circles of informed persons to this issue. That may give us a chance to take a fresh look at these things, since we may have become accustomed to the old approach. The issue of witnesses is very difficult. For example, I can show you about Korotkov [witness within the Korean War Working Group]. We found eight people related to Korea and Professor Korotkov came up with the statement that these people really were not . . .

Mr. Pokrovsky: Correction [in the American translation]. The witnesses testified to the fact that Korotkov was not who he said he was. He was a journalist for a military newspaper and not the commander of a section he claimed to be in the interview where he claimed to know about the transfer of American pilots.

Congressman Peterson: We thank the Russian side for their continued cooperation. It seems both sides have become more comfortable with the professional intent and level of credibility of all Joint Commission members. This has allowed us to be more creative, as you have noted with your recommendations here today. And if I might, I'd like to ask Nick to reply to the one question that had to do with the Vietnamese interviews.

Mr. Pokrovsky: I'm going to make several comments. I'll make them very short. We have documents from 1970 provided by the Russian side, where Ambassador Shcherbakov [former Soviet Ambassador to North Vietnam] discusses having discussions with the Vietnamese about policies regarding prisoners. Therefore, I'd like to highlight that your proposal to at least index and survey the foreign policy documents governing the discussions between Soviet officials and the Vietnamese would be very important to add an important dimension to the paper we propose to refine together.

Second I'd like to propose that the materials of which Mr. Osipov spoke,... We have theorized about Vietnamese passing interrogation materials to the Soviets many times. I recommend that we enjoin Captain First Rank Sivets of the GRU, given that the record was in the military archive, to help us in the search.

Colonel Osipov: He has always been involved.

Mr. Pokrovsky: And there are other historical references that show that the KGB in latter years received the information from these reports for their purposes, and, therefore, I recommend that we not forget the civil intelligence side in again looking for the traces of these documents.

A third very short point is that the Defense POW-MIA office, the office that specializes in the Southeast Asian conflict, has done substantial work with Vietnamese refugees on the subject of United States POWs. I am errant in not having included an adequate review of that research in our initial work, but I will work to bring that into our work to answer these very legitimate lines of investigation.

And lastly, I would like to thank you for your efforts and I appreciate our informal discussions yesterday about having KGB officers interviewed for the record. I think this will add a very important aspect to our lines of investigation.

Congressman Peterson: Something just popped into my mind. We have always talked about American losses in Vietnam. We've never inquired actually if the Soviets had losses in Vietnam. And in fact, if any of those individuals were or are still missing.

Dr. Pikhoya: I'm very thankful for discussing this issue. We started looking at this problem much deeper. Mr. Osipov is going to speak to it now.

Colonel Osipov: It is true there were MIAs on both sides. I regret to say that our archival system does not make it possible to establish this information very rapidly. We will hand over to the U.S. side a list of such people with a request to help us. A list of 46 Russian officers who disappeared all over the world, but primarily in Europe. About 30 Russian flyers disappeared in Korea and of these 46 I'm sure there were a couple who disappeared in Vietnam; however, I'm not sure of the numbers. Within the next two months, work on compiling this will be finished, and we will turn over this list to the U.S. side with the greatest appreciation for your assistance.

Congressman Peterson: We've just never really talked about it in our previous meetings, but I think it bears important fruit to address this as we go through our investigations. And we'll assist in any way we possibly can. And now we really need to prepare a report to the closing plenary by this working group.

Dr. Pikhoya: I think that the basis for such a report would be the report prepared by Mr. Pokrovsky, including all the necessary information. To add to it, we could say that we are going to work in the directions outlined here. That's number one, and number two to add what was stated by the U.S. side declaring its readiness to assist the Russian side in finding Russian MIAs.

Congressman Peterson: I agree. Clearly we'll have to include the information you've given us as to the potential discovery of new documents.

Dr. Pikhoya: Maybe it is to our advantage not to spread the news too broadly because good news should be stated once, when most of the facts are in.

Congressman Peterson: I agree. We won't go into detail but we will note that there may be an impending discovery. And that the Russian side has agreed to work energetically to set up a meeting with some intelligence service individuals in Moscow in the near future.

Dr. Pikhoya: That of course can be included. If Mr. Mazurov were here, he would say that the intelligence service is always prepared. This is why we should never say continuing . . .

Congressman Peterson: Let us just say that valuable new witnesses will be interviewed. We then will follow this line. We will have a text prepared and in your absence, if you could assign someone to check and coordinate the final text.

Dr. Pikhoya: I'll ask Osipov, and Vladlen and Ms. Krivova can help.

Congressman Peterson: It is very important that we set a date, for a goal, so that on our next visit to Moscow in the Spring, that we have done as complete an analysis of this document (preliminary analysis) as possible. There will be editing on both sides.

Dr. Pikhoya: I would like to name this date. I propose June and I'd like to explain why. That makes possible working group meetings on any one of the issues touched on here prior to the meeting in Moscow. I'm sure that on both sides there will be a celebration of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. All people in our commission will be involved in a whole series of activities related to this event. This is why I feel it would be wiser to have this meeting in June so we could work in peace.

Congressman Peterson: I concur and I know there will be massive preparations for that event. But this is something that in this working group we must table until the plenary this morning at which Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov will establish the next date. And we will have an opportunity to make those recommendations.

Colonel Osipov: And so I could say from the Russian side the proposal will be made and it will be the same -- the very end of May or beginning of June. In a preliminary fashion, while we haven't even discussed that issue, it is interesting that totally separately, we came to the same conclusion.

Congressman Peterson: Ok, good.

Mr. Carluccio: Is it the proposal then that we are going to wait until Spring to present the more prepared, dynamic agenda to the full commission?

Dr. Pikhoya: Right now we will provide only preliminary information.

Congressman Peterson: We will only report to our colleagues on the entire commission that this report has been prepared, as a draft.

Colonel Osipov: And that it will serve as a basis for us in preparing our final text. We consider it the foundation for our final text.

Congressman Peterson: And that it is then open to comment?

Colonel Osipov: It should make it possible to let all the experts to become acquainted with this text, to obtain their remarks.

Ambassador Tomsen: In relation to joint field activities in Vietnam, we've just finished the 34th field operation. Nine of the Americans and more Vietnamese went to 15 sites, and we will continue these early next year. We would appreciate your accelerating your internal processes to give us the information on the possible interrogation reports as quickly as possible. It might relate to cases we are actually investigating.

Dr. Pikhoya: At the same time, I'd like to request you let us know about your work in Vietnam. I emphasize it is not our first request. A number of issues that arise there make it possible for us to understand what actually transpired. Because we can assert at this time that the volume of information we have does not make it possible for us to present the full picture. And it will make it possible for us understand what arose in the relationships between the Soviet Union, Vietnam and China within the context of POW issues.

Congressman Peterson: I was going to say we could do a briefing while you're here in town today. I know you're leaving, Mr. Pikhoya, but the rest of your staff could have a briefing Thursday.

Dr. Pikhoya: Yes of course, we could ask Mr. Korotkov, for example, how it is reflected in the presidential archives. And let us consider it in such a way that even though I will not be present, the group is very much in existence here.

Congressman Peterson: Let us because of time, we have to get out of here. We will work on the scheduling of this capsulized briefing, hopefully on Thursday.

Dr. Pikhoya: Yes, thank you.

Eleventh Plenary Session U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on Pow/MIAs Closing Plenary December 9, 1994 Washington, D.C.

Ambassador Toon: I'd like to call the meeting to order now. General, it is good to see you again. I look forward to our final session. I am in the chair, as has been the custom in the past. The procedure today will be for me to make a statement and for you to make a statement. Then, General, we will call for comments from the Co-Chairmen of our working groups and then yours. Do you agree?

General Volkogonov: Yes.

Ambassador Toon: General Volkogonov, Members of the Russian delegation, Members of the American delegation. I will keep my remarks brief since we must leave this conference center by 11:00 in order to be at the Pentagon at 11:30 for our scheduled press conference.

As you know, General, in this country we are basically indentured servants answering to the press, and their representatives do not want to be kept waiting. In your country, as you move towards democracy, you will find this to be true in your relations with the press as well. And that may be the case right now.

With this Eleventh Plenary session, we have completed yet another stage in our joint mission to account for missing U.S. servicemen from World War II, the Cold War, and the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Although we had no major breakthroughs, we continued our steady progress. We feel the work of this plenary session was enhanced by the technical talks we held in November, and we propose that we continue this approach in the future. General, your colleagues have also had an opportunity to speak with family members of several of these servicemen. I know that the family members valued that meeting.

I understand that the newly-formed World War II Working Group got off to an excellent start and has laid a sturdy foundation for the initial report, which we hope to publish in May in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. This report will be not only a gesture to the memory of our service people who fought a common enemy fifty years ago, but will also serve to clear up questions that have remained unanswered for fifty years. I look forward to learning the results of archival work both our sides must accomplish in order to publish our report. It is clear that the vast amount of information that must be reviewed, as well as its incomplete nature, will complicate this task. I hope both sides will contribute the necessary energy and stamina to ensure success.

The Cold War Working Group continues to make steady progress. I look forward personally to reading the new reports being made available from the Border Guards Archives. The documents you provided us on American violations of Soviet airspace contribute to the documentation of our work. We thank you for your efforts to assist us in arranging another trip to Vladivostok to work on the July 29, 1953, shootdown case. We also appreciate your offer to help us develop additional contacts with witnesses in Murmansk and to gain access to cemeteries in that region. We thank General Kalinin once more for his assistance in our trips to camps and prisons.

Work in the Korean War Working Group also made progress. We thank you for the four sets of documents you gave us on aircraft shootdowns as well as for the two memoranda of conversation between Stalin and senior Chinese and North Korean officials. We will analyze them closely. We look forward to receiving the information you will give us on the air rescue helicopter that was delivered to Moscow. Since the Soviet Union had high technical interest in aircraft, and had anti-aircraft regiments in China and in North Korea, the working group agreed that the search for missing U.S. Air Force personnel should remain a priority topic for our future work.

We now understand more clearly which incidents involving your citizens most concern you. We will continue our efforts to find information on the 290 servicemen you still have listed as MIA from the war in Afghanistan. I hope that the computer disk we gave you with the translation of this 290 list and our work on it will be useful. Colonel Osipov has agreed to work with Colonel Biryukov on the condensed analysis of your list of 290 which we have prepared. If you could develop a list of priority cases, it will help me in my efforts to find out new information on your MIAs from Afghanistan.

We will also continue our work in the National Archives of copying documents we find in the course of our work which pertain to Russian citizens who are still unaccounted for from World War II. We will also do what we can to look into the cases of four of your citizens who are still unaccounted for from the Korean War and look forward to receiving Colonel Mazurov's revised list of Soviet citizens who are still unaccounted for from other incidents.

General, let me once again express our thanks and appreciation for your dedication as well as the dedication of your colleagues to this effort. For those who lost a loved one there is nothing more important than the noble mission you have committed yourselves to. On their behalf, we thank you for your work. I now yield the floor to you, General.

General Volkogonov: Thank you, Ambassador Toon. I appreciate your kind words. As we complete this session of our Commission, I would like to note that it is business-like and well constructed in nature as always. The atmosphere is most positive.

As we previously agreed, we worked along 4 lines of inquiry. I also agree that the newly-created working group on World War II did tremendous work in a short period. It seems to me that we have a task to find the overall, summary results. The formulation of these results will be of great importance to the U.S. side and will be of very great importance to Russian side. Soviet MIAs at that time were considered as if they did not exist. Remember when George Orwell said in his book, "A human being is there, but not there"? We had more than 1 million such persons. Permit me to assure you that our work will provide important results, not only for historians but for humanity as well.

As to the Korea Working Group, we presented a number of new documents. I presume that you will find the documents valuable as you become acquainted with them. These documents are indeed valuable, but the fact remains that, as far as material and witnesses, we have no clear finding of Americans on the territory of the Soviet Union. The material we have and are finding are references to fliers, not other types of personnel. I would like to say that, as Mr. Kalinin stated in the past months, we went through the card files of camps and psychiatric hospitals. We should concentrate work on the following:

Even though much time has passed, there are still some witnesses alive. We spoke to people who flew in Korea, advisors, consultants, etc., but not enough. Fortunately, I found out that some who worked on the General Staff of the Soviet Union and the Military Staff of the Far East Military District are still alive. I think it would be valuable to try to find out what we can from these people in the Far East and the 64th Fighter Air Corps.

Thanks to Ambassador Toon for mentioning that there were Soviet flyers who were shot down over the Korean Bay. We would be very interested.

As for the Vietnam Working Group, we think that the document which the U.S. calls "the 1205 document" is the key and we should concentrate on it. I propose that we make a list of those people who translated it from Vietnamese to Russian. They were trained in Hanoi and other places. We don't have many Vietnamese specialists. It should be easy to find these people as some of them should still be alive. Perhaps they can shed light on this. Perhaps, with the help of Colonel Mukhin and Colonel Semenec, we can determine the nature of the protocols, which we may or may not have, that were translated from Vietnamese to Russian. However, it appears to me that the basic key to the riddle is in Hanoi, not in Moscow.

As to the Cold War Working Group, you were given a number of documents from the Border Guards

Archives. It would be valuable to study these documents. The methodology of work should be the following:

1. Pursue a deeper analysis of the facts available.

2. Formulate results which bring facts together. At the same time ask the U.S. side to help us. We gave you several lists. We will give you an updated list of 290 from Afghanistan. Some people are in the West and some have not been found.

Then we are also asking for a list of people who disappeared in the Soviet Bloc countries. Did they go to the West? We don't know. Are they alive? It is not known. So that would be interesting for us.

We are very thankful to you for the list you gave us which records planes shot down over the Pacific Ocean. We would be very interested in some reports and some enciphered telegrams about your planes. We would be grateful. The session was fruitful.

Again, I would like to say that if there was any political discord between our countries, it has not affected our humanitarian efforts here. In principle, for our planet, this home of ours in space, it is necessary that politics go hand in hand with moral behavior. I agree with Ambassador Toon that we should continue as long as it is necessary. We will study all proposals and hope to have a meeting with Boris Ponomarev [former official of the International Department of the Communist Party]. I have met him, he is still an active old man. He knows as much as General Sudoplatov [former KGB officer and author thought to be involved with Vietnam], but will he talk? Ponomarev was an important party person. He knows much, but will he talk about American POWs?

As for the next plenary session, we agree with the proposal from the American side, but we would like to move it to a later date. Perhaps in February or March we could have a preliminary meeting and then in April have the plenary, closer to the 50th Anniversary of Victory in Europe Day.

And in conclusion, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Ambassador Toon, to our American colleagues, to my colleagues for a very pleasant, hospitable, cordial reception here in the capital city. I hope that the work of our commission will set the basic humanitarian tone for all of our relations. I'm sure that the historians of the future will note this particular aspect of our commission. We are destined to a partnership in history, and I am deeply convinced of that. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Toon: Thank you very much, General, for your remarks. And for your recommendations as to what our leaders should do in order to improve relations between our two countries. In other words, follow our example. Before calling on the Chairmen of the working groups, I would like to make a few remarks on some of the suggestions you made. Your suggestion as to how we might shed more light on the "1205" document was a very good one. I wish you the best in finding Vietnamese specialists. You are right in saying that the main work must be done in Hanoi, which we are doing now. Secondly, I do hope that it will be possible to meet with Mr. Ponomarev. Even if he does not have information on POWs, it will be interesting to talk with him, considering our backgrounds.

We should have a preliminary meeting at the working group- level in March. And depending on the results of that meeting we could set the plenary for April. This depends in large measure on the schedules of our congressional colleagues. But we can discuss the question of when the next meeting should be in diplomatic channels.

Now, General, with your permission I would like to call upon our Working Group Chairmen to briefly describe what they have accomplished over the past week. And then your people will comment on their presentations. To facilitate the process of translation, I would ask the Working Group chairmen to come to the head table.

Congressman Peterson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to report that the Vietnam working group conducted two days of working sessions, which I believe both sides will agree were highly productive.

And thank you for the recommendation on how to proceed with the "1205" document. There are still many unanswered questions, and anything we can do to answer them is worthwhile.

Mr. Chairman, several months ago in Moscow, I asked my Russian counterparts to redouble their efforts to search for both documents and witnesses to answer the most critical questions on Vietnam. Mr. Chairman, they have done so, and the results were reflected in our work.

The working group has identified new opportunities to conduct interviews with former Soviet officials who held sensitive positions in North Vietnam during the war. This includes the pending interview to be conducted with Boris Ponomarev, former official of the International Department of the Communist Party. Other important interviews with high-ranking security officials who served in Vietnam are also being arranged.

As for the search for documents, the Russian side reported that an extensive review of documents associated with equipment taken from North Vietnam to the Soviet Union has yielded no information on the fates of American service members. In their searches, however, the Russians have found a new document that may lead to other documents concerning American POWs in North Vietnam. This is an important new find, and our Russian colleagues have assured us that the search for new material is being conducted aggressively. Both sides agreed that when these documents are located, the Russian side will work with our team members at Task Force Russia in Moscow.

The American side presented the Russian side with a draft working paper designed to structure the work of the working group. The paper summarizes our nearly three years of work and provides preliminary assessments of the information gathered by the working group. More importantly, the paper summarizes the issues that remain open for investigation both in the short term and the long term. This paper might be thought of as a preliminary outline to the Vietnam War section of the report that will some day be written on the results of the commission's work. The report is a working document, a draft, and now is open to comments from all sides.

The Vietnam working group closed its work by agreeing to an aggressive plan to both search for documents, and to conduct interviews with witnesses over the coming weeks.

I would like to publicly thank the other members of the American side for their hard work and serious consultation that they have put into the work of the commission. And once again I would like to thank, very deeply, the Russian side for their sincerity and for their hard work in the search of new documents, and for their agreement to seek new witnesses to expand our work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have completed my report.

Ambassador Toon: Thank you, Congressman Peterson. General Volkogonov, before calling upon your side to make any comments that they may have on Congressman Peterson's presentation, I would like to make an announcement about the Press Conference. We now have more time than we anticipated when we came here this morning. The Press Conference has been changed from 11:30 to 12:15.

I would like to suggest that at 11:30 the staff, assistants, and analysts on the American side go to the front of this hotel to take a bus to the Pentagon.

And at 12:00 I would like the Russian side and the American Commissioners to meet at the front of the hotel to take the bus to the Pentagon.

Now, General, is there someone on your side that would like to comment on Congressman Peterson's presentation? I understand that Mr. Pikhoya has left the city.

General Volkogonov: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I agree and my colleagues agree with everything that was stated by Congressman Peterson. Taking into account what I said this morning and what was said by Congressman Peterson, there is really nothing more to add. I would say that we concentrate basically on three areas:

1. The 1205 list,

2. Making a list of the specialists who translated the "1205" list from Vietnamese to Russian, and

3. We should consider searching for answers in Vietnam.

Congressman Peterson: Mr. Chairman, the statement that I have presented to the commission had been coordinated with Mr. Pikhoya before his departure.

In general terms, at least, and we've stayed within that guideline that he agreed to.

Ambassador Toon: Then we can now move to the Korean War Working Group. Congressman Johnson.

Congressman Johnson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, General Volkogonov, my friends. I believe that the Korean War Working Group made good progress at this plenum. We received four sets of documents from the Russian side, which included four separate incidents of pilots and anti-aircraft shoot-downs and should provide us with new information in an attempt to resolve outstanding issues.

We are grateful for the presence of the representative on the Russian side of the Presidential Archives, as well as security representatives and found their input very useful. As a matter of fact, we received two memoranda concerning POWs, between Soviet leadership and the leader of China in North Korea. We put to rest, for the moment, the idea of separate secret bases in outer Russia with the exception of Tashkent, which is still on the table for investigation. We had an effective meeting with the families of the missing. Colonel Orlov, in particular, was very effective in answering their questions. We have come to the conclusion that -- and as I have stated before, Mr. Ambassador -- that the answers to Korea lie in China and North Korea. It is imperative that both of our countries work independently [with North Korea and China], because it is apparent that we can't work together to get into some meetings with those two nations to help resolve the North Korean problem. The Russian side also provided us with information on a captured helicopter. That information will be expanded upon by both sides in our next meetings. The staff on the American side as well as those commissioners here have enjoyed working with the Russian side. Our relationship, I think, has improved, and we look forward to working with Colonel Orlov and Colonel Mukhin in Moscow along with the security representatives. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Toon: Thank you, Congressman. General, would your side care to make a comment on the presentation by Congressmen Johnson?

General Volkogonov: I would like to call on Professor Orlov.

General Orlov: Ladies and Gentlemen, 50 years ago in these days in December, and then January, cooperation between our two countries was really at its highest. American forces were active in the Ardennes. Soviet Forces, as a result of the wishes of the Allies, moved out towards the Vistula River and over the Oder River and came up to Berlin. I am speaking about this victory because of the events yesterday at the meeting with the relatives, because, I must say, that both of our sides were also victorious yesterday. Our joint efforts made it possible to break the ice in our mutual relationship with the relatives and to put them at ease with respect to those who perished in Korea. In this way they became our allies and another iceberg of the Cold War melted. In order not to repeat what has been said by General Volkogonov and Congressman Johnson, I will mention only a few details. We received 6 documents from the American side. We are thankful that they help us in our work. Soon we'll hand over a list of 120 flyers who perished in Korea. We hope this list will help us determine the fates of some MIA flyers. We succeeded in clarifying several points concerning A. Tenney, R. Niemann and Colonel Lovell. We still have many differences in numbers, because of differences in the numbers appearing in lists presented to

the Commission. People's attention to numbers may be different. For example, Louis XIV, when going to war and saying goodbye to Madam Pompadour, would say, "Good-bye, my one and only." She would answer, "Good-bye, Louis, my fourteenth." As you see, there are differences in perceptions of numbers, but I am convinced that with joint efforts we will overcome this difficulty. At the next session we will provide more materials about the helicopter we discussed here earlier, and there will be witnesses. In conclusion I would like to express my thanks to Congressman Johnson, his new assistant Mark Franz, and especially Shannon Smith, who is unfortunately leaving. I wish you all the best. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Toon: Thank you, Professor Orlov. General, you didn't say you had a comedian in your delegation. The General and I have decided that we will take a 10-minute break now and then continue with the Cold War Group and the World War II Group afterwards.

BREAK

Ambassador Toon: I think we'll call the meeting to order. I'd like to start with the World War II Working Group and Dr. Trudy Peterson.

Dr. Peterson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The inaugural session of the World War II Working Group provides a firm beginning for a successful final product. I want to personally thank Colonel Osipov and the other members of the World War II Working Group for their openness and willingness to resolve World War II POW-MIA issues.

We commenced our meeting with a discussion of President Yeltsin's spring 1992 letter that stated 8 Americans were in Soviet prison camps and an additional 4 Americans were in held in Soviet psychiatric hospitals. Colonel Osipov agreed to look into this matter again in hopes of finding clarifying archival information. We discussed other archival issues regarding outstanding requests and ongoing research both related to WWII and previous inquiries that cut across all working groups.

The US side presented our Russian colleagues with a number of outstanding WWII issues that we feel must be resolved. I'm gratified that without exception our colleagues agreed to research these issues and provide us with any information available. We both agreed that the incompleteness of the records and the vast amount of the information available are going to make our task enormous.

Our Russian colleagues impressed upon us the rising desire of their countrymen to account for their missing loved ones. To this end, Colonel Osipov presented us with information regarding the horrendous losses that the Soviet Union suffered during WWII. We are thoroughly impressed with the sacrifice that the Russian people incurred in defeating fascism. The U.S. Side of the Joint Commission agreed to provide information from our ongoing archival research that may account for Russian citizens who did not return to their homeland. We are gratified that our Russian counterparts understand the nature of US privacy laws and in no way expect us to violate these as we provide information on missing military and civilian personnel.

Finally, we discussed the upcoming Fiftieth Anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe and the issuance of a report on World War II clarifying a number of issues. We will discuss the report format which the Russian side proposed and respond through Task Force Russia. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Toon: Thank you Dr. Peterson. General, I believe you wanted to say something?

General Volkogonov: Dear Mrs. Peterson, thank you very much for your presentation. I would like to express my solidarity with one of the issues you've raised. I understand the delicate issue of our question with respect to the so-called Displaced Persons. Two points: 1. I wouldn't want these people to be considered non-existent, dead, or as having disappeared and, due to the old regime, as still being considered non-existent. We would like to have the overall numbers of the people, former Soviet citizens in Western Europe, who are considered non-existent by the Russian Side, so that we would have a better idea of the numbers of people who perished in World War II. We know American legislation very well.

We have absolutely no intentions, other than humanitarian ones, for which we would like to have the overall numbers of these people.

Ambassador Toon: Thank you, General, for that clarification of your position. Colonel Osipov would like to take the floor.

Colonel Osipov: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I would like to express our appreciation to our American colleagues, and especially Trudy Peterson. I would like to express appreciation in the name of the Russian delegation and especially on the part of the tens of thousands of Russian mothers, wives and relatives who for more than 50 years have not heard anything about their relatives who disappeared in World War II. Your readiness to take upon yourself this very difficult task, but very noble task, makes us very happy. We had a very brief working session, but I can say that our basic aims have been reached, and I completely agree with Dr. Peterson. It would be fair to say that we came to an agreement to state at this meeting that we considered 3 basic areas:

1. In spite of the fact that more than 50 years have passed since the war, the problem of POWs and MIAs still exists and it becomes especially noticeable at this time when we're coming closer to this anniversary. For the American side, it's a matter of updating the figures of American citizens who are not accounted for. That number is about 22,000 military personnel. The Russian side is talking about more than a half a million of our citizens.

2. We came to an agreement that the documents available in the archives of both our countries make it possible to come much closer to determining the fate of these people.

3. We do have a chance to publish these materials by May, and we will make every effort to do so. The form of how it will be made public will be determined by us. Thank you.

Ambassador Toon: Thank you, Colonel Osipov. Now I think we'll have a report on the Cold War Working Group, with Mr. Denis Clift reporting.

Mr. Clift: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the Cold War Work Group, we are continuing to work hard. We are continuing to develop and pursue new lines of inquiry, including the identification of additional witnesses and participants who must be interviewed. We are continuing to develop new information both in these working group sessions and in the day-to-day contacts and field work between sessions. As this statement would indicate, our work is proceeding in a spirit of excellent cooperation. The Commission's two Co-chairmen have just mentioned some of the highlights of the Cold War Working Group's work over the past two days. The minutes we will produce from these meetings will provide a detailed account of our review of each Cold War case as well as an assessment of progress to date. There is important work still to be done, and we are in agreement with our Russian colleagues on the next steps to be taken. I wish to emphasize my appreciation to General Krayushkin, to General Kalinin, and to Colonel Osipov for their participation in the meeting with the families yesterday. There is no substitute for such face-to-face contact and dialogue as we continue to move ahead in our humanitarian work. Thank you.

Ambassador Toon: General, does your side wish to make a comment?

General Volkogonov: General Krayushkin.

Major General Krayushkin: We discussed in great detail and very carefully each case of shot down aircraft. Although we really made progress, we found that it is too early to finish our work and that it is necessary to make additional efforts in this direction. We were convinced of that after yesterday's meeting with the relatives of the American flyers who perished in these incidents. I was particularly impressed by the words of the mother of a flyer who perished in 1956. In spite of the fact that we have not been able to find anything in the archives, I promised her that we will make new efforts in order to find collaborating statements or witnesses in order to attempt to discover new materials. And this was not merely a promise. I really can tell you that we will make every effort to search in the archives again. We will focus on those facts where there are contradictions, not just among members of our group, but contradictory statements

of witnesses. What I have in mind are planes that were shot down in '52. As it was before, our primary focus will be to gather statements of witnesses, but we agreed to have new publications and statements on radio and television. We agreed on the trip to Vladivostok and to contact the editorial boards of our two newspapers, the independent newspaper called *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* and the *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*. For the time being, our efforts to find out anything about the remains of the flyer whose plane was shot down in 1960 yielded no results. I promised Ambassador Toon and Mr. Denis Clift to go through criminal files myself. And should there be any hints of materials we will present them to your side. We also handed to the American side a list of our MIAs who disappeared during that time, and we also specified or made absolutely certain what questions we are seeking replies for. We have the same views as far as how we should progress both from the moral and political point of view. In conclusion, I would like to thank Denis Clift and my American colleagues for a very fruitful and fine cooperative effort. I would like to thank my American friends for a very fine cordial reception and attention that was accorded us literally at every step of our stay here. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Toon: Thank you, General Krayushkin. General, that concludes the presentations of our four working groups. I think we have no other business on the schedule. We've agreed that a preliminary meeting will take place sometime in March and a possible plenary session sometime in April. We'll set the dates through diplomatic channels. Do you have anything to add, General?

General Volkogonov: Ambassador Toon, I share your views with respect to these meetings. We should have a preliminary in March and a plenary in April. I agree that we should and that we should arrange these meetings along diplomatic channels. As a member of the Presidential Commission, I will certainly report to the President, Boris Yeltsin, the impressive results that we have achieved in our work here. As a member of the Parliament, I will certainly convey all of this to our Speaker, Mr. Rybkin.

Ambassador Toon: Thank you, General Volkogonov. Now I would like to express my personal appreciation to all participants in this conference this week for their hard work, their contributions. The result, I think, has been a very useful week indeed. Finally, I would like to remind you that the American staff and assistants have to be at the front of the hotel at 11:30 and the rest of us at 12:00 for transportation to the Pentagon. Thank you again and we'll see all of you at dinner tonight.